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Minor Cinemas of Melancholy and Therapy 
Adam Szymanski, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2017 
Since the turn of the millennium, diagnostic rates of depression have skyrocketed to 
unprecedented levels across the globe, constituting a veritable mental health pandemic. During 
this same historical period, numerous art films have aesthetically explored the political and 
existential sense of depression. This dissertation selects five of these films as case studies, and 
closely analyzes how they use the aesthetic resources of the “cinema of poetry” tradition to 
critically perceive the experience of depression in a manner that breaks from psychiatry’s clinical 
gaze and the diagnostic models that it serves to support. By perceiving the depression pandemic 
through a critical lens which shifts its focus from the clinical individual onto the field of 
subjectivity production where the individual is produced, these films propose an event-based 
symptomatology of depression which unsettles many of psychiatry’s assumptions pertaining to 
the nature of depression.  
To theorize the political stakes of this perceptual shift enacted through film aesthetics, I 
invoke Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s theory of minor cinema, which has its roots in their 
collectively written book Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. This present study brings to the 
forefront Guattari’s overlooked solo writings on minor cinema where he allies the concept to an 
anti-psychiatric and schizoanalytic praxis, and it lays out the ways in which the principles of 
minor cinema facilitate a re-politicization and re-existentialization of depression in light of its 
systematic depoliticization and de-existentialization.  
Close analyses of the following five films facilitate the discovery of speculative, event-
based symptoms of melancholy: The Red Desert (Michelangelo Antonioni, 1964), Afternoon 
(Angela Schanelec, 2007), Night Moves (Kelly Reichardt, 2013) Uncle Boonmee Who Can 
Recall His Past Lives (Apichatpong Weerasethakul, 2010) and Palawan Fate (Kanakan 
Balintagos, 2011). 
 
Keywords: Minor cinema, depression,  melancholy, anti-psychiatry, decolonization, 
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Introduction: Perceiving the Pandemic 
The Pandemic 
A depression pandemic is sweeping the globe, and its end appears nowhere in sight. 
Study after study confirms skyrocketing diagnostic rates: now about ten times more prevalent 
than it was only a few decades ago, depression has become the world’s leading cause of 
disability. Approximately 350 million people live with a depressive disorder and over 800,000 
people commit suicide every year.i This startling statistical trend has politicians and public health 
officials scrambling to mitigate a crisis that deepens with every moment by increasing the 
resources allotted to public mental health services.ii However well-intentioned these institutional 
efforts may be, their attempts to quell the depression outbreak have proven largely inept because 
they are grounded on the credulous presupposition, which has also now become a hallmark of 
liberal democratic ideology, that increased access to mental health services will actually translate 
into improved mental health. 
Studies on dominant treatment methods are showing their benefits to be as modest as 
ever, and broad-based initiatives to administer “evidence based treatments” to the public have 
yielded underwhelming clinical results.iii To make matters worse, no curative breakthrough lies 
on the horizon since the basic research on depression has long resigned itself to the search for 
topical solutions. Martin Seligman, a depression researcher and former president of the American 
Psychological Association, has outed the “dirty little secret” that biological psychiatry and 
clinical psychology have totally abandoned the search for a cure. “The road has come to a dead 
end at symptom relief,” he writes. “Every single drug on the shelf of the psychopharmacopeia is 
cosmetic. There are no curative drugs and no drug is in development that I know of that aims at 
cure” (46). Even after having abandoned the loftier goal of cure to settle for mere symptom 
suppression, clinicians are witnessing relapse after relapse. Access to first-rate treatment has 
done little to change the unwavering fact that once someone has been diagnosed with severe 
depression, it is typical for them to battle with a high risk of relapse for their entire life.iv 
The crisis has gotten so out of control that even the world’s financial elite have started to 
worry about the economic consequences. “This is not just a public health issue—it’s a 
development issue,” says Jim Yong Kim, President of the World Bank. “We need to act now 
because the lost productivity is something the global economy simply cannot afford” (World 
Health Organization 2016b). In support of the World Health Organization’s call for increased 
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government investment into mental health services, Jong Kim underscores the economic 
advantages of treating depression and anxiety disorders, citing a “fourfold return.” Without 
delving into how destructive this free marketing of life really is,  his statement harbours a telling 
contradiction that begs to be teased out. By framing the mental health epidemic as a development 
issue, Jong Kim unconsciously infuses the discourse on depression with a political-economic 
dimension that psychiatry is wont to conceal, and points to one of the reasons why psychiatry’s 
dominant methods have proven so unsuccessful at alleviating the crisis, to the degree that they 
could even be considered an aggravating factor. For if psychiatry was really concerned with 
intensifying health, and not just suppressing the symptoms of mental illness, then it would be 
obliged to put neoliberal hegemony (and its deleterious effects on the bulk of the world 
population) into question, and develop a critical auto-reflexivity about its own relationship to 
power. Instead, psychiatry not only leaves the status quo uncontested, but is instrumental in its 
reification. The financial elite represented by Yong Kim just “couldn’t afford” to have it any 
other way.   
Psychiatry’s naturalization of asymmetrical power dynamics is as notable today as it was 
when Foucault gave his lectures on psychiatric power at the Collège de France in 1973-1974. 
Foucault refers to a number of historical examples whereby psy-professionals are brought into 
schools, the army, or the prison in order to reinforce the order of the institution, and these lead 
him to conceive of psychiatric power as an “intensification of reality” that “is found wherever it 
is necessary to make reality function as power” (Foucault 2006: 189). One of Foucault’s many 
insights is that there is a fundamental complicity between the discipline of psychiatry and 
society’s dominant institutions, however unconducive to mental health or overall well-being that 
they may be. The intensification of reality that Foucault describes, whereby psychiatry reifies the 
power dynamics of society at large, is enacted through psychiatry’s diagnostic practice of 
identifying an individual subject with a specific mental illness. In the diagnostic scene, an 
“individual” is clearly demarcated from “society,” and as a result of thus distinction, society is 
normalized (no matter how cruel or unjust it may be), and the individual is pathologized (no 
matter how understandable their suffering may be given the circumstances).v Psychiatric power 
renders depression a personal problem that you “have,” and must assume responsibility for 
managing, thereby intensifying and subtly absolving the neoliberal reality through the act of 
medical diagnosis.  
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Psychiatry’s awesome power to produce subjectivity is wielded through a perceptual 
apparatus that Foucault calls the “clinical gaze”—“a way of seeing, saying, and doing in relation 
to illness, the body, [and] life itself” (Rose and Abi-Rached 79).vi Based on the research of their 
“Brain, Self and Society” project, Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached have identified three 
dimensions to the clinical gaze: the spatio-temporal, the technological and the institutional (Rose 
and Abi-Rached 79-80), each of which are operative in the medical perception of depression. In 
the diagnostic scene, the clinical gaze transforms the patient into a spatio-temporal matrix that 
allows the doctor to perceive clinically significant patterns and influences (the persistence of 
symptoms over a set period of time, family history, environmental factors, etc.); diagnostic 
technologies such as standardized questionnaires and brain scans can be used to glean the 
targeted symptoms; and mental health institutions and networks of social legitimization (the 
hospital, the media, the university) provide resources and infrastructure to make the gaze’s 
conclusions operative on a mass scale.  
Institutions of medical perception have certainly developed to embrace new (mostly 
neurological) theories and technologies over the last two centuries, but they have retained the 
core function that Foucault ascribes to the clinic: that is, they extract the person who is ill from 
the illness. “In the rational space of disease,” Foucault writes,  
doctors and patients do not occupy a place of right; they are tolerated as disturbances that 
can hardly be avoided: the paradoxical role of medicine consists, above all, in 
neutralizing them, in maintaining the maximum difference between them, so that, in the 
void that appears between them, the ideal configuration of the disease becomes a 
concrete, free form, totalized at last in a motionless, simultaneous picture, lacking both 
density and secrecy, where recognition of itself opens onto the order of essences…If one 
wishes to know the illness from which he is suffering, one must subtract the individual, 
with his particular qualities (Foucault 2003: 9, 14 translation modified). 
The clinical gaze neutralizes the patient, whose presence could only introduce possible 
distortions or variations, and unnecessarily complicate a neatly classifiable and ideal disease with 
essential qualities.  
 By constructing an autonomous disease as object of its perception, the clinical gaze 
subtracts the individual. But rather than amount to its overcoming, the individual’s subtraction 
marks its very production.vii This may seem counterintuitive, but medical perception’s 
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subtraction of the individual is at the same time a privileging of the individual—a privileging of 
what to subtract. The individual’s subtraction is made to stand in for the erasure of everything 
else that disappears in the diagnostic scene, like the plethora of affective ties and libidinally 
significant relationships which are systematically obscured by the clinical gaze. In search for an 
autonomous disease, medical perception occludes all that the depressed person brings into the 
diagnostic encounter, effectively denying their complicated presence—the multiplicity of 
relations that encompass the individual and are irreducible to it—in the name of scientific 
objectivity. These relations are swept outside of the clinic’s walls, and labeled “society.” All that 
remains is a standardized shell, a clinical individual, whose role is to play host to an alien disease 
living inside of it. By bringing disease under the regime of medical perception, the diagnostic 
scene ritually performs this separation of individual from society, exemplifying Foucault’s 
assessment that “medical authority functions as power well before it functions as knowledge” 
(2006: 3).  
A more contingent theory of subjectivity is warranted if the experience of being 
profoundly unwell is to be reinfused with an existential and political dimension that allows for 
escape from the essentialist confines of the “individual,” “society” and “depression” triad that 
psychiatric power reifies so efficiently. A theory of subjectivity-in-the-making is exactly what 
militant psychoanalyst Félix Guattari proposes through his theory of “assemblages” which he 
develops in collaboration with Gilles Deleuze. Assemblages are “set up at the intersection of 
meaning, material and social facts, and, above all, of their transformation” (Guattari 2009c: 209) 
and they comprise “actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another” as 
well as “acts and statements” and “incorporeal transformations” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 
88). The metastable manner of the assemblage, or the way that it tentatively stages the mobile 
relations between its component parts, articulates a dramatically expanded sense of the term 
“subjectivity.” In “Subjectivities, For Better or for Worse,” an essay that Guattari wrote near the 
end of his life, he builds on the idea of subjectivity as a dynamic assemblageviii and proposes a 
provisional definition of subjectivity as “the set of conditions that make it possible for individual 
and/or collective factors to emerge as a sui-referential existential territory, adjacent or in a 
determining position to an alterity that is itself subjective” (199b: 196). Guattari’s insistence on 
the relational and mobile disposition of events of subjectivity production makes evident the 
inherent limitations of the clinical gaze and suggests the need for an enlarged field of perception 
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that can operate beyond the limits of the individual to sense the manifold forces that condition 
singular iterations of depression. Guattari makes clear that his theory of subjectivity is not a 
theory of the individual: “The self-conscious subject should be considered a particular ‘option,’ a 
sort of normal madness. It is illusory to believe there exists only one subject—an autonomous 
subject, centered on one individual” (Chaosophy 262). The analyses of subjectivity which fill the 
following pages of this study build on Guattari’s ideas by deploying allied thinkers such as 
William James, Gilles Deleuze, A.N. Whitehead and Gilbert Simondon whose theories of 
subjectivity also complicate the bipartite division between the individual and society on which 
medical perception’s authority rests.  
 The importance of Guattari’s assemblage theory of subjectivity for an analysis of 
depression cannot be overestimated, especially given the context in which it was developed. 
Guattari wrote and published prolifically while living and working as a radical psychoanalyst at 
La Borde, an alternative psychiatric institution for psychotics that was started by Jean Oury in 
1951. The collective psychotherapeutic practices of La Borde greatly influenced his theoretical 
writings, and their full significance is revealed only when read in light of the theraperutic 
impulse guiding his life’s work. For this reason, I return to Guattari’s work throughout this 
project precisely because of how his theories of subjectivity production are intimately linked to 
the therapeutic practice.  
Never one to accept biological reductionism, Guattari always insisted that nonnormative 
psychic states which qualify for cateogorization as mental illness must first and foremost be 
conceived of as an existential problem of subjectivity production. The schizoanalytic praxis he 
developed at La Borde works on precisely this premise. At once analytic and creative, 
schizoanalysis discovers unconscious blockages, and breaks through them by diagramming lines 
of flight towards novel assemblages of subjectivity whose existential territories could create 
therapeutic value for all involved. Premised on the assemblage theory of subjectivity quoted 
from above, schizoanalysis reinfuses the problem of depression with the existential and political 
dimension that is stripped away by psychiatric power and its perceptual apparatus. Once 
depression is regarded as an impasse in the machinic production of assemblages of subjectivity, 
it regains the existential and political dimensions that psychiatric power obscures through its 
naturalization of the biological disease model. Through adopting an assemblage approach to 
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subjectivity, it is no longer possible to demarcate where individual, society, or disease begins and 
ends. 
By isolating a disease as if it was autonomous and producing an individual subject 
through perceptual subtraction, the clinical gaze parses out the bulk of the “machinic 
assemblage” that informs how (a patient’s) life can be lived. Psychiatry’s production of the 
individualized subject, cut off from its conjoined assemblages, makes for what Deleuze calls a 
“clinical state” of subjectivity that “does not open out onto anything” (Deleuze 1998: lv). 
Strangely enough, given the therapeutic mandate of medicine, the inherent sclerosis of the 
clinical state stemming from its ritualized reification of individual and society lends itself to a 
sense of isolation and existential sterility. Guattari was known to suffer from recurring bouts of 
depression throughout his lifeix and in Chaosmosis, a book dedicated to the analysis of the 
production of subjectivity, he allies the sensation of feeling like a discrete individual—the sort of 
individual that the clinical gaze produces—to the experience of depression. He writes: “The 
phenomenological apprehension of being existing as inert facticity only occurs in the case of 
limit experiences such as existential nausea or melancholic depression” (109). Psychiatric 
power’s production of the clinical individual through its imposition of the disease model thus 
makes for a highly alienating scenario, whereby an essential disease reifies a depressive sense of 
self, all remarkably in the name of mental health. 
Schizoanalysis searches for lines of flight from the depressive sense of self that arises in 
moments of being made to feel like an isolated individual, or “being existing as inert facticity,” 
cut off from the movements of the world’s assemblages and their resingularizing potential that 
psychiatric perception chooses to ignore. By remapping the subjective cartography, 
schizoanalysis introduces an aesthetic, or “critical,” element into the clinical domain of mental 
health. In Deleuze’s remarkable “critical and clinical” project, which articulates a limit point 
shared between art and medicine, he develops the concept of critique in a new direction as “the 
literary technique and style of the writer” (Smith li). The guiding thesis of his project is that 
artists, using aesthetic technique and style, can imaginatively perceive new constellations of 
subjectivity, that when transposed to the clinic, could become verifiable medical classifications. 
The classic examples he gives are the literary figures Marquis de Sade and Leopold Sacher-von 
Masoch,  
whose names were used as labels in the nineteenth century to denote two basic 
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‘perversions’ in clinical psychiatry.… This encounter between literature and medicine 
was made possible, Deleuze argues, by the peculiar nature of the symptomatological 
method. Medicine is made up of at least three different activities: symptomatology, or the 
study of signs; etiology, or the search for causes; and therapy, or the development and 
application of a treatment. While etiology and therapeutics are integral parts of medicine, 
symptomatology appeals to a kind of limit-point, premedical or submedical, that belongs 
as much to art as to medicine.… Deleuze strongly suggests that artists and authors can go 
further in symptomatology than doctors and clinicians, precisely “because the work of art 
gives them new means…” (Smith xvi-xvii)  
If artists can go further than clinicians, perceiving symptoms of emergent subjectivities, and not 
only of a disease whose symptoms are already known and medically classified, then they are in 
the perfect position to complicate essentialist narratives about depression that are derived from 
the intrinsically limited scope of the clinical gaze and subsequently recounted by the medical-
industrial complex’s media appendages.x The shared emphasis on perceiving assemblages of 
subjectivity is the point where Deleuze’s “critical and clinical” project and Guattari’s lifelong 
commitment to elaborating schizoanalytic praxis dovetails. In both cases, the revolutionary 
function of art, and even pure science, is its ability to make critical discoveries that fall outside of 
the clinic’s established classifications.  
The cinema is no exception to the rule, and is equally well equipped with the critical 
capacity to symptomatologically perceive emergent assemblages of subjectivity. Periodically 
throughout his life, Guattari turned to the cinema as a way to better understand the workings of 
desire “before the separation between the familiarized self and the social field” takes place 
(Guattari 2009a: 245). By creating images that index the process of subjectivity production, and 
not merely the reified, individual subjects produced by the clinical gaze, the cinema trades 
critical perception for clinical perception to enact a radical symptomatology of a world ravaged 
by a depression pandemic. The stark differences between these two modes of perception are 
reflected in their respective symptomatologies. Psychiatry’s diagnostic handbook, the Diagnostic 
and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders-5 lists nine symptoms of “major depressive disorder,” 
each of which are found in the patterns of the depressed patient’s feelings, thoughts and 
behaviours (feelings of worthlessness, thoughts of death, psychomotor disturbances, etc.).xi If 
Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic theory of subjectivity is taken seriously, and subjectivity is seen 
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as a dynamic event irreducible to the individual, then the sort of symptoms that are listed in the 
DSM and perceived (as signs) by the clinical gaze can be considered as complete or exhaustive 
only under highly reductive conditions.  
The cinema’s symptomatology is entirely different. Its critical mode of perception opens 
onto the site of subjectivity production, where it discovers event-based symptoms of depression. 
Through a close analysis of key filmic examples, this project foregrounds four of these 
symptoms: the depotentialization of neuroplasticity, alienation from a common world of 
experience, the foreclosure of an encounter with alterity, and the erosion of Indigenous values by 
capitalist modes of valuation.xii By shifting focus from the standardized clinical subject 
(psychiatry’s privileged symptomatological site), onto the plane of immanence where 
subjectivity is produced, the films discussed in this project implicitly challenge the disease model 
of depression and its dependence on an individual subject who must house the disease, and be 
made responsible for managing it. Once the symptoms of depression can no longer be found on 
an individual but in the world and its relations, then what the symptoms begin to index is not 
necessarily a disease—natural, ideal, essential—but a highly contingent manner of subjectivity 
production, and its conditioning by power. The following study is allied to the cinema’s critical 
symptomatology and the far-reaching consequences this perceptual shift.  
True to the critical force of art, contemporary cinema’s symptomatology markedly differs 
from what medical institutions consensually recognize depression to be. So much so, that the 
perceptual shift from the clinical to the critical welcomes a terminological shift. The term 
“depression” is loaded with a lot of clinical baggage that doesn’t make itself very amenable to 
studies of cinema, even when filmmakers make their art in response to the waves of acute 
emotional pain cascading across the globe. As already alluded to, the term “depression,” denotes 
a clearly definable clinical entity corresponding to an exhaustive list of symptoms, whose 
meaning couldn’t be more precise. The concept of melancholy, on the other hand, retains an 
ambiguity that honours the cinema’s perception of subjectivity production, and the re-
existentialization and repoliticization of depression that follows from these critical acts of 
perception. One reason for melancholy’s ambiguity has to do with the sheer historical longevity 
of the concept. Long before the notion of clinical depression came into common usage after the 
publication of the DSM-I in 1952, artists, poets, philosophers and physicians made recourse to 
melancholy to describe a number of historically contingent ways of feeling, with epoch after 
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epoch adding to the concept’s polysemy.xiii Already by the early seventeenth Century, could 
Robert Burton pen the following line: “The Tower of Babel never yielded such confusion of 
tongues as this Chaos of Melancholy doth variety of symptoms” (Burton 108). Whether an 
imbalance of black bile in Aristotle’s great statesmanxiv, the sin of acedia afflicting St. Theresa of 
Avila’s melancholy nunsxv, or the sense of dejection that fills the flâneur in Charles Baudelaire’s 
macabre symbolist poetryxvi, melancholy mutates throughout history, taken up when needed to 
describe the painful tedium, despair and despondency that has wrought so many lives, in so 
many different ways.  
The visual arts’ longstanding fascination with melancholy is one of the main reasons for 
its fruitful ambiguity. The exhibit Melancholy: Genius and Madness in the Occident, which was 
presented at the Galeries nationales du Grand Palais in Paris (October 2005-January 2006) and 
the Neue Nationalgalerie in Berlin (February-May 2006), presents this historical relationship in 
great depth. Documented in an oversized book of the same name edited by Jean Clair, it 
meticulously shows how melancholy has inspired artistic creations as stylistically and 
historically diverse as antiquity’s votive stencils (Melancholy Athena) (Image 2.2), paintings of 
medieval religious experiences (Jérome Bosch’s Saint-Jean Baptiste dans le desert (Image 2.3), 
Albrecht Dürer’s famous renaissance engravings (Melancholia I) (Image 2.6), and the modern 
paintings of Edvard Munch (Melancholy III) (Image 2.7), to name just a few.  
Due in large part to this aesthetic tradition carrying melancholy down through the ages, 
discovering its qualities in ever-novel assemblages, melancholy has a noteworthy reputation of 
being applied, as Jennifer Radden explains, “not only to persons but landscapes and events” (30). 
It is precisely this depersonalized, event-based conception of melancholy coursing through art 
history that I activate in this study of the contemporary art cinema’s melancholy aesthetics. It 
bears repeating: whereas depression is mired in the confines of the clinical state productive of an 
essential disease and reified individual, melancholy lends itself to the critical functions of art and 
schizoanalysis, which open onto the collective, evental conditions of subjectivity production. 
 The terminological shift from depression to melancholy enables a repoliticized and re-
existentialized manner of perceiving the mental health crisis in the realm of the aesthetic, and it 
is also for this reason that I opt for the term melancholy instead of its companion “melancholia.” 
History has witnessed much slippage between these two words to the extent that they are 
virtually indistinguishable, but if one slight difference can been maintained, it parallels the one 
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teased out above between melancholy and depression: that melancholia is a distinctly clinical 
entity with highly elaborate psychoanalytic definitions, whereas melancholy is more ambiguous 
and describes a generalized affective tonality coursing through art history that mutually includes 
a variety of conjoined emotional states such as suicidial despair, unwavering psychic distress, 
exhaustion, loneliness, isolation, resignation and lapsed faith. In the following chapter I review 
the literature on melancholia and explain in more detail how the Guattarian theory of subjectivity 
production diverges from the Freudian principles to which psychoanalytic theorists of 
melancholia such as Judith Butler and Julia Kristeva adhere. But for the moment it should suffice 
to say: there is no loss in the assemblage. Practically all literature on melancholia from the 20th 
Century onwards refers back to Freud’s 1917 Ur-text “Mourning and Melancholia.” The basic 
premise of this text is that melancholia is the result of the failure to mourn a lost love object. 
Instead of detaching from the object through a process of reality-testing and replacing it with a 
new one in cases of successful mourning, melancholia takes hold when the libido “regresses into 
the ego” (Freud 1957: 257) and internalizes its ambivalence towards the lost object, resulting in 
symptoms such as “painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the 
capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a 
degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in a delusional 
expectation of punishment” (Freud 1957: 243).  These psychoanalytic symptoms of melancholia 
appear in slightly modified form in the DSM-V’s list of criteria for clinical depression, and 
acknowledge the sort of emotions that the melancholy aesthetics of art history put on display. 
The terminological shift that I propose is one from “depression” and “melancholia,” which carry 
precise but weighty clinical defintions, to the more nebulous “melancholy” and its aesthetic 
heritage. By latching onto the leeway afforded by a term like “melancholy” it becomes possible 
to trade off a clinical ethos for a critical one, and to reorient the site of symptomatology from the 
clinical individual to the eventful assemblage.xvii  
A crucial effect of this perceptual displacement is that by shifting the symptomatological 
site towards the event of subjectivity production, the cinema’s melancholy aesthetics potentialize 
an analogous reappraisal of depression’s corresponding etiologies and therapies. The second half 
of this project seizes this newfound opportunity to examine how experimental processes of 
subjective recomposition can double as acts of therapy and activism.xviii By exploring the 
coordinates of melancholic assemblages of subjectivity, and experimenting with their 
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recomposition, the filmmakers featured in this study challenge the uncompromising ossification 
of what depression has been made to mean, and even more importantly, how it may be diagnosed 
and treated, and by whom.  
 Thus it could be said that the filmmakers who populate the pages of this dissertation are 
nothing less than what we could call therapeutic activists.xix They take the speculative risk of 
viewing the depression pandemic, a thoroughly trying state of affairs, through the critical lens 
offered by the cinema, so as to re-existentialize the problem in ways that enable therapeutically 
acting in line with collective well-being, without waiting for the sanction of medical authorities. 
In the throes of a pandemic exacerbated by neoliberal power’s devaluing of life itself, a 
devaluing reified by psychiatry’s clinical apparatus, such lay acts of relational healing through 
the recomposition of subjectivity would amount to nothing less than an urgently needed praxis of 
both therapy and activism—or what we could call therapeutic activism: a way of acting on 
Foucault’s reminder in the closing lines of Discipline and Punish, that in the apparatuses of 
normalization that are intended “to provide relief, to cure, to help,” one should hear “the 
rumbling of battle” (Foucault 308). 
 
The Films 
The following investigation into the production of melancholic subjectivity and the 
conditions for its therapeutic reassemblage is enacted through encounters with five different 
films: The Red Desert (Michelangelo Antonioni, 1964), Afternoon (Angela Schanelec, 2007), 
Night Moves (Kelly Reichardt, 2013) Uncle Boonmee Who Can Recall His Past Lives 
(Apichatpong Weerasethakul, 2010), and Palawan Fate (Kanakan Balintagos, 2011). The Red 
Desert announced the arrival of the “cinema of poetry” by blending the aesthetic strategies of 
neorealism and expressionism to create a “free indirect” image that confounds the distinction 
between objective and subjective perspectives, and between the psyche and the socius (the social 
body). The film’s aesthetic accomplishment in turn created the artistic conditons for the latter 
four films to explore the “psychosocial” dynamics of the depression pandemic.  
Each of these four contemporary films begs to be read in light of a broader film 
movement with visibility in the global cinemascape: The Berlin School, American Neo-
Neorealism, New Thai Cinema and Fourth Cinema. Over the course of the dissertation, I situate 
the case studies within the political and artistic context of these film movements, since it helps to 
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show how these films’ concern for the precarity of well-being under global capital is part of a 
broader artistic awareness towards this pressing issue. In making this gesture, I do not mean to 
claim that these film movements are to be read primarly and solely as responses to the depression 
pandemic, since that narrow of interpretation would limit many other productive ways of reading 
these films and the film cultures in which they take part. However, I do contend that the political 
and existential contours of the contemporary depression pandemic can be found in many of the 
new millenium’s most artistically signficiant film movements.  
I have decided to limit the scope of this project to these five case studies. A more all-
encompassing presentation of melancholy aesthetics in contemporary cinema would likely touch 
on related film movements, such as the Iranian New Cinema (Jafar Panahi, Abbas Kiarostami), 
the Taiwanese Second New Wave (Tsai-Ming Liang), recent Québecois cinema (Rodrigue Jean, 
Ivan Grbovic), the Danish Dogme movement (Lars von Trier, Thomas Vinterberg), and a slate of 
other active auteurs including Lav Diaz (Melancholia, 2008), Pedro Costa (In Vanda’s Room, 
2000), Joachim Trier (Oslo, Ausust 31st, 2011), Steve McQueen (Shame, 2011), Carlos Reygadas 
(Silent Light, 2007) and Béla Tarr (The Turin Horse, 2011). I do not intend for the five films that 
I have chosen as my case studies to be taken as representatives of this greater set of films, and 
they would undoubtedly fail to uphold the weight assigned to them should they be tasked with 
representing what these other films have to say about life in the depression pandemic. Rather, 
they have been chosen for their ability to function as limit-cases of how the cinema has the 
potential render aesthetic qualities of melancholy experience and offer an alternative to the 
reigning psychiatric models which dictate the sense of depression and define the range of 
legitimate therapeutic responses to it.  
At first glance, the five films that I have chosen as my case studies may seem to have 
little in common other than their melancholic tonality. The Red Desert predates the other four 
films by over thirty-five years; each film comes from a different country (Italy, Germany, USA, 
Thailand, and the Philippines); and each features dialogue in their respective languages (Italian, 
German, English, Thai, and Palawano). Moreover, they each relay quite different narrative 
intrigues: psychosis in an industrial zone, a breakup in a bourgeois cottage, the direct action of a 
group of ecological activists, an ailing man’s recollection of his past lives, and a couple’s search 
for a shaman who can heal the wounds of colonialism. Politically and culturally speaking, they 
contrast as well, with each film making meaning in relation to a unique site of power relations: 
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1960s Italy’s “economic miracle”; post-unification Germany; the climate of economic collapse 
in post-2008 America; Thailand’s anti-communist history; and the neocolonization of the island 
of Palawan by multinational resource extraction companies. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
none of these filmmakers could be mistaken for overtly narrating or dramatizing depression. The 
films that serve as this project’s case studies are not necessarily “about” depression or 
melancholy, in the way that many films have recently capitalized on the timeliness of the topic.xx 
Conversely, the melancholy aesthetics that run through each of these films discussed arise out of 
their shared concern affective suffering. By perceptually opening onto the field of subjectivity 
production, each filmmaker discovers a unique event-based symptom of this suffering that is 
unmistakably present and painful, even if very few of the characters in the films are explicitly 
identified as having a depressive disorder.  
Given the high degree of variance between the films focused on in this study, it begs the 
question as to how such thematically, geographically, linguistically and culturally distinct films 
could possibly be grouped together. All of the case studies in this dissertation could be 
categorized under the rubric of two separate, but sometimes overlapping, fields of study: global 
art cinema and minor cinema. In what follows, I will lay out how the category of global art 
cinema validates this dissertation’s choice of case studies, since it articulates how otherwise 
disparate filmmakers share in a common artistic heritage and enter into dialogue with one 
another on the global festival circuit. Afterwards, I will supplement the global art cinema 
framework with the theory of minor cinema to explain how these films also engage in a political 
aesthetics of anti-psychiatry that puts into question the clinical construct of depression and its 
inherent individualism, in opening onto an event-based understanding of melancholy experience.  
In their edited anthology entitled Global Art Cinema, Rosalind Galt and Karl Schoonover 
privilege the “global” nature of contemporary art cinema and include essays that emphasize the 
commonalities between East Asian, Latin American, American, African and European art 
cinemas. “‘Global,’” they argue is not merely one of art cinema’s themes “but an inherent 
element, alongside and interpenetrating ‘art’ and ‘cinema’” (20). The editors offer four criteria of 
art cinema, xxi but for the purposes of this study, which ranges in purview from West to East to 
Global South, from First World to Fourth, the aspect of art cinema that warrants deepest 
emphasis is none other than its globality. Published in 2010, the Global Art Cinema anthology 
amounts to what its authors themselves admit is a polemic (20). The reason why adding the 
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qualifier “global” amounts to a polemic about art cinema at this historical moment is because, as 
Galt and Schoonover point out, “in traditional film historiography, art cinema has been a way to 
organize national cinema in canons of ‘great directors,’” which amounts to a “critical tendency 
[that] conflates art cinema with national cinema” (7). What the collection’s editors argue instead 
is that “art cinema always carries a comparitivist impulse and transnational tenor” (7).  
Influential film theorist Dudley Andrew adds weight to this global conception of the art 
film in his preface to the edition. He says straightforwardly that art cinema “is by definition pan-
national, following the urge of every ambitious film to take off from its point of release, so as to 
encounter other viewers and other movies, elsewhere and later” (vi). For Andrew, the 
“international address” of a film is what warrants its consideration as art cinema, in 
contradistinction to national cinemas, which address local populations (and are often 
unintelligible or indecipherable outside of that linguistic-cultural context). He gives the example 
of Philippine cinema, where  
out of hundred films made each year this past decade, only fifteen or so can be identified 
as part of the Philippine art cinema, specifically those that have been selected to screen 
abroad.… So there would seem to be two distinct Philippine cinemas, one based on 
cultural belonging, bound to the Tagalog language, and the other taken up by a polyglot 
international audience who can access the films at festivals or download them on their 
computers (vii).  
What Andrew’s conception of art cinema offers is a way to emphasize how films not only enter 
into relation with one another on global circuits of exhibition that cross national borders, but are 
constructed with this deterritorialized encounter in mind. 
The international address of a work of Philippine art cinema, like Palawan Fate, which 
can also be categorized as a Fourth Cinema title (these are not mutually exclusive categories), 
does not subtract from its imbrication in local political issues. Though sometimes, as Dudley 
Andrew points out, this relationship between internationally recognized auteurs and their home 
countries is undeniably strained.xxii Apichatpong Weerasethakul’s relationship to Thailand 
perfectly encapsulates this tension. He ultimately decided not to show his most recent film 
Cemetery of Splendour in his homeland mainly “because he fears it would run foul of the ruling 
military junta” if he did not edit the film in accordance with Thailand’s strict censorship laws. “I 
feel there is more violence in our country than in others that are in similar situations and I am sad 
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to see that I don’t have any power or rights to speak, because I know if I speak, harm will come 
defiance of the grave risks, art cinema’s global address is more than an institution, aesthetic 
practice, or genrexxiii, but a downright political necessity. Apichatpong may freely live in 
Thailand, but his films, banished from Thai movie theatres, are made with the knowledge that 
they will become nomadic exiles.  
 The other auteurs who I focus on in this dissertation don’t suffer from the same sort of 
censorship legislation, but they do share Apichatpong’s unease towards their respective nations 
and national cinemas. For example, Antonioni’s oeuvre—and especially The Red Desert—is a 
meditation on the feeling of alienation that can arise in one’s own country, particularly when 
dealing with a modern factory setting made of chemical smoke, industrially coloured steel, and 
empty streets. In the context of the Berlin School films, even when they are shot in Germany, 
featuring local settings and subject matter, one would be hard pressed to try and squeeze these 
filmmakers into a national cinema discourse due to how drastically they differ in style, theme, 
and tone from their nationalist counterparts. xxiv Ulrich Köhler, one of Angela Schanelec’s Berlin 
School contemporaries, even goes so far as to deliberately rail against the mainstream German 
cinema and its sanitized liberal politics. For her part, Kelly Reichardt demonstrates a repeatedly 
ambivalent relationship to her home nation. Her films sympathize with marginalized and 
downtrodden characters all the while quietly indicting the American political system for 
exacerbating their misery. As one of the most relevant American indie filmmakers, she could 
have easily transitioned into a career in Hollywood. At least until now, Reichardt has opted to 
find alternative financing for her films in an effort to preserve her creative autonomy, effectively 
cementing her as an outsider in her own domestic market. Lastly, Kanakan Balintagos, who 
would undoubtedly qualify as one of the “ten to fifteen art cinema auteurs” from the Philippines 
that Dudley Andrew references, reaches out to a broad cross-section of publics to express diverse 
facets of his hybrid existence. As a queer Indigenous man of colour from the Global South, 
inspired as much by his ancestral myths as European and modern Philippine art cinemas, his 
films appeal to festival publics as diverse as Cannes, Imaginative (Toronto), Cinemalaya 
(Manila), and Frameline (San Francisco). Though widely celebrated on the indie film circuit in 
his home country, Balintagos is still somewhat of an anomaly in Philippine film culture since he 
tells the types of stories that rarely make their way onto domestic screens. He is a true “wanderer 
between worlds,” as ethnologist of Filipino psychology, Katrin de Guia has so eloquently said, in 
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reference as much to the national and cultural borders he straddles as to his shamanic capabilities 
(139).  
These filmmakers’ international mode of address has brought them into a global 
exchange, through which they have all been marked by aesthetic and thematic contagion. 
Rajendra Roy articulates this phenomenon in her introduction to the Museum of Modern Art’s 
coffee table book on the Berlin School, when she points out how one of the movement’s 
filmmakers, Christoph Hochhäusler “situates the Berlin School on a global terrain, noting that 
filmmakers such as Abbas Kiarostami, Apichatpong Weerasethakul, and Howard Hawks have 
been at least as influential as [German filmmakers] Fritz Lang, Rainer Werner Fassbender or 
Werner Herzog” (11). The reference to Apichatpong should not go unnoticed. In the very same 
book, Hochhäusler’s telling essay “On Whose Shoulders: The Question of Aesthetic 
Indebtedness,” imparts the secret that Berlin School directors “are in agreement over the 
influence of Apichatpong” and additionally suggests that Kelly Reichardt should be regarded as 
a contemporary of the Berlin School (Hochhäusler 24). A couple of other clever cinephilic links 
between Apichatpong and the Berlin School are hard to ignore. In 2011, Ulrich Köhler directed a 
film called Sleeping Sickness, and only three years later, Apichatpong, whose oeuvre has long 
displayed a fascination with all things oneiric, decided to make Cemetery of Splendor, a film 
about the epidemic spread of a mysterious sleeping sickness where hallucinations become 
indistinguishable from reality. Another uncoincidental connection between these parties crops up 
in a Cinema Scope piece on Angela Schanelec and her latest film (aptly titled The Dreamlike 
Path) (2016). Its author makes the keen observation that both Schanelec and Apichatpong’s 
earlier efforts Marseille (2004) and Tropical Malady (2004) are structured as diptychs, and 
happened to premiere at Cannes the very same year (Williams 13). Consciously and 
unconsciously, it is safe to say that there is a stylistic and thematic contagion between art cinema 
directors, as this brief example between Apichatpong and the Berlin School indicates, regardless 
of the gaps between their respective national cultures.  
Perhaps this mutual indebtedness should not come as much of a surprise, since many art 
film auteurs, particularly the ones who comprise this study, are the inheritors of a specific current 
of art cinema called the cinema of poetry that has a history of casting psychologically unstable 
protagonists and using a free indirect aesthetic to interrogate their psyche’s relational 
underpinnings. Each of the films discussed in the following pages reactivate this tradition 
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inaugurated in the 1960s to express a common concern for well-being in the midst of a 
depression pandemic which is as global as art cinema itself.  
The theory of minor cinema is useful for articulating the anti-psychiatric politics behind 
this perceptual shift from the individual to the event, and it provides the means for thinking these 
films together based on shared affinity, sensibility and concern rather than shared identity, which 
is the more common way of organizing studies of film. In the following literature review section 
of the dissertation, I provide a more detailed resume of the various ways that the theory of minor 
cinema has been taken up in film studies and I excavate Guattari’s underacknowledged 
contributions to the theory of minor cinema to show how it has a longstanding alliance with anti-
psychiatric praxis. At this point in the introduction, I would simply like to introduce the theory of 
minor cinema’s main chaiacteristics to show how it helps to justify my selection of films for the 
case studies, and more importantly, how it articulates the shared political and aesthetic sensibility 
of these films.   
Minor cinema is now a film studies concept with widely acknowledged currency in the 
discipline, but its roots date back to Deleuze and Guattari’s 1975 book Kafka: Toward a Minor 
Literature. In their collaborative study of Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari deploy the concept of 
minor literature to explain the political aesthetics of Kafka’s work in a manner that challenged 
the two types of readings that had dominated interpretations of his work up until that point in 
time: natural (psychoanalytic) and supernatural (theological) interpretations. According to Réda 
Bensmaïa, “one misses the mark in Kafka either by putting him in the nursery—by oedipalizing 
and relating him to mother-father narratives—or by trying to limit him to theological-
metaphysical speculation to the detriment of all the political, ethical, and ideological dimensions 
that run through his work and give it a special status in the history of literature” (Bensmaïa ix). 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of minor literature consists of three fundamental criteria. The first 
is “a high coefficient of deterritorializartion” characteristic of a minority’s use of a major 
language, as is the case of Kafka’s Prague German (1986:16). “The second characteristic of 
minor literatures,” Deleuze and Guattari write, “is that everything in them is political. In major 
literatures, in contrast, the individual concern (familial, marital, and so on) joins with no other 
less individual concerns, the social milieu serving as a mere environment or background…. 
Minor literature is completely different, its cramped space forces each individual intrigue to 
connect immediately to politics” (1986: 17). Deleuze and Guattari then go on to write, “The third 
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characteristic of minor literature is that everything takes on a collective value…There isn’t a 
subject, there are only collective assemblages of enunciation…” (1986: 18, italics in original). 
The three characteristics of minor literature that Deleuze and Guattari find in Kafka’s work lead 
them to the conclusion that “the minor no longer designates specific literatures but the 
revolutionary conditions for every literature within the heart of what is called great (or 
established) literature” (1986: 18).  
This conclusion is an important one, and it should be taken as a reminder that even 
though this study uses the concept of minor cinema to expound the anti-psychiatric politics of 
select art films which serve as limit-cases, by no means should that be misconstrued to suggest 
that all of art cinema is somehow a minor cinema. To translate Deleuze and Guattari’s maxim 
from literature into the realm of cinema, we can say that the minor no longer designates specific 
cinemas, but the revolutionary conditions for every cinema, within the heart of what is called 
great (or established) cinema. The films that comprise this project’s case studies are minor limit-
cases of global art cinema, and the majoritarian structure that they inflect from within is not a 
specific language or cinematic genre, much less the art cinema’s institutions, but psychiatry’s 
mode of clinically perceiving—and producing—mental illnesses such as depression. The reason 
why it can be said that these films undo psychiatric perception from within, much in the same 
way that Deleuze and Guattari speak of minor literatures as acting on the revolutionary 
conditions within established literatures, is that the object of psychiatry’s clinical gaze—the 
(mentally ill) individual—also happens to be the subject of neoliberal political life par 
excellence. To shake psychiatry’s clinical gaze from within doesn’t require making a film inside 
of a doctor’s office or hospital (though it could), since the individual, and the individualism, that 
the gaze naturalizes and reifies can be found across diverse fields of subjectivity production 
adjacent to various social spaces and instutions. Only in the most acute cases is psychiatry now 
practiced in an asylum or hospital context; the vast majority of psychiatric subjects, especially 
those who are diagnosed with depression, carry their diagnoses and treatments—points of 
subjection—around with them in the quotidian. Psychiatry is an institution of the everyday and 
the everywhere. Unsettling the effects of its ways of seeing on the production of subjectivity 
requires intervening into the quotidian spaces of its operations—(battle)fields of subjectivity 




The three charcateristics of minor literature that Deleuze and Guattari advance in Kafka 
articulate with remarkable clarity what happens when psychiatry’s clinical gaze is traded for 
cinema’s critical perception. Firstly, the territory on which the clinical construct of depression is 
built comes undone, and is extended to new, destratified linkages. In these cases, the cinematic 
image is invested with a high coefficient of deterritorialization because it opens onto an event of 
subjectivity production that precedes and exceeds the bounded individual on all sides and in all 
tenses. It becomes impossible to speak of this or that person’s depression, as if they were the 
proprietiers of an internalized disease, since the entire image, and the event of subjectivity 
production that it perceives, is inundated with a melancholic affective tonality. The “territory” of 
the depressed individual is deterritorialized onto a relational field of melancholy. Secondly, in 
minor cinemas of melancholy and therapy, the depression which is routinely (mis)taken for an 
individual concern in psychiatry is made to connect immediately to politics. Private emotions are 
exploded in favour of a generalized affective tonality that is coterminous with the spaces that 
give rise to them. The “immediacy” of this connection between the private affair and politics 
follows from the deterritorialization of the clinical individual upon which this bipartitie division 
is constructed. In minor cinemas, there is no mediator between the personal and the political, as 
if each could claim an autonomous existence of its own—there is only the political immediacy of 
events of subjectivity production. Thirdly, depression’s becoming-melancholy through this 
process of deterrritorialization takes on a collective value as the subject of depression is replaced 
by a melancholic collective assemblage of subjectivity. In these limit-cases of minor cinema, 
what psychiatry frames as a disease belonging to a clinical individual, becomes an immediately 
political impasse in the composition of collective existence. Taken together, we can see why the 
three chacteristics of Deleuze and Guattari’s minor literature are so useful for elucidating my 
case studies’ perceptual shift from a clinical to a critical view of the depression pandemic: they 
articulate the political and existential stakes that are gained in melancholy’s line of flight from 
the confines of clinical depression. 
These minor films of melancholy and therapy may not share an identity, but they do share 
an affinity. Not content to have psychiatric power dictate the meaning of the widespread 
existential malaise that saturates their film worlds, the makers of minor cinemas that fill the 
pages of this dissertation shift perception away from the clinical individual to re-existentialize 
and repoliticize the pandemic by harnessing the critical force of art. Together, these filmmakers 
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can be considered therapeutic activists, or practicing schizoanalysts, who in fathoming the world 
in which they are mired, open perception onto existential horizons of subjectivity production far 
beyond the clinic’s sightlines, thus finally making it possible to act, to therapeutic effect, in the 
midst of a pandemic that has for too long been left to the professionals—professionals who are 





As an accompaniment to this dissertation’s introduction, I would like to offer a literature 
review section that positions my project within the intellectual genealogies which have given rise 
to it, and that articulates its contribution to growing fields of academic study. In this section I pay 
special attention to the disciplinary stakes of my dissertation, by outlining how it contributes to 
longstanding debates about the production of subjectivity that have characterized the theoretical 
tradition of film studies since 1964—a date which happens to coincide with the dawn of “modern 
film theory” signaled by the initial publications of Christian Metz, as well as the release of 
Antonioni’s The Red Desert, a film that Pasolini used to articulate his “cinema of poetry” at the 
Festival of Pesaro the following year. The film studies fields that I dialogue with over the course 
of the dissertation and which I will summarize in this literature review include: psychoanalytic 
approaches to film, film philosophy, and minor cinema. In addition to foregrounding the 
disciplinary history that informs this project, I also take the opportunity afforded by this 
literature review to map out the critical theory on depression and melancholia, since this is 
another field of interdisciplinary study that falls within the dissertation’s thematic scope. Over 
the course of presenting this scholarship, I touch on several fields and methods from around the 
humanities that occasionally intersect with film studies, such as queer theory (gender and cultural 
studies), neurodiversity (disability studies), and anti-psychiatry. By mapping out this intellectual 
terrain, I aim to provide a clear picture of how various scholarly discourses have shaped my 
present study, and how in turn I envision my dissertation as a contributing to the discipline of 
film studies at its intersection with these research fields. 
To begin, I would like to situate my writing on minor cinemas of melancholy and therapy 
within the disciplinary history of film studies. To do so, I will offer a synopsis of the 
“theory/Post-Theory” debates that have coloured the discipline, and explain how this dissertation 
revisits this theoretical preoccupation with how the cinema produces subjectivity. This approach 
largely waned after the “crisis of political modernism” in the 1980s—a disciplinary crisis 
reflective of the seismic shift from modernism to postmodernism and poststructuralism in the 
broader intellectual landscape which D.N. Rodowick meticulously historicizes in his 
monumental 1988 book of the same name (The Crisis of Political Modernism: Criticism and 
Ideology in Contemporary Film Theory. By examining 1970s film theory’s most significant 
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impasses, and the sorts of (cognitive, historicist, and empiricist) solutions that were proposed by 
“Post-Theorists” in the mid-1990s, I will argue that other viable alternatives for maintaining film 
studies’ theoretical preoccupation with the production of subjectivity were possible, even after 
the shortcomings of 1970s theory were becoming increasingly apparent to scholars. I would like 
to suggest, for reasons that will become more apparent in the following pages, that one of these 
overlooked alternatives is represented by the figure of Félix Guattari, whose close intellectual 
proximity to two of the most influential figures in the history of film theory, Jacques Lacan, his 
one-time psychoanalyst and mentor, and Gilles Deleuze, his frequent collaborator, uniquely 
positions him as a potentially significant interlocutor in the history of film theory. Guattari‘s 
“schizoanalytic” work on art and activism, I argue throughout, is particularly relevant for 
discussions of political cinema, despite his writings having been largely ignored by film scholars 
up until this point in time. 
Modern Film Theory: From Political Modernism to Post-Theory to Film Philosophy  
On the very last page of his two-volume study on the cinema, Gilles Deleuze addresses 
the state of film theory during which the books were written: “The usefulness of theoretical 
books on cinema has been called into question (especially today, because the times are not 
right)” (Deleuze 2007: 280). Published in France in 1983 and 1985, the two “cinema books,” as 
they are colloquially referred to, appeared at a highly turbulent and transitional moment in the 
history of the study of film. Whether Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 are best regarded are precipitators 
of this turbulence or as symptoms of a more fundamental shift in attitudes towards film theory 
that was already underway is an open question. In either case, these books’ historical 
situatedness is highly significant, since the mid-1980s marks a critical juncture in the 
development of film theory that has heavily conditioned scholarly trends ever since. The 
theoretical paradigm that had dominated film theory in the 1970s began to wane as critiques of 
its hegemony over the theoretical enterprise continued to mount from emerging corners of the 
academy. By laying out the factors that contributed to film studies’ sweeping transformation 
from a theory-centric discipline to one that is largely seen as “post-theoretical,” I will be able to 
situate and strengthen a central premise of this project: namely, that Deleuze’s cinema books and 
Guattari’s schizoanalytic writings (a significant portion of which are about art, media and film), 
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offer an alternative way out of the two-sided debate between “political modernists” and “post-
Theorists.” 
 The epoch of “modern” film theory, as Dudley Andrew refers to it in his 1984 book 
Concepts in Film Theory (the sequel to his 1976 publication The Major Film Theories), begins in 
1964: “In an important sense, film theory came to life by burying a work that was representative 
of all earlier film theory: 1964 was the date both of the publication of Jean Mitry’s Esthétique et 
psychologie du cinema and the appearance for the first time of the work of Christian Metz” 
(Andrew 1984: 11).xxv The arrival of Christian Metz ushered in new theoretical paradigms and 
working hypotheses that would change the shape of film theory over the following decade and a 
half, a historical period that is commonly considered to be the most formative period of film 
studies as a discipline.xxvi By the time of May 1968’s political upheavals, the conditions were 
ripe for the crystallization of a fairly coherent theoretical programme drawing on Saussurian 
linguistics, Althusserian ideology critique, and Lacanian psychoanalysis. This triad of 
intellectual influences from the Parisian intellectual scene became the founding references for 
theoretically-minded film journals such as Screen, Cinéthique, Afterimages and eventually 
Cahiers du Cinéma (after renouncing its Bazinian roots in 1970). These influences came to 
dominate film theory and film studies throughout the 1970s (film theory and film studies were 
still largely synonymous with each other at this point in time). The result is a well-known canon 
of essays that have recurrently served as conceptual touchstones for the discipline and are still 
regularly taught in undergraduate and graduate seminars, such as Christian Metz’s Le significant 
imaginaire: psychanalyse et cinéma, Laura Mulvey’s “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” 
Peter Wollen’s “Godard and Counter-Cinema: Vent d’Est”; Stephen Heath’s close structural 
analysis of Touch of Evil in “Film and System: Terms of Analysis”; Raymond Bellour’s essays 
on Hitchcock which were collected in L’Analyse d’un film; and the editors of Cahiers du 
Cinéma’s “John Ford’s Young Mr. Lincoln,” to name just a few of the most recognizable 
examples.  
 What undergirds practically all modern film theory, and what necessitated its break from 
classical film theory, was a serious intellectual commitment towards discerning how the cinema 
produces subjectivity. This commitment was accompanied by a shift in focus from individual 
films towards the underlying structure of cinema as a whole. Conceived of as a social apparatus 
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that worked on libidinal drives to structure subjectivity in a highly systematized and standardized 
manner, the cinema, not films themselves, became the film theorist’s prime object of study. 
Films never disappeared from the theoretical picture entirely, and in some famous cases of 
meticulous formal analysis, such as Raymond Bellour’s, films were brought into closer view 
than ever before through the use of editing tables that could freeze a film whose continuous flow 
had previously been immutable (Goddard 258). By reprinting images side by side with analytical 
text in scholarly essays, the film image took on a new scholarly function, which, counter-
intuitively, resulted in the film image forfeiting its position as object of study. The film image 
was frozen and reprinted to better understand the new object of study which replaced it: the 
film’s underlying structure— a structure that was thought to be largely overdetermined by the 
commercial aims and bourgeois ideology of popular cinema. One of the principle tasks of 1970s 
theory was to decipher this underlying structure of the film, or, to use the language of the period, 
to interpret the political unconscious of the film-text’s representational operations. (Terms such 
as representation, identification, signification and interpretation are some of the key concepts that 
define the film theory of this era and Dudley Andrew devotes whole chapters to them in his 
Concepts in Film Theory book). By interpreting the “unconscious” structure of a film, it becomes 
possible to theorize the “empty place”xxvii or “subject-position” that a film (and the social-
psychic-technological apparatus that it is a part of) prepares for its spectator. In structuralist film 
theory, as in structuralism more generally, “The true subject is the structure itself” (Deleuze 
2004: 178). After all, the spectator enters the cinema—conjoins with the cinematic apparatus—to 
be “subjected,” or “sutured” (in the terminology of Kaja Silverman’s The Subject of Semiotics), 
to the (phall[og]ocentric) laws serially structuring popular film-texts.  
 Lacanian psychoanalysis, Althusserian Marxism and Saussurian linguistics granted film 
theorists the tools for exploring the complex operations implicated in the cinema’s production of 
subjectivity. In the following paragraphs, I will briefly outline how each one of these intellectual 
traditions contributed to the development of 1970s film theory, specifically with regards to its 
emphasis on the production of subjectivity and the accompanying modes of close film analysis 
that were justified by its theoretical presumptions. After expounding the psychoanalytic, Marxist 
and semiotic underpinnings of theories of subjection, I will point to some of the perceived 
shortcomings of these approaches which precipitated a variety of challenges to the disciplinary 
hegemony of film theory in the 1980s. Finally, once these disciplinary shifts have been charted, I 
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will argue that the figures of Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze offer an alternative manner of 
theorizing the production of subjectivity that doesn’t fall into some of the same traps that 
plagued modern film theory and its structuralist heritage.  
Political Modernism 
 It is no coincidence that the date of Christian Metz’s first publication in 1964 marks the 
dawn of modern film theory. Metz was the first true modern film theorist in that he adopted the 
new “scientific” attitude of the epoch and painstakingly worked to systematically apply Lacanian 
principles of analysis to the cinema. As I alluded to above, one of the most recognizable traits of 
psychoanalytically inspired film theory was a killing off of the “love object”—the cinephilic 
attachment—in order to approach the cinema from what was thought to be a more objective 
position. Metz writes: 
To be a theoretician of the cinema, one should ideally no longer love the cinema and yet 
still love it: have loved it a lot and only have detached oneself from it by taking it up 
again from the other end, taking it as the target for the very same scopic drive which had 
made one love it. Have broken with it, as certain relationships are broken, not in order to 
move on to something else, but to return to it at the next bend of the spiral…. I have 
loved the cinema, I no longer love it, I still love it. (Metz 1985: 15, 79). 
The love for cinema that appears “at the next bend of the spiral” is a distanciated love that holds 
the object (of study) in place through a logic of “secondarization” that prevents the theoretician 
from being carried away by the “primary processes” that the film image-as-imaginary signifier 
activates. Only by first dispelling the image’s seductive lure for identification, and detaching 
from the cinephilic love that he or she once uncritically indulged in, may the psychoanalytic 
theoretician then study the imaginary signifier’s subjectifying power and make sense of 
cinephilic desire.  
For Metz, an educated attitude of detachment is both the precondition upon which film 
may be studied psychoanalytically, as well as the aim of psychoanalytic film study. In the 
opening lines of Psychoanalysis and Cinema, he writes: “Reduced to its most fundamental 
procedures, any psychoanalytic reflection on the cinema might be defined in Lacanian terms as 
an attempt to disengage the cinema-object from the imaginary and to win it for the symbolic, in 
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the hope of extending the latter by a new providence” (Metz 1985: 3). A few pages later he goes 
on to explain in more detail how “winning the imaginary for the symbolic” is the aim of 
psychoanalytic film study, but also its precondition, since its fait accompli in fact organizes his 
study’s present configuration. The psychoanalytic study of film enacts 
an economic conversion by which a strong object cathexis (here attraction to the cinema), 
initially molar and opaque, subsequently undergoes an instinctual vicissitude that 
bifidates it and arranges it like a pair of pliars, one pincer (voyeuristic sadism sublimated 
into epistemophilia) coming to meet the other in which the original imaginary dual 
effusion with the object is retained as a (living, surviving) witness—in short, this 
itinerary and the present configuration that results from it. (Metz 1985: 16) 
Sublimating the voyeuristic sadism of the image’s imaginary signifier into the symbolic realm of 
epistemophilia accomplishes a degree of detachment that makes a scholarly relation to the 
cinema possible. Paradoxically, however, this scholarly, detached attachment which 
preconditions the psychoanalytic study of the cinema, would not be possible without the 
psychoanalytic concepts which allowed the theorist to successfully leverage the required degree 
of detachment in the first place. 
There are very bold disciplinary and methodological implications to what Metz has to 
say. What his theory implies is that an untainted study of film with an adequately scientific 
relationship to truth would be impossible were it not for psychoanalysis. In short, if the study of 
film were ever to become a discipline, which indeed it did during Metz’s lifetime, then film 
studies would need psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, wouldn’t need film—or 
any art for that matter—since it already had established its object of study (the human psyche) 
and the aesthetic arena through which to interpret its unconscious: the dreamwork.xxviii In Metz’s 
writing, this hierarchy of importance which grants primacy to the psychoanalytic enterprise, 
paired with the aforementioned anxieties towards the cinematic image, results in an eschewal of 
individual films in favour of writing about cinema as a whole. His seminal work The Imaginary 
Signifier is noticeably bereft of practically any mention of actual films, and film analysis only 
appears in the latter third of Film language where he discusses Adieu Philippine (1962) and 8 ½ 
(1963). One of Metz’s principle strategies for maintaining a scientific distance from the 
cinema—a potentially dangerous and confusing love object—was to develop a theory of the 
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cinema that would transcend the specificity of any given film. Metz was the main catalyst for 
applying the principles of psychoanalysis to the study of film, and the scientism of his approach, 
along with the enormous cultural currency of psychoanalysis at the time, helped to lend new 
legitimacy to the theoretical study of film in the United Kingdom and United States. The way 
that Metz’s pioneering approach was eventually taken up in anglophone film studies diverged 
somewhat from his own method, but as I will show in the following pages, modern film theory 
still retained the bulk of his core ideas about the cinema and the need for a detached sort of 
attachment to it.  
 One of the main reasons why the emphasis that Metz’s psychoanalytic film theory 
placed on a “detached attachment” towards the cinema became so influential for film theorists 
throughout the 1970s is because it was supported by its confluence with Althusserian Marxism. 
For different yet parallel reasons, Marxist theoreticians also found it necessary to distance 
themselves from the film image. Whereas for psychoanalysis the danger of the film is 
represented by its opening onto the imaginary, for followers of Althusser, the danger lies in the 
image’s ability to naturalize the dominant ideology. Psychoanalysis responds to the threat of the 
film image by making the unconscious conscious (or winning the imaginary for the symbolic), 
and Althusserian Marxism, in a parallel move, seeks to raise class consciousness and de-
naturalize the dominant ideology, exposing its constructedness, and thus opening the theoretical 
possibility of constructing a classless society in its place.  
 Whether in Lacanian psychoanalysis or Althusserian Marxism, the imaginary exists as 
something to be conquered by theory. The extent to which Althusser draws on psychoanalytic 
concepts of the imaginary and the unconscious can be shown with recourse to a couple of 
significant quotations from Lenin and Philosophy. For Althusser, “Ideology represents the 
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” and yet it “has very 
little to do with ‘consciousness’ – it is profoundly unconscious” (Althusser 1971: 162). Like 
Metz’s imaginary signifier, Althusser’s imaginary begs to be won over to the realm of language 
and thought, which is why he is led to claim, “Philosophy is, in the last instance, class struggle in 
the field of theory” (Althusser 1976: 37). To struggle for a classless society in the field of theory 
is to perform ideology critique, to break false consciousness, and to win the imaginary for the 
symbolic—especially in mass art forms like the cinema, so that the subjective conditions for 
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macropolitical revolution could be created. It is no coincidence that film theory drew so 
extensively from a combination of psychoanalysis and Althusserian Marxism with their equally 
expansive theorizations of the imaginary. As Metz writes, “More than the other arts, or in a more 
unique way, the cinema involves us in the imaginary: it drums up all perception, but to switch it 
immediately over into its own absence, which is nonetheless the only signifier present” (Metz 
1985: 45). 
 The imaginary signifies, and it is on the level of the signifier that 1970s filmmaking 
and film theory sought to create the critical distance necessary for producing subjectivity against 
the grain of bourgeois normativity. Lacan and Althusser’s ideas are quite consonant with one 
another when it comes to the privileged role of language and signification in the constitution of 
the subject, and their shared logocentrism defines the structuralist underpinnings of modern film 
theory’s political strategy of intervening on the level of the signifier. To emphasize the central 
role that language plays in their respective theories of subjectivity production and film theory 
more generally, I will offer some key citations from these two thinkers.  
 According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Lacan “structuralized” 
psychoanalysis much in the same way that Althusser “structuralized” Marxism (and that Roland 
Barthes and Claude Lévis-Strauss respectively “structuralized” literary criticism and 
anthropology) (Johnston 2013: n.p.). Lacan’s structuralization of psychoanalysis took place  
under the banner of a “return to Freud” according to which, as his most famous dictum 
has it, “the unconscious is structured like a language” (l'inconscient est structuré comme 
un langage). Lacan portrayed himself as the lone defender of a Freudian orthodoxy in 
danger of being eclipsed by its alleged abandonment and betrayal in the post-Freudian 
analytic universe…. Lacan adamantly maintained that a Saussurian-assisted recovery of 
the overriding significance of language for analysis both clinical and metapsychological 
is the key to faithfully carrying forward Freud’s revolutionary approach to psychical 
subjectivity. All of this was announced in detail in the lengthy founding manifesto of 
Lacanianism, the 1953 écrit “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in 
Psychoanalysis” (often referred to as the “Rome Discourse” because of where it was 
delivered). (Johnston 2013) 
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At a conference commemorating “60 years of Lacan,” psychoanalyst Paul Verhaeghe explains 
how the “Rome Discourse” and its newfound structuralist emphasis on a semiotics of the 
unconscious led to a historical shift in how psychoanalysis conceives of the subject. For the first 
time, the psychoanalysis develops an auto-reflectivity about its imperative to produce an analytic 
subject:  
[S]omething has to take place—namely, the psychoanalytic realization of the subject. 
This is totally new, both the idea of the subject and the idea that this subject has to be 
realized via the process of analysis.  Don’t forget that Lacan started his career with a 
focus on paranoia and personality, and had moved from there to the theory on the mirror 
stage and the imaginary, where the I (le je) took the central stage. There was no question 
of a subject. (Verhaege: n.p.).     
With Lacan’s shift in focus from the imaginary to the symbolic, the subject of analysis emerged; 
emerged as subjected to the chain of signifiers coursing through the unconscious that arose 
during the free association of the analytic scene.  
 Lacan theorizes the linguistic underpinnings of psychic life and the production of 
subjectivity by rereading Freud’s notions of unconscious and symptom through a semiotic 
framework. The turn to semiotics allowed Lacan to advance psychoanalysis’ scientific 
ambitions, ambitions which, we should recall, Christian Metz fully embraced in the development 
of his method for creating critical distance from the cinema’s imaginary signifier and 
subsequently winning it for the symbolic. Lacan writes: “If psychoanalysis can become a science 
(for it is not yet one) and if it is not to degenerate in its technique (and perhaps this has already 
happened), we must rediscover the meaning of its experience. To this end, we can do no better 
than return to Freud's work” (Lacan 221). He goes on to offer a linguistic understanding of the 
dream: 
We must thus take up Freud 's work again starting with the Traumdeutung [The 
Interpretation of Dreams] to remind ourselves that a dream has the structure of a sentence 
or, rather, to keep to the letter of the work, of a rebus.… What is important is the version 
of the text, and that, Freud tells us, is given in the telling of the dream—that is, in its 
rhetoric. Ellipsis and pleonasm, hyperbaton or syllepsis, regression, repetition, 
apposition—these are the syntactical displacements; metaphor, catachresis, antonomasia, 
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allegory, metonymy, and synecdoche—these are the semantic condensations; Freud 
teaches us to read in them the intentions—whether ostentatious or demonstrative, 
dissimulating or persuasive, retaliatory or seductive—with which the subject modulates 
his oneiric discourse. (Lacan 222) 
This passage exemplifies how Lacan transforms the dream into a text, and the text into a verbal 
point of relay in the discursive relationship between analyst and analysand, whose rhetorical 
structure becomes the focus of analysis. Under the impulses of structuralism, the oneiric is 
transduced into discourse, and if the dream remains the “royal road to the unconscious” as Freud 
referred to it in The Interpretation of Dreams, then it is only in its telling, and the syntactical 
structure of this telling, that it still performs this vital role for the psychoanalytic project.  
 Lacan’s semiotic repurposing of the Freudian unconscious comes along with clinical 
implications for the role of the analyst who brings the analysand’s unconscious into 
consciousness. First and foremost, Lacan is adamant that psychoanalysis works towards cure 
through speech, and only through speech: “Whether it wishes to be an agent of healing, training, 
or sounding the depths, psychoanalysis has but one medium: the patient's speech” (Lacan 206). 
The patient’s speech, their telling of their dreams, functions in this context as the site of both 
symptomatology and therapeutics: symptomatology because the symptom is gleaned from the 
patient’s speech as “signifier of a signified that has been repressed from the subject’s 
consciousness” (Lacan 232); and therapeutics because “symptoms can be entirely resolved in an 
analysis of language, because a symptom is itself structured like a language: a symptom is 
language from which speech must be delivered” (Lacan 270). Lacan’s emphasis on the verbal 
symptom as signifier of an unconscious signified forms the intellectual backdrop to 1970s film 
theory, which privileged interventions on the level of the signifier as fundamental to its political 
strategy of altering dominant modes of subjectivity production. 
 In conjunction with Lacan, Althusser was the other main influence on the film theory 
of the period and its semiotic understanding of subjectivity. In parallel fashion to how the Lacan 
of the Rome Discourse gave subjectivity a renewed importance in psychoanalysis, the same can 
be said of Althusser and the privileged role that he grants subjectivity in his theory of ideology, 
which marks a novel contribution to the history of Marxist thought. Althusser specialist William 
Lewis contextualizes Althusser’s contributions as follows: 
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During the 1970s, Althusser continued the revisions begun in 1967 and elaborated other 
Marxian ideas he believed to be underdeveloped. Perhaps the best known of the new 
conceptual formulations resulting from these efforts is that of “ideological interpellation.” 
This account of how a human being becomes a self-conscious subject was published in an 
essay titled “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” (1970). It was excerpted from a 
larger essay titled “On the Reproduction of Capitalism.” This work analyzed the 
necessary relationship between state and subject such that a given economic mode of 
production might subsist. It includes not only an analysis of the state and its legal and 
educational systems but also of the psychological relationship which exists between 
subject and state as ideology. This narrative of subjectification was intended to help 
advance Althusser's argument that regimes or states are able to maintain control by 
reproducing subjects who believe that their position within the social structure is a natural 
one. Ideology, or the background ideas that we possess about the way in which the world 
must function and of how we function within it is, in this account, understood to be 
always present. Specific socio-economic structures, however, require particular 
ideologies. These ideologies are instantiated by institutions or “Ideological State 
Apparatuses” like family, schools, church, etc., which provide the developing subject 
with categories in which she can recognize herself. Inasmuch as a person does so and 
embraces the practices associated with those institutions, she has been successfully 
“hailed” or “interpellated” and recognized herself as that subject who does those kinds of 
things. As the effect of these recognitions is to continue existing social relations, 
Althusser argued that a Dictatorship of the Proletariat is necessary so that Ideological 
State Apparatuses productive of the bourgeois subject can be replaced with those 
productive of proletarian or communist subjects. (Lewis 2014) 
What I would like to highlight from this account of Althusser’s theory of ideology is how the 
psychological relationship that exists between the political subject and state is understood in 
terms of ideology, and how ideology in turn operates through language. The most illustrative 
example that Althusser provides of interpellation, is of the police officer’s “ ‘Hey, you there!’”  
(Althusser 1971: 118), an enunciation which stops the individual in the street, as he or she comes 
to recognize him or herself as a subject under the law. 
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 In his article, “The Politics of the Sign and Film Theory,” Philip Rosen explains how 
Althusser’s theory of ideology compliments Lacan’s psychoanalytic modeling of the signifier by 
putting it into contact with a social and historical “outside” that is at work “inside the sign.” In 
Althusser’s “framework on the play of signifiers … the regulation of signification becomes 
inseparable from the composition of the social whole” (Rosen 1981: 19). Rosen goes on to add, 
“In recent film theory this regulation has been elaborated as a matter of subject construction and 
positioning. Without questioning the validity of the critique of the sign as applied to filmic 
signification or the benefits of the appeal to psychoanalysis, it is still possible to suggest that 
routing the politics of the sign through a theory of the subject requires more explicit attention to 
the question of determinations in and by the social formation” (Rosen 19). Althusser’s concept of 
interpellation provides just such explicit attention to social formations that was lacking in 
psychoanalytic accounts of subjectification while still clinging to its Saussurean foundations. 
 Together, Althusser and Lacan’s structuralist Marxism and psychoanalysis combined 
in modern film theory to generate a unique emphasis on the signifier as both psychic and social 
site of subjectivity production. The relationship between psyche and the socius is one of the lines 
of inquiry running throughout this project and I will return to the importance of the division 
between the psychic and the social approaches to understanding the film image in chapter one. 
For now, it should suffice to say that the psychic and social constitute the two most influential 
areas of inquiry in the founding of modern film theory, with the psychic lineage tracing its roots 
back to Lacan, and the social to Althusser. 1970s film theory’s defining quality was the belief 
that interventions on the level of the signifier could catalyze radical social change, since the 
signifier was seen as the key relay in processes of desiring identification and ideological 
interpellation that naturalized and reified pre-existing libidinal and social relations. 
 One of the many merits of D.N. Rodowick’s The Crisis of Political Modernism is that 
it situates 1970s film theory within these broader intellectual movements of the period. 
Rodowick explains: “Political modernism was the defining idea, what Foucault might call the 
historical a priori, of 70s film theory” (Rodowick 1994: iix); “a complex, contradictory unity 
from the fields of literary semiology, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and Althusserian Marxism in the 
study of film and ideology” (Rodowick 1994: 272). Political modernism “is the expression of a 
desire to combine semiotic and ideological analysis with the development of an avant-garde 
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aesthetic practice dedicated to the production of radical social effects” (Rodowick 1994: 2). A 
couple of examples from prominent 1970s film theorists will help to show how the structuralist 
ideas of Lacan and Althusser influenced their relationship to the film image and came to 
privilege the signifier as the point of political intervention into the production of subjectivity.  
 One of the most important adaptations of Lacan’s thought in the film theory of the 
period is Kaja Silverman’s book The Subject of Semiotics. An exemplary work of political 
modernism, Silverman turns to Lacanian analyst Jacques-Alain Miller’s concept of suture to 
“account for the means by which subjects emerge in discourse” (Silverman 1984: 200). She 
writes: “Miller defines suture as that moment when the subject inserts itself into the symbolic 
register in the guise of a signifier, and in doing so, gains meaning at expense of being” (200). In 
the section of her book devoted to this notion of suture, Silverman lays out how it operates in the 
work of influential film theorists such as Laura Mulvey, Jean-Pierre Oudart, Daniel Dylan and 
Stephen Heath. By transposing the Lacanian idea of suture to the study of film, it undergoes 
some structuralist modifications, similar to how the dream, the unconscious and the symptom of 
Lacan’s Rome Discourse accrued significance only in being verbally relayed by the patient’s 
speech. Likewise, in the film theory of suture, the film and its structure are viewed syntactically: 
“Shot relationships are seen as the equivalent of syntactic ones in linguistic discourse, as the 
agency whereby meaning emerges and a subject-position is constructed for the viewer” 
(Silverman 1984: 201). Silverman goes on to analyze key films in the canon of classical 
Hollywood to show how the scopic structure of a film (determined in most cases by shot-reverse-
shot editing) delimits the subject positions that it makes available to the spectator, and that these 
positions are inherently gendered. She writes: “It is imperative to note that the identifications and 
erotic investments of classic cinema—like those established during the Oedipus complex—
produce a sexually differentiated subject. Not only are classic cinema’s subject positions 
organized along sexual lines, but so is the desire it inaugurates. Indeed, the entire system of 
suture is inconceivable apart from sexual difference” (Silverman 1984: 221).    
 Silverman’s analysis of classical Hollywood cinema as structured around sexual 
difference recalls Christian Metz’s assertion that “the cinematic signifier is not only 
‘psychoanalytic’; it is more precisely Oedipal in type” (Metz 65). The subject positions offered 
by sexual difference within the Oedipal triad are still highly overdetermined by the semiotic 
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function of the phallus as signifier of disavowed lack. Silverman makes recourse to feminist film 
scholar Claire Johnston’s “Towards a Feminist Film Practice: Some Theses” to highlight this 
dilemma and chart some avenues out of the phallic overdetermination of subjectivity:  
As a process, a practice of signification, suture is an ideological operation with a 
particular function in relation to paternal ideology in that out of a system of differences it 
establishes a position in relation to the phallus. In so doing it places the spectator in 
relation to that position…. It is this imaginary unity, the sutured coherence, the imaginary 
sense of identity set up by the classic film which must be challenged by a feminist film 
practice to achieve a different constitution of the subject in relation to ideology. (Johnston 
1976: 56 in Silverman 1984: 221-222) 
In this excerpt from Johnston’s influential text, the Lacanian notions of suture, the imaginary, 
identification and the phallus combine with the Althusserian concept of ideology (albeit in a 
uniquely paternal constellation) to delineate how the social relations of a patriarchal and 
capitalist society are reproduced through the highly selective subject-positions offered by the 
mass institution of the cinema. 
 A more thorough review of the literature on suture has been performed in other places, 
such as Rodowick’s chapter “Language, Narrative, Subject” in The Crisis of Political 
Modernism, but for my purposes here it suffices to say that in 1970s film theory, the formal 
composition of a film was seen as having direct implications for the type of subjectivity that a 
film could bring into existence. The sutured, seemingly seamless illusionism of Hollywood 
cinema prompted the valourization of concepts such as “excess” (Deborah Linderman and 
Kristin Thompson), “visual unpleasure” (Laura Mulvey and Peter Wollen) and “masquerade” 
(Mary Anne Doane) as strategies of resistance to dominant signifying, and thus subjectifying, 
practices. As contradictory as some of these various theories prove to be, they can all be read as 
part of broader tendency in film theory that sought various means to break out of Hollywood’s 
systematic production—or suturing—of spectatorial subjectivity in accordance with the 
dominant (patriarchal, bourgeois) ideology.  
 The structuralist paradigm of modern film theory, with its basis in Lacan and Althusser, 
generated a unique type of film analysis that put these theoretical principles into practice. Two of 
the writers whose film analyses mark some of the period’s crowning achievements are Stephen 
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Heath and Raymond Bellour, who each in their own way straddle the contradiction that Christian 
Metz describes between cinephilia, or fascination with the film image, and a latent anxiety 
towards the image and its illusory nature. Heath and Bellour’s most acclaimed works are heavily 
inspired by Metz. Up to a certain point, they activate the principles of his “grande 
syntagmatique,” or what Metz posited as a universal syntagmatic structure organizing the 
narrative cinema, and combined this approach with meticulous, shot-by-shot analyses of films. In 
his article “The Core and Flow of Film Studies,” an essay in the special issue of Critical Inquiry 
on the state of the disciplines, Dudley Andrew describes how the method of formal analysis that 
was used by these theorists was influenced by the structuralist imperatives of the period. 
Stephen Heath’s seventy-page reading of Orson Welles’s Touch of Evil, symptomatically 
titled “Film and System: Terms of Analysis,” remains a thrillingly ingenious, if 
intimidating, exercise in this mode. Published in Screen in two installments during 1975, 
it owed much to Metz and to Raymond Bellour, whose series of analyses of the molecular 
structure of classical Hollywood movies—especially Hitchcock’s—led film scholars to 
believe that every film could be parsed into a web of over-lapping codes, each of which 
could be cracked and whose overall structure (the textual system), furthermore, could be 
related to larger systems working above the level of narrative (Andrew 2009: 899).  
To be precise, and to build on the presentations of Lacan and Althusser’s work provided thus far, 
the “larger systems working above the level of narrative” are none other than what could be 
called the unconscious—whether that unconscious be of the “political-ideological” or “psychic” 
variety. In the film analysis of the 1970s, the film was conceived of in much the same light as the 
dream in Lacanian psychoanalysisxxix—as a text. By analyzing its textual structure, it was 
thought possible to shed new light on the limited range of subject positions that the cinema 
offered its spectators, and thus what the politics of a given cinema effectively were. Modern film 
theory’s strategy of constituting the film as a text encapsulates its ambivalence towards the 
cinema, with its mix of fascination and anxiety, or reverence and criticism. The theoretical 
gesture is entirely in line with Metz’s assertion that the aim of film theory is to win the imaginary 
for the symbolic, since the text is exactly that—symbolic. In the 1970s, film analysis became 
known as “textual analysis”; just as for the Lacan on the Rome Discourse, the interpretation of 
dreams became the interpretation of the discourse of dreams. 
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 Both Heath and Bellour articulate their practices of textual analysis in relation to Metz, 
and while each of them is heavily indebted to his work, they seek to differentiate their methods. 
For example, in “Film and System: Terms of Analysis,” Stephen Heath makes the film-as-text 
the foundation for his analysis. He even goes to the extent of saying that “by ‘film’ is meant the 
given unit of discourse” (Heath 1975: 9). Heath then distinguishes between analysis of the film 
(as unit of discourse) and the filmic system (which includes its relations of production). Metz’s 
“grande syntagmatique” only applies to the former, so Heath departs from Metz’s methodology 
by supplementing the psychoanalysis of film with the ideological analysis essential to the project 
of historical materialism (Heath 1975: 28). For Heath, “textual analysis” and its roots in the 
“grande syntagmatique” is fundamental to understanding the ideology being reproduced by the 
filmic system as a whole, and the place that it makes for the spectatorial subject who acts as 
“turning-point (circulation) between image and industry (poles of the cinematic institution) 
which demands study in the analysis of films” (Heath 1975: 8). 
For his part, Bellour similarly pays homage to Metz and the notion of film-as-text, while 
differentiating his style of analysis. “Metz was looking for a concept (that of textual system), 
which had no need of any film,” he writes. “I, on the other hand, hoped that the ‘desire of the 
film’ would be concentrated in every fragment” (2000: 8). Bellour’s search for the textual 
system’s desiring economy in the fragments of the film leads him to “freeze” the film on the 
editing board and fill the pages of his studies with those still images. What these fragments of 
“text” articulated, was none other than a universal unconscious structure that psychoanalysis 
found in all literary texts. Dudley Andrew points that Bellour was symptomatic of the intellectual 
period in this regard; “The epigraph preceding [Bellour’s] analysis of North by Northwest, an 
epigraph ascribed to Barthes, insists that all novels are ultimately the story of Oedipus” (Andrew 
1984: 141). As much as Bellour’s method of close textual analysis displays a strong drive 
towards elucidating the imperceptible yet highly determining structure of the film-text, he also 
recognizes the limitations of close shot-by-shot breakdowns for explaining the unconscious 
structure of a film. In response to Bazin’s timeless question, “What is Cinema?” Bellour 
responds, “the unattainable text” (Goddard 2009: 261; Bellour 2000: 21-22). This response is 
indicative of Bellour’s growing suspicion that freezing a film and analyzing its structure can not 
somehow do justice to an artform that is inherently durational and experiential. As I will delve 
into more in later passages of this literature review, Raymond Bellour renounces the structuralist 
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aspirations of modern film theory in favour of new approaches couched in the work of Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari after the crisis of political modernism in the 1980s. For now, it 
suffices to say that like many of the 1970s film theorists who deployed formal analyses to ground 
their theories, Bellour found it necessary for the film to be read as a text, and thus, made into a 
text by theory. 
Theorists of the epoch most often performed close textual analyses of Hollywood cinema, 
and display a certain ambivalence towards what they found. On the one hand, the classical 
Hollywood cinema was the cinema that most fully embodied the dominant bourgeois and 
patriarchal ideologies of the economic and social institutions adjoined to the cinema. Yet on the 
other hand, theorists could often find points of resistance, or at least potential for resistance, by 
using theory to discover the limitations and excesses of the classical text. Dudley Andrew is 
worth quoting at length on this point,  
Instead of popular leftist films, the modern theorist far prefers the more complicated films 
of conservative filmmakers because they confront the limits of classical cinema. For this 
reason the notorious Cahiers du cinema essay on John Ford’s Young Mr. Lincoln takes 
such an ambivalent stance toward this reactionary film. Like Georg Lukacs before them, 
they find more merit in the honest but serious work of the old guard than in the simple 
and self-righteous alternatives posed by leftists who adopt the traditional forms. Ford, and 
all important filmmakers in the tradition (the whole hagiography of the early Cahiers 
comes to mind here: Preminger, Hitchcock, Nicholas Ray, Douglas Sirk, Minelli, and so 
on), struggle to make the classic film system express ostensibly commonplace values, but 
in their best work they do so with such complexity and honesty that everything is put in 
jeopardy. In these films the genre (the Western, the family melodrama, even the musical) 
are made to bear more weight than they are capable of carrying…. In Roland Barthes's 
breakdown, the films of Ford, Sirk, Minelli, and company are “plural texts,” seemingly 
coherent narratives which nevertheless invite and reward many, even contradictory 
interpretations. Much of the best theoretical work of the 1970’s went into determining, 
not the range or relative importance of such interpretations, but the structure of a text that 
could support and guide them all. This at least was the avowed purpose of the Cahiers 
piece on Young Mr. Lincoln and Heath’s essay on Touch of Evil. (Andrew: 122-124).  
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Like the Cahiers du Cinéma editors’ piece on Young Mr. Lincoln, Heath and Bellour choose to 
analyze Hollywood texts. Heath is most well-known for his analysis of Orson Welles’ Touch of 
Evil and Bellour for his analyses of Hitchcock’s oeuvre, including North by Northwest, Marnie, 
and Psycho, as well as films by classical auteurs such as D.W. Griffith (The Lonedale Operator), 
Vincente Minnelli (Gigi) and Howard Hawks (The Big Sleep). As Andrew explains, by closely 
analyzing films by highly regarded “masters” of Hollywood cinema, film theorists could deduce 
the range of—sometimes contradictory—subject positions offered by the structure of the text. 
What this labour of constituting the Hollywood film as text accomplishes is a certain proximity 
to the image without being lost, as Christian Metz so feared, in the ideological trappings of its 
imaginary lures for identification. By using the structuralist methods available, modern film 
theorists approached the film image towards which they expressed a strong ambivalence, and 
even went to the length of freezing it on the editing table, thus constituting it as a text. As a result 
of this textual operation whereby the imaginary signifier came to appear as just that—a 
signifier—it became possible for theorists to hold onto their “love for the cinema,” including 
even reactionary texts like Young Mr. Lincoln, Gilda, or The Londedale Operator, while at the 
same time undertaking the critical steps necessary to temper their attachment and cultivate an 
oppositional politics. 
 This critical tendency coursing through the textual analyses of 1970s theory did not 
happen in a vacuum: it emerged in tandem with the artistic efforts of the period which were 
allied to a similar political sensibility. The era of political modernism is equally recognizable in a 
concentrated group of radical filmmakers who played with the subjectifying effects of the 
signifier. Just like the intellectuals of the period, filmmakers such as Jean-Luc Godard, Chantal 
Akerman, Harun Farocki, Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle Huillet, and Yvonne Rainer were 
equally engaged with structuralist thinking and the emphasis that it places on the signifier’s 
power to produce subjectivity and structure the unconscious. They frequently deployed 
Brechtian-inspired distanciation techniques to break what theorists called the illusionism of the 
classical narrative film and its powerful means of suture. The theorist who arguably did the most 
to theorize this modernist, avant-gardist vein of the 1970s art cinema is Peter Wollen. Much like 
the thinkers I have previously mentioned, Wollen’s thought is couched in the radical semiotics of 
the period, and his analyses of political filmmakers stress the textual operations that they enact 
on the level of the signifier in the aim of producing revolutionary forms of subjectivity. 
39 
 
“Godard and Counter-Cinema: Vent d’Est” is the most iconic of his essays. This essay 
positions revolutionary-materialist filmmaking against Hollywood and “the values of the old 
cinema” and sets up a table that lays out the binary oppositions between them. On the side of 
Godardian materialist filmmaking are a variety of distanciation techniques that flaunt the 
materiality and constructedness of the signifier: narrative intransitivity, estrangement, 
foregrounding, multiple diegesis, aperture, un-pleasure and reality (Wollen 120). Wollen opposes 
these “cardinal virtues” against the “seven deadly sins” of Hollywood filmmaking: Narrative 
transitivity, identification, transparency, single diegesis, closure, pleasure, and fiction. The 
impulse behind these Brechtian-inspired techniques are explicitly political: to break the spectator 
out of his or her illusionistic subjection to the signifier in favour of an auto-critical subjectivity 
that renounces the simple pleasures of bourgeois spectacle in favour of the more difficult, yet 
necessary, path of constructing a revolutionary reality out of the laborious negation of fiction.  
In other key places such as “Ontology and Materialism in Film” and “The Two Avant-
Gardes” Wollen builds on this avant-gardist theory of radical aesthetics to privilege a historical-
materialist avant-garde against a more de-politicized, or “ontological” avant-garde embodied by 
filmmakers such as Malcom LeGrice, Michael Snow, Hollis Frampton and Stan Brakhage: “For 
Brecht, of course, the point of the Verfremdung [estrangement or alienation]-effect was not 
simply to break the spectator’s involvement and empathy in order to draw attention to the artifice 
of art, ie, an art-centred model, but in order to demonstrate the workings of society, a reality 
obscured by habitual norms of perception, by habitual modes of identification with ‘human 
problems’” (Wollen 1976: 17-18 cited in Rodowick 1994: 157). Wollen’s invocation of Brecht 
as the figure through which a new counter-cinema with radical social effects could be 
constructed is entirely in keeping with the intellectual climate of the period. Screen published 
two special issues on Brecht (in which Wollen played a crucial role)—issues 15.2 (Summer 
1974) and 16.4 (Winter 1976)—and books from the early 80s such as Martin Walsh’s The 
Brechtian Aspect of Radical Cinema and George Lellis’ Bertolt Brecht: Cahiers du cinéma and 
Contemporary Film Theory grant Brecht an important role in their vision of radical politics.  
If any one essay can sum up the logic of political modernism, it is likely Wollen’s on 
counter-cinema, since it encapsulates the theory, method and aesthetic sensibility of 1970s film 
studies. The synthesis that film theory of the era achieved by adopting the intellectual genealogy 
of psychoanalysis, Marxism and semiotics culminated in a unique and clearly defined aesthetic, 
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methodical and political programme. However, by the early 1980s, this paradigm was brought 
into question by diverse styles of critique that all, in one way or another, questioned the 
hegemony of this theoretical approach over the study of film.  
 
The Crisis of Political Modernism & the Theory/Post-Theory Debates 
 
 D.N Rodowick devotes an entire book to the conditions that precipitated the crisis of 
political modernism, and an extensive review of these precipitating factors is beyond the scope 
of this literature review. However, it is worth pointing out some of the main reasons why this 
specific way of doing film theory came to pass, and also to point out what sort of approaches 
supplanted it as the new disciplinary orthodoxy. After tracing the crisis of political modernism 
and the critiques that were levelled against modern theory, I will turn to the role of Deleuze and 
Guattari in the disciplinary history of film studies to argue that they offer a way to maintain a 
theory of subjectivity production that offers a line of flight out of the 1970s incarnation of film 
theory and its limitations that were exposed with increasing regularity in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 The crisis of political modernism was precipitated in part by the weight of some of 
theory’s own internal contradictions, and partially by critiques levelled against it from corners of 
the academy that were either not interested in theory, saw its value but also recognized its 
shortcomings, or were vehemently against it. First, I will share some citations from Rodowick’s 
book on the topic that articulate the internal reasons why theory found itself at a historic impasse. 
Afterwards, I will foreground some of the external challenges to theory that reconfigured the 
shape of the discipline.  
 There are three main internal reasons why 1970s film theory came into crisis. The first 
reason is that the rigid binary that it set up between realism and formalism was belittling of the 
artistic tradition of realism and foreclosed scholarly interest in the popular arts which were 
deemed to be “irredeemably compromised by the ‘dominant ideology’ in content and in form,” 
writes Rodowick. “… In creating two broad regimes of discourse (realism and modernism, 
ideological and theoretical practice) opposed to each other and thus complete in themselves, 
political modernism could not produce critical concepts sensitive to nuances of form or 
meaning” (Rodowick 1994: xxiii). Political modernism’s strict and programmatic aesthetic 
sensibility effectively decided a priori what the (subjectifying) effects of a given film would be, 
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based largely on value judgements about its stylistic and film cultural heritage. What was left out 
of such discussions was the possibility that a film’s meaning was not entirely determined by its 
form, and that oppositional filmmaking could adopt different forms, narratives and themes across 
diverse cultural and historical contexts. Admittedly, 1970s film theory did maintain some leeway 
for these types of non-deterministic interpretations, particularly amongst feminist film theorists 
who discovered the possibility for alternative modes of identification with the image and their 
corresponding subjective positions in the “excessive” moments of the classical Hollywood text. 
Moments of masquerade, aesthetic excess or self-reflexive performativity all offered 
opportunities for textual slippage and the heterogeneous subject positions that such slippage 
enables. Nevertheless, these admissions of textual slippage never really challenged the 
overarching cinema/counter-cinema binary that dominated the epoch’s intellectual sensibility, 
and as Rodowick writes with reference to this theoretical bind: “binary thinking excludes any 
alternative not accounted for by the dualism itself” (1994: xxvii). 
 The second internal factor contributing to the crisis of political modernism was, 
somewhat ironically, film theory’s failure to self-reflexively recognize the textuality of its own 
practice.  
The text was a bounded space required to accomplish a specific “meaning-effect”—the 
“deconstruction” of its relation to ideology and a transformation of the positions of 
meaning offered to the spectator. This thesis produced the following paradox in the 
discourse of political modernism: there is no text in theory. Or more clearly, the 
discursive and institutional force of theory was reduced or dissembled by the attribution 
of an epistemological self-validation to the “materialist text.” The ascription of 
“theoretical practice,” as a function of a “materialist” film practice, the differentiation of 
film form according to criteria of epistemology, identity, and the body, in short, the 
identification of critical practice and knowledge as a property of these forms, all 
contributed to marking “theory” as a relation external to “the text.” Implicitly, the 
theoretical discourse that articulated these concepts became a supplemental relation: an 
adjunct to “political/aesthetic” practice but not a part of it; a necessary step toward the 
accomplishment of a “materialist film practice” that, nevertheless, would be superfluous 
once the forms of that practice had been decided. For ideally, this “text” would be 
autodeconstructive of itself and its spectator. (Rodowick 1994: 273)  
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By privileging the Brechtian text of counter-cinema that flaunted the materiality of its own 
signifier to such a degree, film theory came to imply its own superfluousness. For a truly 
materialist text that would be autodeconstructive of itself and its spectator, and a text that had 
completely broken from the dominant ideology and its illusionism, would be in no need of 
theory. Film theory effectively posited its own negation in the tangible possibility of the 
materialist text’s actualization. To invoke the theme of detached attachment that I described in 
my discussion of Christian Metz above, according to this internal paradox of political 
modernism, once the love object of cinema ceases to pose the ideological and psychic dangers 
that once characterized it by self-reflexively becoming a materialist, auto-deconstructive text, 
then the need for theory is vanquished.  
 The third internal pressure that led to the crisis of political modernism was the shifting 
landscape of continental philosophy. I consider the changing patterns of continental thought to be 
an “internal” reason as to why political modernism faced a crisis because it was the three guiding 
intellectuals of French structuralism whose thought formed the basis for what would become 
film theory. In other words, no film theory would have been possible were it not for these 
philosophical influences. The rise of new approaches to understanding the production of 
subjectivity in French philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s contributed to the crisis of political 
modernism by unsettling some of its founding ontological assumptions about the nature of the 
subject. Two of the thinkers whose work brought about this shift in theories of subjectivity 
production are Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, the first of whom you will know from the 
introduction, is an important influence on this project and its dialogue with the history of anti-
psychiatry. To cite again from D.N. Rodowick,    
The questions posed by political modernism do not simply define a local, transient 
problem in film theory; rather, they have determined the institutional foundations of 
that theory in its currently reigning forms. Moreover, there are larger historical and 
philosophical issues at stake. For example, by 1972 Michel Foucault and Jacques 
Derrida’s work had charted in an exemplary manner the breakup of the constitutive 
unities of sign, structure, and subject that were characteristic of a certain era of 
knowledge. (Rodowick 1994: 272) 
As the unities of sign, structure, and subject came under scrutiny by “poststructuralist” thinkers 
such as Foucault, Derrida, and significantly for this project, Deleuze and Guattari, the founding 
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premises of modern film theory were brought under scrutiny for legitimate philosophical 
reasons. Charting the full scope of the shift from structuralist to poststructuralist theories of 
subject and sign would be beyond the scope of this literature review, since it would require a 
gloss on a wide range of thinkers whose work is often incongruent in focus and intention. At this 
moment in time it should simply suffice to say that once the linguistic and structuralist 
underpinnings of subject and sign became unsettled, so did the fusion of theories insisting on the 
film being read as a text which characterized film studies during its most formative decade. 
 In addition to these philosophical reasons for the waning of modern theory, at least in the 
way it was practiced in the 1970s, Dudley Andrew offers a complementary sociological 
explanation:  
After 1980 straightforward American film scholarship had begun to depose foreign 
intellectuals, with their obtuse, often untranslated, vocabularies. A sociologist of 
knowledge might find that Grand Film Theory simply did not leave enough room for the 
greatly expanded corps of researchers streaming out of American graduate schools who 
needed to come up with additional objects of study and new ways of studying them. 
Historical and cultural topics provided endless opportunities, and this is the direction film 
studies took in the U.S. I resisted this wholesale abandonment of theory (Andrew 901). 
In his assessment of the crisis of political modernism, Rodowick echoes Andrew’s resistance 
towards the wholesale abandonment of theory. He argues that even though the theoretical 
approaches of the period did find themselves up against their own internal limitations and 
contradictions, the exposure of these limitations simply signaled the progress of philosophical 
inquiry. The perceived inadequacies that arose in 1970s film theory weren’t inadequacies of 
theory or philosophy in general, or with its ability to produce knowledge about the cinema, but 
simply with this epistemologically and historically contingent iteration of it. That the structuralist 
underpinnings of film theory were contested by new theories of sign and subject did not 
necessarily need to imply that inquiry into the production of subjectivity in the cinema be 
abandoned. 
 Rodowick is clear that theoretical inquiry into the cinema and its production of 
subjectivity was ripe for further contributions, even in the 1980s and 1990s, and that the 
philosophical resources of theory had not been anywhere close to extinguished. He argues,  
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If in retrospect it is possible to identify the end, no matter how indistinct, of the era of 
political modernism, this end is marked neither by the inadequacy of its basic concepts 
nor by the exhaustion of its philosophical and critical resources…. The discourse of 
political modernism, and the crisis it represents, is but a local manifestation of that long 
and arduous transformation in the foundations of philosophy and the human sciences that 
is our inheritance from Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. And to the extent that this discourse 
participates in the announcement of “the end of man” in the era of late capitalism, it also 
celebrates difference in the multiplication of sites of resistance and possibilities of 
subjectivity heretofore unimagined and unimaginable (Rodowick 1994: xxvi, 272).  
Evidently, Rodowick was much more enthusiastic about the promise of theory to overcome its 
limitations and contradictions. Interestingly enough, he even found the rationale for this closely 
held belief in the history of psychoanalytic thought, which foresaw its own limitations when 
dealing with subject matter as unruly as the unconscious: “[U]ltimately, what a political criticism 
must hold onto is the recognition that textual determinations on the ‘placement’ of the subject are 
both undecidable and unpredictable. The contribution of psychoanalysis to twentieth-century 
thought is that meaning is always in excess of the signifier, and that similarly, the subject is 
always in excess of meaning” (Rodowick 1994: 297-298). Psychoanalysis’ latent ability to 
articulate the indeterminate nature of subjectivity stemming from the signified’s unconscious 
excess over and above the signifier was not enough to save it from being cast aside in favour of 
new cognitivist and historicist methods. The disciplinary disavowal of Lacanian psychoanalysis 
which began in the 1980s had less to do with its suitability for theorizing new forms of 
subjectivity, than with the privileging of a whole new research agenda which led in many 
exciting and productive directions, but which left behind the theoretical interest in the cinema’s 
production of subjectivity that defined the discipline during its most formative decade of 
institutional legitimization.  
 Instead, what happened in the two decades which ensued was that, to use a figure of 
speech, the production of subjectivity baby was thrown out with the film theory bathwater. 
Rodowick’s October essay “Elegy for Theory,” which he later expanded into a full-length book 
of the same name, describes the disciplinary climate of the 1980s and 1990s in which theory was 
displaced by history, science and philosophy (2007: 95). The era witnessed a “reinvigoration of 
historical research, more sociologically rigorous reconceptualizations of spectatorship and the 
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film audience, and the placement of film in the broader context of visual culture and electronic 
media” (2007: 91). The most emblematic and influential critiques of modern film theory came 
from David Bordwell who initiated what has come to be known as the “theory debates” with the 
disciplinary polemic Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies, an anthology that he coedited 
with analytic philosopher Noël Carroll in 1996.  
Bordwell’s implicit criticisms of film theory had long been germinating by this point in 
time. As Dudley Andrew writes, The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style and Mode of 
Production which Bordwell co-wrote with Janet Staiger and Kristen Thompson “would dispense 
with lofty theory altogether, building a historical poetics based on a notion of image processing 
that Bordwell would soon ground in the universals of cognitive psychology” (Andrew 2009: 
902). The joint research programmes of historical poetics and cognitive psychology espoused by 
Bordwell and aligned scholars in the 1980s eventually expanded into a disciplinary debate about 
method in the 1990s. The declarative title of Bordwell and Carroll’s Post-Theory aimed for no 
less than to bury film studies’ “grand” theoretical inclinations once and for all in the embrace of 
analytic philosophy and what Bordwell calls “middle level research”: empirical and 
historiographic studies, as well as exhibition and stylistic histories (Bordwell 1996: 27).  
Bordwell argues that these types of middle-level research offer a way out of the “deep 
continuities of doctrine and practice” that he finds in 1970s film theory and the cultural studies 
that emerged from it in the 1980s. The four “continuities of doctrine” that he identifies and 
heavily criticizes are: “1. Human practices and institutions are in all significant respects socially 
constructed; 2. Understanding how viewers interact with films requires a theory of subjectivity; 
3. The spectator’s response to cinema depends on identification; and 4. Verbal language supplies 
an appropriate and adequate analogue for film.” The four “continuities of practice” that he pairs 
to these “doctrines” are as follows: “1. Top-down inquiry; 2. Argument as bricolage; 3. 
Associational reasoning; and 4. The hermeneutic impulse.” An elucidation of his criticisms 
towards these “doctrines” and “practices” can be read from pages 18-26 of his essay 
“Contemporary Film Studies and the Vicissitudes of Grand Theory” in the Post-Theory 
anthology.  
Bordwell’s polemic against film theory garnered a lot of attention and prompted a debate 
about the role of theory in the study of film. Perhaps the most passionate counter-attack on 
Bordwell came from an unlikely source: Slavoj Žižek. Though not strictly a film scholar, the 
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widely read Lacanian-Marxist philosopher occasionally writes film theory and has even starred 
in a couple of movies that consist of him performing theoretical readings of films, The Pervert’s 
Guide to Cinema (2006) and The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology (2012). His 2001 book The Fright 
of Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieslowski between Theory and Post-Theory levels criticisms back at 
David Bordwell, argues for the inadequacy of middle-level research to account for the social 
constructedness of cinema, and defends the basic premises of 1970s film theory and its manner 
of theorizing the production of subjectivity. Colin MacCabe, one of the main contributors to the 
journal Screen during the 1970s and the author of studies on Brecht and Godard, penned an 
impassioned preface to Žižek’s book that defends the theoretical enterprise of the 1970s against 
Bordwell and Carroll’s attacks. He sums up the book and its disciplinary significance as follows: 
Žižek’s work, and this book is as good and ambitious as anything he has done, could be 
taken as the exemplar for a project of renewing the study of cinema by intensifying its 
theoretical ambition. For those followers of fashion who look for a retreat from Marx and 
Freud, a hideous mimicking of the threadbare nonsense of the “third way,” this book will 
be a grave disappointment. This book intervenes in one of the most contemporary 
intellectual debates—concerning ‘Post-Theory’ and cognitivism—but it does so without 
ever abandoning questions of class struggle and the unconscious. Žižek’s engagement 
with Post-Theory lays bare both its obvious fallacies and its more hidden vanities. He 
then goes on, via extended readings of Kieslowski's films, to offer a dazzling alternative 
that sacrifices neither the particularities of individual texts nor the nuances of broad 
philosophical argument. Like all of his work The Fright of Real Tears combines polemic 
and rigour, wit and insight. It makes clear that there can be no fundamental analysis of 
film which is not theoretically informed—but that theory must always revive itself in a 
real love of the cinema. (MacCabe viii-ix) 
The reader will undoubtedly notice that the language of MacCabe’s preface invokes the 
vocabulary and ideas that were wielded by Christian Metz, and argues for a revival of the 
theoretical paradigm that dominated in the 1970s. One of the main rationales guiding MacCabe’s 
argument is that the Post-Theory and cognitivism of David Bordwell and others are intrinsically 
incapable of accounting for the political dimension of subjectivity production and thus resign 
themselves to a brand of “post-ideological” and postmodern abandonment typical of the Blairist 
third wave politics which set the backdrop to MacCabe’s preface. Žižek makes clear in the 
47 
 
opening chapter of his book that he intends to continue the psychoanalytic and Marxist 
philosophical heritage of theorizing the cinema’s production of subjectivity. He writes: 
In philosophy, it is one thing to talk about, to report on, say, the history of the notion of 
subject (accompanied by all the proper bibliographical footnotes), even to supplement it 
with comparative critical remarks; it is quite another thing to work in theory, to elaborate 
the notion of ‘subject’ itself. The aim of this book is to do the same apropos of 
Kieslowski: not to talk about his work, but to refer to his work in order to accomplish the 
work of Theory (Žižek 2001: 9).  
Žižek and MacCabe’s response to Bordwell is to return to the structuralist paradigms of the 
1970s, attempt to revitalize them, and argue in their defence. If one were to read the debate 
between Žižek and Bordwell in a vacuum, one might feel the need to accept the terms of the 
debate and pick one side or the other; to choose whether to maintain the Lacanian-Althusserian 
model of subjectivity in the close critical analysis of film, or to abandon this model and its 
political presumptions entirely, as is the case with Bordwell and colleagues. However, the binary 
that is set up between the parties in this two-sided debate eschews another important avenue for 
theoretical research into the cinema and its powers of subjectivity production provided by Gilles 
Deleuze’s film philosophy, Félix Guattari’s schizoanalytic writings and their collaborative work 
on the minor arts. 
 
Gilles Deleuze and Film Philosophy 
Around the same time that David Bellour, Janet Staiger and Kristen Thompson published 
The Classical Hollywood Cinema, Gilles Deleuze made his foray into the world of film with his 
voraciously read cinema books. At this moment in his career, Deleuze had risen to prominence in 
the French intellectual milieu and was heralded as one of the world’s most mature philosophers. 
His turn to the cinema was no accident. The cinema books are the culmination of Deleuze’s 
lifelong cinephilia and a timely contribution to the study of film in a moment when its methods 
and sense of direction were in jeopardy. According to François Dosse, the biographer of Deleuze 
and Guattari, the books were the result of three academic years and 250 class hours devoted to 
film: “In working on a topic not typically addressed by classical philosophy, was Deleuze taking 
a respite from philosophy? Not at all. As was often the case, moving into new areas of reflection 
48 
 
was the result of both contingent, external factors and the internal necessities of his philosophical 
reflection” (Dosse: 397).  
What I will do in this section is provide an overview of how Deleuze’s cinema books and 
his philosophy more generally have influenced the discipline of film studies. To do so, I will 
highlight several film scholars whose work was nourished by opting not to accept the terms of 
the theory/Post-Theory debates and instead gravitated towards Deleuze’s thought and the room 
that it opened up for research methods that challenged structuralism’s tenets without delving into 
Bordwellian-style middle-level research. My aim here is to account for Deleuze’s disciplinary 
significance and for how his work can be taken as a line of flight out of the false opposition set 
up between the Žižek and Bordwell camps of the theory/Post-Theory debates. One of the best 
ways to gauge the impact of Deleuze on the discipline is to look at the scholars who have 
devoted attention to his work. Given their disciplinary capital and the fact that their work is 
associated with 1970s film theory, Dudley Andrew, D.N. Rodowick and Raymond Bellour’s turn 
to Deleuze in the 1990s and 2000s is of particular interest.  
Bellour’s association with Deleuze and Guattari marks his search for a way out of the 
internal contradictions of the structuralist paradigm in which he was working—contradictions of 
which he was all too aware. Even after his intensive work on close textual analysis that he 
became most well-known for, Bellour arrives at a moment in his career where he declares, in his 
1985 article “Analysis in Flames,” “Film analysis has finally become an art without a future” 
(54). The reason why Bellour becomes dissatisfied with film analysis and says that it is an art 
without a future is because, as Michael Goddard explains, “the polysemous and elusive body of 
the filmic text went beyond the linguistic capacities of film analyses, not because of any lack on 
the part of the analysts but simply because of the excess and resistance of filmic materials to 
linguistic procedures” (Goddard 2009: 259). It is no coincidence that after griping about the 
bleak future for film analysis and admitting the resistance of the filmic materials to linguistic 
readings that Bellour turns to Deleuze’s film philosophy as an avenue through which to re-
approach the image with a fresh pair of eyes. Bellour has gone on to publish multiple essays on 
Deleuze’s film philosophy including “Thinking, Recounting: The Cinema of Gilles Deleuze” in a 
special issue of Critical Discourse entitled “Gilles Deleuze; A Reason to Believe in This World”; 
“Deleuze: The Thinking of the Brain” in an issue of the journal Cinema; and a contribution to the 
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edited collection The Guattari-Effect with his essay “Going to the Cinema with Félix Guattari 
and Daniel Stern.” 
Bellour’s turn to Deleuze and Guattari after the heyday of structuralist film theory is 
representative of a larger trend. After Dudley Andrew and D.N. Rodowick provided meticulous 
epistemological histories of modern film theory, or political modernism, each turned to the work 
of Gilles Deleuze to resist the Bordwellian-style abandonment of theory and politics. Rodowick 
was the most adventurous of the two in this regard, evidenced by his unreserved embrace of 
Deleuze in Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, an early work of anglophone film scholarship on 
Deleuze published in 1997, as well as his edited collection Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze’s Film 
Philosophy published in 2010 (a collection which features yet another essay by Bellour on 
Deleuze entitled “The Image of Thought: Art or Philosophy, or Beyond?”). For his part, Dudley 
Andrew has continuously emphasized Deleuze’s significance in his disciplinary overviews, such 
as “The Core and Flow of Film Studies” and “La Réception de Deleuze parmi les Anglo-
Saxons,” and he draws on Deleuzian concepts such as nomadism and deterritorialization to 
account for the significance of orality in West African cinema in his essay “The Roots of the 
Nomadic: Gilles Deleuze and the Cinema of West Africa” which appears in Gregory Flaxman’s 
edited anthology The Brain is the Screen. 
Andrew and Rodowick keep plenty of company in turning their focus to Deleuze. In their 
introduction to the Deleuze and Film collection, editors David Martin-Jones and William Brown 
paint a fine picture of just how ubiquitous Deleuzian approaches to film have become. The texts 
that they include in their summary of the literature include: Laura U. Marks’ The Skin of the 
Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses; Barbara Kennedy’s Deleuze and 
Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation; Alison Butler’s Women’s Cinema: The Contested Screen; 
Patricia Pisters’ The Matrix of Visual Culture: Working with Deleuze and Film Theory; Ronald 
Bogue’s Deleuze on Cinema; Anna Powell’s Deleuze, Altered States and Film; David Martin-
Jones’ Deleuze, Cinema and National Identity: Narrative Time in National Contexts and Deleuze 
and World Cinemas; Martine Beugnet’s Cinema and Sensation: French Film and the Art of 
Transgression; Garrett Stewart’s Framed Time: Toward a Postfilmic Cinema; John Mullarkey’s 
Refractions of Reality: Philosophy and the Moving Image; Patricia MacCormack’s 
Cinesexuality; Timothy Murray’s Digital Baroque: New Media Art and Cinematic Folds; Paola 
Marrati’s Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy; Amy Herzog’s Dreams of Difference, Songs 
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of the Same: The Musical Moment in Film; Damian Sutton’s Photography, Cinema, Memory: 
The Crystal Image of Time; Gregg Redner’s Deleuze and Film Music: Building a 
Methodological Bridge Between Film Theory and Music; Felicity Colman’s Deleuze and 
Cinema: The Film Concepts; Richard Rushton’s Cinema after Deleuze; and Patricia 
MacCormack and Ian Buchanan’s edited collection Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema 
(Brown and Martin-Jones 2012: 2). There is also a plethora of articles reflecting Deleuzian 
approaches to cinema that could be added to this list of monographs and edited collections.  
 What the reader will undoubtedly notice is the sheer heterogeneity of topics alluded to by 
the titles of these texts. While Deleuze has made a significant mark on the discipline, as 
evidenced by the growing bulk of scholarship influenced by his work, “Deleuzian approaches to 
film” has not been, and cannot be, synthesized into a coherent theoretical programme, as was 
practically the case with 1970s film theory. The authors listed above poach concepts found 
across Deleuze’s body of work—not only his cinema books—to broach topics as diverse as 
sensation, women’s cinema, national cinema theory, new media art, and film sound, to name just 
a few.  
To provide a gloss on each and every one of the film studies books that has been 
influenced by Deleuze would be beyond the scope of this literature review and would veer off 
towards more detailed discussions of various sub-fields within the discipline that this dissertation 
does not necessarily traffic in. What I would like to do, however, is cue into Deleuze’s 
importance for renewing an analysis of the cinema’s production of subjectivity which was the 
disciplinary focus of film studies in the 1970s. To do so, I will engage with a couple of 
particularly poignant readings of Deleuze found in the pages of Gregory Flaxman’s The Brain is 
the Screen and Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body.  
In his introduction to The Brain is the Screen, Flaxman describes the impasse of 1970s 
theory that I have outlined above, and then goes on to explain how the shape that the discipline 
of film studies has taken in the era of post-theory can be critiqued from a Deleuzian perspective. 
He writes:  
Not only does Deleuze inevitably dismantle the discourses that traditionally nourished 
film studies, discourses such as phenomenology and structuralism, but more generally, 
and perhaps more importantly, his books buck the current trend in film studies toward 
theoretical indifference. In recent years, film theory has more or less gone underground; 
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the tenets of semiotics, psychoanalysis, and (Althusserian) Marxism are still called upon, 
but without the same conviction, as if they constituted the rituals of a faith in which we 
no longer quite believe. In their stead, historicism, spectator studies, cultural studies, and 
cognitivism have come to dominate the field. The result is a peculiar, and peculiarly 
fashionable, absence of debate—about what film is, about its difference from other arts, 
about its effect on thought, about the way its images can be distinguished—in which a set 
of traditional assumptions quietly cement themselves. Without the old analogies to Plato's 
cave, Freudian dream-work, or linguistic models, which at least made clear that certain 
fundamental questions were at stake, the cinema is understood (tacitly but perhaps more 
firmly than ever before) as a system of re-presentation, one that calls upon the inherent 
conventions of the human mind (e.g., schemata, deep structures, rules of signification) 
first to create and then to make sense of images. Such an understanding of cinema 
appeals to the conventional division of subject and object, spectator and image, that is, 
the very “strata”… that Deleuze and Guattari condemn in A Thousand Plateaus as our 
human prison. (Flaxman 2000: 7-8). 
Flaxman is equally critical of structuralist film theory and the cognitivist appeal to the all-too-
human mind that has arisen in its place. In a very insightful analysis that is unfortunately slightly 
hidden in one of the book’s marginal footnotes, Flaxman expands on his criticism of post-
theoretical approaches. He turns the criticisms that Bordwell levels at 1970s film theory back 
against the cognitivist enterprise to expose its own dogmatism in the following passage:  
[T]he cognitivist gambit merely replaces Grand Theories (semiotics, psychoanalysis, 
Althusserian Marxism) with its own quasi-Aristotelian, quasi-Kantian schematism. 
Cognitivism may not produce allegories as obvious as those of its theoretical 
predecessors, but that should not be taken to mean that it has eluded totalization—only 
that it is deeply and deceptively unaware of its own habitus. What cognitivism calls 
science and, better yet, common sense are the accumulation of conventions whose 
schematization we have yet to significantly interrogate. Fortunately, to a certain degree 
Deleuze does this for us: above all the Kantian schemata, Deleuze suggests, is the 
expression of power…. (Flaxman 200: 49). 
Flaxman’s critique of Bordwell’s dogmatic faux-scientism and his appeals to common sense 
brings to light some of reasons why another key thinker of 1990s cinema studies opted for a turn 
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to Deleuze, instead of following Bordwell’s cognitivist programme, in order to illustrate how the 
visceral pleasures of the image condition the production of spectatorial subjectivity.  
 Of all the film studies books written from a Deleuzian perspective, Steven Shaviro’s The 
Cinematic Body is the most disciplinarily significant. It is a highly polemical and theoretically 
innovative book published in 1993 that refutes both the tenets of structuralist film theory that 
Colin MacCabe and Slavoj Žižek resolutely defend, and Bordwell’s “middle-level” alternative. It 
can be read as a companion piece to Rodowick’s The Crisis of Political Modernism, in that it 
also comments on the crisis that had begotten modern film theory. But unlike Rodowick’s book 
which “surveys, critiques and works forward from recent directions,” Shaviro’s intention in this 
book is different: “to accentuate the crisis in film theory, to help blow the paradigm apart … to 
suggest the possibility of thinking otherwise about film and culture” (13). 
Deleuze is the most important interlocutor for Shaviro in his efforts to shift the 
framework through which the cinema can be studied, from one based on a signifying semiotics 
of psychoanalysis to a material semiotics of psychophysiology (Shaviro 1993: 52). In this 
presentation of Shaviro’s book, I will begin by sharing his Deleuzian-inspired critiques of the 
psychoanalytic study of film, and then follow through to explain the alternative that he proposes.  
 Shaviro starts his criticism in much the same way as Bordwell and Carroll, by staging his 
frustrations with Lacanian orthodoxy. He writes: 
Psychoanalytic film theory has taken on all the attributes of a religious cult, complete 
with rites and sacred texts. Twenty years of obsessive invocations of “lack,” “castration,” 
and “the phallus” have left us with a stultifying orthodoxy that makes any fresh 
discussion impossible. It is time to recognise that not all problems can be resolved by 
repeated references to, and ever-more-subtle close readings of, the same few articles by 
Freud and Lacan…. With a few singular exceptions (such as Dudley Andrew's [1985] 
defense of phenomenology, or Noel Carroll's [1988] cognitive theory), psychoanalysis 
remains the sole and ubiquitous horizon of “serious” (read: academic) discourse on film. 
The languages of Freud and Marx, or more precisely of Lacan and Althusser, as they 
have been reductively superimposed upon a certain formalization of the cinematic 
apparatus, have long been the reigning master discourses for any interrogation of desire 
and politics, gender and sexuality, and culture (Shaviro ix; 12-13) 
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Shaviro’s frustration with the psychoanalytic paradigms which dominated the tradition of film 
theory is due to their “desire to keep at a distance the voyeuristic excitations that 
are its object” (13). This paradoxical desire to love the cinema but also to contain it and leverage 
distance from it is encapsulated by the work of Christian Metz surveyed above. Shaviro argues 
that this “reactive side” of film theory which repudiates its love object “has all too completely 
gained control.” He goes on to write: 
This theory still tends to equate passion, fascination, and enjoyment with mystification; it 
opposes to these a knowledge that is disengaged from affect, and irreducible to images. 
… Behind all these supposedly materialist attacks on the ideological illusions built into 
the cinematic apparatus, should we not rather see the opposite, an idealist’s fear of the 
ontological instability of the image, and of the materiality of affect and sensation?” 
(Shaviro 1993: 13). 
Shaviro correctly points out that psychoanalytic models compensate for the fear and anxiety 
provoked by the image’s awesome materiality by framing the ontological instability of its 
affective register within Oedipal models of desire and subjectivity. The problem is that such 
theories wind up actualizing their hypothetical models. Shaviro writes: “The self-reflexive 
theorizing that allows us to become aware of certain structural constraints also ends up echoing 
and amplifying those constraints, reproducing them on a larger scale. This is what Deleuze and 
Guattari call the ‘oedipalizing’ effect of psychoanalysis and structural linguistics” (Shaviro 11).  
The point Shaviro makes here is very similar to the insight that John Mullarkey makes in 
his book on film philosophy Refractions of Reality: Philosophy and the Moving Image. What 
Mullarkey has to say is,  
In Deleuze (and Guattari’s) understanding, by positing the primacy of the Oedipus 
complex, Freud and Lacan confused consequences (symptoms) for causes. Deleuze does 
not say that the Oedipus complex and castration anxiety do not exist—“we are 
oedipalised, we are castrated”—but that psychoanalysis takes as constitutive what are 
actually derived from other forces (Mullarkey 84).  
Deleuze and Guattari’s argument that psychoanalysis mistakes symptoms for causes points to 
one of the reasons why they provide the ammunition which fuels Shaviro’s critique of 1970s film 
theory. What all of these thinkers find in psychoanalysis is a penchant for ordering, controlling 
and disciplining the image’s unruly materiality, which is exactly what the oedipal models of 
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subjectivity and desire enable. Christian Metz only managed to re-establish his desiring 
relationship to the image after both it and he had been secured in place by psychoanalytic models 
of identification and the subject-object distinction it implies.    
 Rather than abandon theoretical approaches to the image altogether, what Shaviro 
proposes is a new way of conceiving the image that embraces its materiality and affectivity. He 
describes at length the shortcomings of the psychoanalytic ontology of the image which 
disguises its own anxiety before the image with a theory of lack:   
The fundamental characteristic of the cinematic image is therefore said to be the one of 
lack ... But is it really lack that makes images so dangerous and disturbing? What these 
[psychoanalytic] theorists [of film] fear is not the emptiness of the image, but its weird 
fullness; not its impotence so much as its power. Images have an excessive capacity to 
seduce and mislead, to affect the spectator unwarrantedly. (Shaviro 1993: 15-16)  
The affective capacity of the image that is controlled and disavowed by psychoanalytic theories 
of film is exactly what Shaviro valorizes in his foregrounding of the cinema’s corporeal 
pleasures and the forms of subjectivity that they produce.  
 Shaviro’s adoption of affective politics brackets linguistic models of subjectivity in 
favour of new concepts and a renewed critical relationship to the film image that admits and 
accepts its ontological indeterminacy. “It is not the case that everything is linguistic or textual,” 
writes Shaviro “but rather that language is one particular instance (although an important one) of 
the processes of stratification. The alternative between presence and mediation, or 
phenomenological immediacy and linguistic deferral, is therefore a false one: experience is at 
once textualized (or opened to the play of negations and differences) and anchored in a living 
present” (1993: 27). As one particular instance of a broader and more complex process of 
stratification, language needs to be thought in relation to other non-linguistic strata of experience 
that factor into the production of subjectivity. The diminished role that language plays in 
Shaviro’s reconceptualization of the film image’s experiential qualities leads him to make a 
number of prescriptions about the direction that he feels film theory needs to take: 
… [W]e need to abandon the notions of representation, identification, lack, and so on, if 
we are to be able to map out the political lines of force, the plays of power and resistance, 
that inhabit and animate the cinematic image. I am urging that we surrender to and revel 
in cinematic fascination, rather than distance ourselves from it with the tools of 
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psychoanalytic reserve and hermeneutic suspicion. And I am quite definitely suggesting 
that film’s radical potential to subvert social hierarchies and decompose relations of 
power lies in its extreme capacity for seduction and violence (even though—or rather, 
precisely because—this capacity is also the source of its effectiveness as a tool of 
manipulation and propaganda). (1993: 65) 
Here, Shaviro draws on Foucault’s “microphysics of power” and Deleuze’s insistence on the 
materiality and affectivity of the image to make claims that would have been impossible under a 
psychoanalytic paradigm. The politics that Shaviro advances in this quotation revels in the 
affective materiality of the image and its ability to prompt subjective shifts that may, under the 
right conditions, contest oppressive power structures. In contradistinction to the Brechtian stance 
so commonly held in the 1970s which insists that the politically conscious image must be auto-
deconstructive and alienate its spectator as a means of shaking-off its own illusionism, Shaviro 
posits a revolutionary political potentiality to the image’s illusionistic pleasures. This 
détournement of the tenets of 1970s film theory leads Shaviro to valourize a particular brand of 
affective politics grounded in masochistic and perverse corporeal pleasures: “Film should be 
neither exalted as a medium of collective fantasy nor condemned as a mechanism of ideological 
mystification. It should rather be praised as a technology for intensifying and renewing 
experiences of passivity and abjection” (Shaviro 1993: 65). 
 Shaviro’s brand of affective politics is somewhat idiosyncratic, particularly in terms of 
how he blends Deleuze’s fascination with masochism with the political programme of 
accelerationism in his more recent works such as Post-Cinematic Affect.xxx My project is highly 
indebted to the theoretical ruptures that The Cinematic Body helps to precipitate, but the politics 
of this dissertation are not aligned to those of Shaviro. However, I share this preceding passage 
because he makes an extremely important insight that I can’t stress enough: that the image can 
incarnate and render visible dynamics of power. I build on this idea over the following chapters 
to ask how power conditions the production of melancholic subjectivity and how resistance to 
power can be enacted through the production of subjectivities with therapeutic value. 
 Another important premise that Shaviro’s film philosophy develops out of Deleuze and 
Foucault is the image’s more-than-representational qualities—that the representational 
component of an image is again but one strata of a more complex experiential phenomenon. In 
1970s film theory, the image was conceptualized as a representation with an indexical 
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relationship to reality, and was thus theorized as lacking in reality. Deleuze’s film philosophy 
provides a way out of this predicament to conceive of the image as fully material, sensuous and 
affective. In other words, the image becomes event.xxxi Shaviro explicitly states that an event-
based understanding of the image based in the work of Foucault and Deleuze guides his project: 
My guiding principle is that cinematic images are not representations, but events. 
Foucault writes (following Deleuze): “An event is neither substance, nor accident, nor 
quality, nor process; events are not corporeal. And yet, an event is certainly not 
immaterial; it takes effect, becomes effect, always on the level of materiality. Let us say 
that the philosophy of event should advance in the direction, at first sight paradoxical, of 
an incorporeal materialism.” (Foucault 1982: 231 in Shaviro 1993: 23-24) 
To conceive of images as events and events as having material effects is to entirely 
reconceptualize how the cinema produces subjectivity, in a way that breaks from the doxa of 
1970s film theory but without abandoning theory in favour of Bordwellian methods. Shaviro’s 
event-based understanding of the image is one of the reasons why his 1993 book is still so 
pertinent today. Given the way that the image had been approached by the theorists before him, 
his turn to Deleuze and Foucault opened new methodological possibilities for critically 
approaching the image and studying the cinema’s production of subjectivity. 
  By moving from the image as imaginary to the image as event, Shaviro’s Deleuzian 
break from psychoanalytic film theory allows for an equally event-based understanding of the 
production of subjectivity. According to an event-based understanding of subjectivity 
production, psychoanalysis’ reification of the individual subject (not to mention clinical 
psychiatry’s reification of the same sort of individualism), gives way to an event that spatially 
and temporally exceeds and precedes the individual. Deleuze puts it this way: “The life of the 
individual has given way to an impersonal and yet singular life, which foregrounds a pure event 
that has been liberated from the accidents of internal and external life, from the subjectivity and 
objectivity of what has come to pass” (Deleuze 2006: 386). And in another similar passage, 
which I address in more detail in chapter two, Deleuze continues to emphasize the 
indistinguishability between “subjectivity” and the event itself: “One might equally well speak of 
new kinds of event, rather than processes of subjectification” (Deleuze 1995: 176). Significantly, 
the same event-based conceptualization of subjectivity runs through Guattari’s theoretical and 
therapeutic work. In her chapter in The Minor Gesture on how autistic perception can perceive 
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the eventfulness of depression, Erin Manning accentuates this aspect of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
thought. She writes: “all of Guattari’s theory and practice emerges from the necessity to bring 
out the collective resonance of the event, to see illness not as a personal problem to be analyzed 
outside of the field of relation, but as an event, an ecology…” (Manning 2016: 170). The subject 
is the outcome of the event, not its initiator (Manning 2016: 61). Building on Deleuze and 
Guattari’s entrance into the discipline of film studies, one of the founding principles of this 
dissertation is precisely that this impersonal life of event-based assemblages of subjectivity can 
be glimpsed in the temporal and spatial relations of the cinematic image, or the composition of 
the image’s plastics.  
 In this section of the literature review I have traced the history of modern film theory, 
paying special attention to how it theorizes the production of subjectivity, from the political 
modernism of the 1970s through to Deleuze’s influence on the discipline which began in the 
early 1990s with Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body. While engaging with pressing questions about 
how the production of subjectivity factors into the current depression epidemic, this dissertation 
also happens to traffic in the most longstanding lines of questioning coursing through the history 
of film theory. By embracing the event-based understanding of subjectivity that is found in 
Deleuze’s philosophy and that has influenced many active film theorists, this dissertation 
intervenes at a historical juncture of film theory that is aptly suited to reproblematizing the 
depression epidemic and its imbrication with a sclerosis in the subjectivities that are incited and 
accepted under global capitalism. To end this section of the literature review, I will offer a 
couple of more quotations from Rodowick who argues that if film theory, whose elegy has been 
sung, is ever to be resurrected or redeemed, it is in guise of film philosophy. He writes: “If one 
must compose an elegy for theory, let us hope it awakens a new life for philosophy in the current 
millennium” (Rodowick 2007: 109). It is no coincidence that the potential Rodowick sees in film 
philosophy is inherently Deleuzian, and he announces its arrival with much exuberance: “In 
2009, the afterimage of Gilles Deleuze’s film philosophy continues to recur and to reignite new 
thinking. Welcome to the new Deleuzian century!” (Rodowick 2010: xxiv).  
 




The impact that Deleuze has had and continues to have on the study of film can be 
largely attributed to his two books on the cinema. However, as I have suggested above, the shifts 
that his work has helped to bring about in the fields of film theory and philosophy are equally 
indebted to his collaborative rereadings of psychoanalysis with Guattari. This explains why, 
according to John Mullarkey, “there are (at least) two quite different kinds of post-Deleuzian 
film theory, depending on which Deleuzian texts are sourced by the theorist. One would imagine 
that the two cinema books would be central for every Deleuzian cineaste, and yet they are not” 
(Mullarkey 2009: 107). The impact that Deleuze has made on film studies has not all been made 
through the same texts. One of the reasons for this is because there are multiple Deleuzes: the 
Deleuze of the cinema books, the pre-Guattari and post-Guattari Deleuzes, and Deleuze with 
Guattari. It’s an open question, but perhaps there isn’t even a post-Guattari Deleuze since he 
admitted to having been so “Guattarized” that even though he effectively wrote his last book 
What is Philosophy? on his own due to Guattari’s depression, physical health problems, and 
complications in his personal life in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Guattari’s thinking saturates 
the writing to such a degree that he is credited as co-author. So, there are at least three Deleuzes, 
and his collaborations with Guattari mark a turning point in his philosophical trajectory. Given 
the sort of exuberance with which Deleuze has been celebrated by film scholars such as 
Rodowick, Andrew, Bellour, Shaviro, Flaxman, Martin-Jones, and others, Guattari’s comparable 
absence in the field of Deleuzian approaches to film philosophy is quite glaring. 
In this section of the literature review I focus on the concept of minor cinema, since of all 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts, this one happens to serve three important purposes in my 
dissertation, and happens to have catalyzed a plethora of film studies scholarship on the topic. 
Firstly, as I mention in the introduction, the concept of minor cinema articulates Deleuze and 
Guattari’s assemblage theory of subjectivity which undoes the primacy of the individual. The 
effects of this undoing are particularly significant in the context of the global depression 
pandemic, and help to rethink, through an encounter with select art films, how depression and 
therapy are bound up with the play of neoliberal powers that condition the production of 
subjectivity.xxxii The second reason why I turn to the theory of minor cinema is because it 
accounts for the grouping together of films from diverse national, linguistic and cultural 
contexts. While all the films discussed in this dissertation can be categorized under the banner of 
“the cinema of poetry,” which is an aesthetic tradition within the modern art cinema that harks 
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back to the 1965 Festival of Pesaro, minor cinema supplements and accentuates this 
categorization by providing the conceptual tools for articulating these films’ shared political and 
anti-psychiatric sensibility. Thus, minor cinema is a useful theory for understanding the rationale 
behind the selection of case studies which populate the pages of this project: each one of them 
shares in a common concern for cultivating a political praxis of therapy in the midst of a 
depression pandemic, and this shared concern, or ethos, precedes any common point of 
identification. What the theory of minor cinema offers is an opportunity to think films together 
through their shared affinity in the stead of shared identity.  
Thirdly, the theory of minor cinema has a little-known but highly significant connection 
to the anti-psychiatry movement that comes through in Guattari’s solo writings on the topic. 
Even though a cluster of texts on minor cinema have been published in the past two decades, 
with the exception of Gary Genosko’s critical introduction to Guattari, none have paid serious 
attention to the anti-psychiatric undercurrents of the theory. The proceeding pages of this section 
of the literature review expose this gap in the scholarship on minor cinema, and my dissertation 
should be read as an attempt to fill that gap by connecting Guattari’s minor cinema of anti-
psychiatry to the contemporary moment’s crisis of depression and the films that respond to it. 
One of this literature review’s assertions is that Guattari’s anti-psychiatry writings are vital to a 
more nuanced and multi-faceted comprehension of minor cinema that goes beyond the Deleuze-
centric readings—and, I would argue, misreadings—that dominate the film studies scholarship 
on the concept.  
 This part of the literature review and methodology section surveys the film studies 
scholarship on minor cinema. It begins by tracing the theoretical roots of “the minor” in Deleuze 
and Guattari's collaborative project Kafka: Toward A Minor Literature and then goes on to 
consider how Guattari and Deleuze’s solo writings on “minor cinema” have shaped the 
contemporary film studies scholarship on the concept. This section also explores how the theory 
of minor cinema has been transposed into a variety of contexts across established sub-fields of 
film studies, such as queer and gender studies, (trans)national cinema studies, and film 
aesthetics.  
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s treatise Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1975) 
christens the concept with a consideration of Franz Kafka’s modernist writing as a unique 
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political reconfiguration of literature and language. Kafka (1883-1924) was a Czech Jew living 
in Prague during the Austro-Hungarian Empire whose use of German made the major, colonizing 
language “take flight” and “stutter.” After their collaborative text on Kafka, Deleuze and 
Guattari returned to the political importance of the minor in relation to both language and cinema 
in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1980). Deleuze further elaborated on 
the minor in Cinema 2: The Time-Image (1985), while Guattari repurposed the concept in the 
“Cinema: A Minor Art” chapter of the original 1977 Encres edition of La révolution 
moléculaire.xxxiii 
For Deleuze and Guattari, “A minor literature doesn’t come from a minor language; it is 
rather that which a minority constructs within a major language” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 
16). As I went over in the introduction, there are three characteristics of minor literature: “the 
deterritorialization of language, the connection of the individual to a political immediacy, and the 
collective assemblage of enunciation” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 18). These characteristics 
comprise Deleuze and Guattari’s baseline definition of minor literature, but as will be seen, this 
three-pronged definition has proven quite malleable across its various usages by film studies 
scholars. The heterogeneous quality of the concept can be partially attributed to its recurrence 
throughout Deleuze and Guattari’s works in slightly modified formulations. For example, A 
Thousand Plateaus expands on the definition of the minor provided in Kakfa to include 
“musical, literary, linguistic as well as juridical and political references” (1987: 105). Deleuze 
continues to build on the concept in Cinema 2, where he frames the minor in primarily 
decolonial terms, citing Senegalese filmmaker Ousmane Sembene and Québecois documentary 
filmmaker Pierre Perrault as minoritarian artists. Current scholarship on minor cinema is 
indebted to Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, A Thousand Plateaus, Cinema 2: The Time-
Image and to a much lesser extent, Guattari's own writings on the topic, and has since expanded 
in manifold directions. In the pages that follow I survey the manners in which the theory of 
minor cinema has been extrapolated outwards from Deleuze and Guattari's primary texts on the 
topic, with a special gloss on Guattari’s own rarely mentioned contributions to a minor cinema of 
anti-psychiatry and how it constitutes a unique contribution to the theory of minor cinema.  
 The tendency to focus on Deleuze rather than Guattari in the film studies scholarship on 
minor cinema certainly warrants further investigation. Though Deleuze and Guattari 
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collaboratively evoke the concepts of minor literature and the minor in Kafka: Toward a Minor 
Literature and A Thousand Plateaus, when they turn to minor cinema—rather than minor 
literature—in their solo writings, the two philosophers emphasize slightly different facets of the 
concept, and these differences are often overlooked. Whereas Deleuze focuses on decolonial 
politics, Guattari focuses on the politics of anti-psychiatry. These two facets of minor cinema are 
rarely discussed together, but not coincidently, they happen to map onto two interrelated 
concerns of this dissertation: therapeutic activism and decolonization struggles. Since they are 
each indispensable interlocutors in the intellectual genealogy that informs my project, I 
emphasize both Deleuze’s decolonial and Guattari’s anti-psychaitric aspects of minor cinema in 
my following review of the literature.  
Deleuze never actually wrote of “minor cinema.” He wrote of minor literature, and minor 
arts, and minor speech acts, but never explicitly of “minor cinema.” Nevertheless, the “modern 
political cinema” which he discusses in Cinema 2 touches on a similar problematic to the one 
that he explores with Guattari in their book on Kafka, and has made a substantial impact in the 
subsequent theorization of minor cinemas by film studies scholars. For Deleuze, this “modern 
political cinema” is explicitly grounded in the colonial situation and the examples he gives of 
Pierre Perrault and Ousmane Sembene are wrought with the tension that comes from having to 
speak, act, and live in a colonial reality, while at the same time attempting to reconfigure the 
colonial relationship. The importance of the colonial relationship to Deleuze’s modern political 
cinema has been expanded on in recent scholarship on minor cinemas, and has heavily 
influenced work that deploys the interrelated, and sometimes overlapping, concepts of accented, 
interstitial, intercultural, exilic, diasporic, small national and ethnic cinemas. These types of 
cinema and their relationship to minor cinema will be discussed later in this chapter after a look 
at how Guattari ascribes a unique set of qualities to minor cinema based on a politics of anti-
psychiatry. 
 Guattari diverges from Deleuze’s modern political cinema of emergent collectivities 
engaged in decolonial struggle to posit a minor cinema of madness, desire, intensities and amour 
fou—in other words, a minor cinema of anti-psychiatry. The films which Guattari discusses as 
works of minor cinema are Asylum (Peter Robinson, 1972), a film about famous anti-psychiatrist 
and co-founder of the Philadelphia Association R.D. Laing; Fous à délier (March 11 Collective, 
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1976) which deals with disciplinary repression inside of a psychiatric hospital unit; Fists in the 
Pocket (Bellochio, 1965), a film about a troubled young man who lapses into epileptic seizures 
due to familial tensions; Urgences (Raymond Depardon, 1988) and Histoire de Paul (René Feret, 
1974), vérité documentaries that follow the quotidian lives of patients in psychiatric emergency 
wards and asylums; and Commes les anges déchus de la planète Saint-Michel (Jean Schmidt, 
1978), a film about homeless people in Paris and the influence of drugs and racism on their lives. 
Guattari’s interest in a minor cinema of anti-psychiatry could also be extended to Ce gamin-là 
(Renaud Victor, 1975), a film about a community of autistic children that he mentions in his 
essay “Cracks in the Street.”  
 In addition to envisioning a new minor cinema of anti-psychiatry, Guattari also stresses 
the importance of a minor cinema that would depict concrete political struggles. Three further 
examples minor cinema that Guattari mentions include Coup pour coup (Martin Karmitz, 1972), 
a documentary-style film about the solidarity of female labourers at a textile factory in France 
(which does, not coincidentally, happens to include a scene of a mental breakdown on the factory 
line); Germany in Autumn (Alf Brustellin, Hans Peter Cloos, et al., 1978), an omnibus film that 
mixes documentary and fiction in its depiction of the kidnapping of a businessman by the Red 
Army Faction in 1970s Germany; and Mourir à trente ans (Romain Goupil, 1982) a 
documentary about the suicide of far-left militant Michel Recanati who was friends with the 
film’s director Romain Goupil. These films blend documentary and fiction, and connect the 
turbulence of political struggles to the crises of psychic life which afflict many of their 
characters. Guattari’s minor cinema of anti-psychiatry is closely aligned with political struggles 
outside of psychiatric institutions, in schools, factories and the streets.  
 Guattari also discusses two works of the American independent cinema in the 1970s,  
Badlands (Terrence Malick, 1973) and Eraserhead (David Lynch, 1976), as examples of minor 
cinema. Needless to say, these films differ quite markedly from the films mentioned above. 
Regardless of their commercial appeal, Guattari praises Eraserhead as one of the greatest films 
on psychosis (Genosko 2009a: 149) and lauds Badlands as a “film displaying the effects of 
amour fou: ‘the film is only there to serve as support for a schizophrenic journey’” (Genosko 
2009a: 122). Badlands may seem most anomalous as a work of minor cinema, since on one level 
it seems to follow certain conventions associated with commercial cinema: a youth romance, 
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road movie tropes, narrative coherence, climactic action, and a clear resolution. But Guattari's 
oblique reading of the film (which runs counter to Malick’s own explanation of the film and its 
characters) teases out the “minoritarian” potential of the film’s use of “a-signifying part-signs” 
that short-circuit the logic of the Lacanian signifier that echoes throughout the history of film 
studies. Guattari rejects the Lacanian psychoanalytic model and its influence on semiotics, 
proposing that “the Lacanian signifier prevents us from entering the real world of the machine” 
(quoted in Genosko 2009a: 101).  
 Genosko’s critical introduction to Guattari’s minor cinema sheds important light on 
Guattari’s ideas about semiotics: 
The directness between semiotic and material fluxes (intense and multiple) is not diverted 
into a sphere of representation or signification (psychical quasi-objects like the 
Saussurean sign consisting of sound, image and concept) that results in their mutual 
cancellation, which is how Guattari characterizes the condition of the subject in both 
structuralism and psychoanalysis; instead, the a-signifying particles, the most 
deterritorialized types of signs (not fully formed but part-signs), provide lines of escape 
from the snares of representation, and they “work” things prior to representation. (2009a:  
46) 
Guattari finds that Badlands is laden with these a-signifying part-signs such as intense blues, 
bizarre behaviours and border crossings (Genosko 2009a:145). Genosko explains that these part-
signs “are not interpretable and centred on the signifier, but are expressive of the unformed 
signaletic matter of cinematic images, [and they] trigger a becoming minor in those sensitive to 
their encounter with them” (2009: 147). Guattari’s material semiotics enriches an understanding 
of minor cinema because it allows for a consideration of how a film’s aesthetics, in addition to its 
thematics, can be read as undeniably political. According to Genosko, Guattari's diverse 
selection of films demonstrates that “minor cinema is not documented by one genre, but crosses 
and mixes and confounds its expectations” (2009a:156). In Guattari’s minor cinema, the image 
“‘intervenes directly in our relations with the external world’ and influences the semiotizations 
of viewers” (2009a: 149). It is worth pointing out here how much Guattari’s linking of pre-
representational and a-signiying aesthetic components has in common with Steven Shaviro’s 
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proposition in The Cinematic Body that films be analyzed in terms of the immediate affective 
relationship that they establish with spectators.  
Rarely do theorists propose detailed plans for a film, but that is exactly what Guattari 
does in his “Project for a Film by Kafka,” a publication that crystallizes how Guattari connects 
minor literature to minor cinema and to real-world institutional politics. Guattari’s project 
remains the sole explicit attempt that I know of to connect the theory of minor cinema to 
filmmaking practice. The project demonstrates provocative ideas about many aspects of the 
creative process, and constructs a minor cinema that consists of notes and fragments, an 
unfinished script, and precise details about shot types and cinematography. Guattari even goes to 
the point of describing how the film can be funded and exhibited. As a part of the project, 
Guattari envisions a television station absorbing much of the initial funding costs, and considers 
the possibility that the film could appear on television as a “cultural series” (Guattari 2009b: 
152). This proposition expands the definition of minor cinema to potentially encompass “made-
for-tv” movies, television shows, mini-series and other cultural collaborations with state-
sponsored funding sources. In addition to Guattari’s innovative plans for funding, he provides a 
detailed script complete with notes on cinematography, mise-en-scène, and sound. Guattari 
anticipates shooting the scenes around a massive wall that connects disparate dramatic vignettes. 
The project rejects a linear plot and instead embraces Kafka’s own fragmentary mode of writing, 
“bringing together people with different points of view and setting out from systems of specific 
singularities ... to contribute in ways that make the themes, and the significations that tend to 
impose themselves, explode” (Guattari 2009b: 152). Guattari’s film proposal suggests that 
filmmakers who collaborate with state or private agencies for funding should not be excluded 
from a discussion of minor cinema because they can still take these funds and apply them to 
advance minoritarian politics. The central role that television can play in the exhibition of a 
minor cinema moves away from any sort of film puritanism that Deleuze could be accused of in 
his cinema books resulting from what has been characterized as his unabashed auteurism. 
Although Guattari's understanding of political cinema is multifaceted and original, it is 
rarely mentioned in the film studies scholarship on minor cinema, which as I mention below, 
takes its primary cues from Deleuze and Guattari's collaborations and Deleuze’s work on modern 
political cinema in Cinema 2. By glossing the film studies scholarship on minor cinema, I will 
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paint a picture of the scholarly discourse on the topic and the absence of engagement with 
Guattari that this dissertation will help to correct. 
 Many contemporary film scholars have extrapolated on Deleuze and Guattari's shared 
theorization of minor literature, as well as Deleuze's discussion of minor cinema in Cinema 2. 
These interactions have resulted in diverse approaches to re-contextualizing the minor across 
multiple filmmaking traditions, genres, and sub-fields of film studies. These readings of minor 
cinema routinely deviate from the three characteristics of minor cinema that Deleuze and 
Guattari clearly lay out in their book on Kafka. As a result, the discourse on minor cinema resists 
any sort of stable, totalizing definition. The recent deployment of the minor by authors working 
both within, outside, and around film studies has resulted in the even further diversification of 
the concept. In this next part of my literature review on the theory of minor cinema, I will outline 
how the concept has been taken in three different directions to deal with queer and women’s 
cinemas, small and sovereigntist national cinemas, and avant-garde cinemas.  
The first category to be discussed here is the queer and gendered minor cinema. This 
deployment of minor cinema has been applied to queer and women filmmakers whose films re-
work male-centred and heteronormative narratives as an expression of a gendered or queer 
subjectivity. Though the texts this type of minor cinema do not cite Guattari’s individual 
writings, they can be read as allied to Guattari’s political ideas and actions. In Molecular 
Revolution in Brazil, Guattari dialogues with activist groups, unions and workers to discuss the 
political role of homosexuality during Brazil’s process of democratization.xxxiv Also, in an 
interview published in Soft Subversions, Guattari touches on the nuanced and conflicted 
relationship between homosexuality and minor literature (146).  
 The first film scholar who I will focus on is Patricia White. She discusses the works of 
lesbian filmmakers, including Chantal Akerman and Sadie Benning in her article “Lesbian Minor 
Cinema.” White explains in detail how the films by Akerman and Benning correspond to each of 
the three aspects of minor literature outlined in Kafka. Firstly, White addresses 
deterritorialization in terms of queer sexuality. She writes that Deleuze and Guattari’s definition 
of the minor “resonates with ‘queer,’ another term that inflects rather than opposes the dominant, 
one that ‘deterritorializes’ sexuality and expression” (411). Many of Akerman’s films are rather 
ambiguously queer, especially in comparison to some of Sadie Benning’s films, but White still 
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detects deterritorialization in Akerman’s use of exilic themes (412). Following Deleuze and 
Guattari, White then connects the individual to a political immediacy. White does so by focusing 
on the “direct address, personal narration and physical presence of the artist” in Sadie Benning’s 
Me and Rubyfruit (1989) and It Wasn't Love (1990) (419). The personal address, narration and 
authorial presence does more than connect to the political, White argues that the personal also 
connects to the collective, fulfilling the third criteria of minor literature: “For each filmmaker, 
reworking her own past (films) produces a new relationship between the filmmaker and the 
protagonist that addresses the viewer not as a member of a niche market, but as part of a network 
or collectivity” (425). The films discussed in “Lesbian Minor Cinema” span continents and 
historical periods, and Patricia White’s grouping of them together through the theory of minor 
cinema provides an important precedent for studying nationally and historically incongruent 
films side-by-side when they share in an ethico-political sensibility.  
 David Martin-Jones also engages with queer cinema and Deleuze in his essay 
“Demystifying Deleuze: French Philosophy meets Contemporary U.S. Drama.” Martin-Jones 
considers The Doom Generation (Gregg Araki, 1992) as a work of minor cinema after 
differentiating minor cinema from third cinema. To make this distinction Martin-Jones writes: 
Minor cinema shares third cinema’s concern over the manner in which dominant forms of 
cinema represent political issues, and construct identities. However, the most crucial 
difference between the two is that minor cinema does not place as much emphasis on an 
artisanal mode of production as third cinema does. Partly as a consequence of this, the 
term minor cinema can also be applied to any number of cinemas outside of 
revolutionary, post-colonial or third world situations (Martin-Jones 2009: 226) 
This argument is worth highlighting because it admits the political valence of films that that fall 
outside the schema of third cinema, and admits that these types of films can still have 
decolonizing effects. Martin-Jones’ approach to minor cinema in this essay also connects 
political cinema to both questions of sexuality and nationality. Specifically, in reference to The 
Doom Generation, Martin-Jones argues that the film presents 
stereotypes (sexual, and in the U.S. case, national) in quotation marks, asking us to 
reconsider their normal and normative uses. This unusual rendering of established norms 
of identity takes place in a film shot as though in stylistic quotation marks (witness its 
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elaborate, expressionistic mise-en-scène, etc.), thereby doubly questioning the dominant 
norms of identity representation in Hollywood cinema (2009: 231). 
The aspect that Martin-Jones chooses to privilege here is its high degree of deterritorialization 
that can make a dominant “language” (in the case of literature) or film form (in the case of 
cinema) stutter and disarticulate.   
 In his article on a 1998 Scottish film directed by Peter Mullan, “Orphans, a Work of 
Minor Cinema from Post-Devolutionary Scotland,” Martin-Jones argues for Orphans' 
minoritarian position in relation to British national identity and documentary realism. Like 
Patricia White, Martin-Jones bases his account on the three characteristics of minor literature 
which Deleuze and Guattari delineate in Kafka, but he also expands on these criteria to address 
issues of nationality inspired by Deleuze’s discussion of decolonial filmmaking in Cinema 2. At 
the outset of the article, Martin-Jones connects aesthetic reappropriation to changing conceptions 
of the nation. He writes: “I hope to show that [Orphan’s] aesthetic renegotiation of social realism 
(an aesthetic derived from the British documentary realist tradition) reflects the current 
renegotiation of identity in which both Scotland, and the Scottish film industry are involved” 
(2004: 226). Martin-Jones has been one of the most ardent supporters of Deleuze in the 
discipline and has helped to make Deleuze’s work palpable to film scholars, especially those 
working in the field of national cinema theory. However, I do think that Martin-Jones’ focus on 
the “renegotiation of identity” somewhat misses Deleuze and Guattari’s point about minor 
literature connecting the individual to a political immediacy, because by virtue of being 
connected—and becoming part of—the immediacy of an assemblage, identity isn’t so much 
renegotiated as it is undone in the recomposition of subjectivity. The point at which identity 
returns after that recomposition is a moment of majoritarian restratification. Regardless, I think it 
is important to continue to present Martin-Jones’ work on the minor despite what I see as his 
misreading because he has published so widely and played an important disciplinary role in 
justifying the use of Deleuze in the study of cinema in recent years. Although Martin-Jones only 
focuses on the film Orphans in the aforementioned article, he discusses an array of films and 
their relationship to the nation in his book Deleuze, Cinema, and National Identity. The book 
notes the growing currency of Deleuzian thought within film studies and then goes on to frame 
minor cinema in terms of national narratives (Martin-Jones 2006: 6, 36).  
68 
 
 Other authors such as D.N. Rodowick, Bill Marshall, Dudley Andrew and Mette Hjort 
have discussed minor cinema in relation to the nation, though with different emphasis than 
Martin-Jones. Rodowick devotes a chapter to minor cinema in his book Gilles Deleuze’s Time 
Machine, and I find his writing to be much more in line with the spirit of Deleuze’s thought, 
which has more to do with undoing identity than reasserting it. The chapter “Series and 
Fabulation: Minor Cinema” reorganizes and reapplies concepts scattered throughout the Deleuze 
and Guattari canon to build on the established characteristics of minor cinema found in the Kafka 
book. Rodowick discusses narrative, temporality, and the production of subjectivity in relation to 
minor cinema because, as Rodowick explains over the course of the chapter, minor uses of 
narration (or language) can posit a people yet to come. Rodowick picks up on Deleuze’s analysis 
of Ousmane Sembene as a minor filmmaker and discusses his early film Borom Sarret (1966) as 
a work of minor cinema because it posits a people who do not yet exist. Rodowick analyzes the 
film’s use of storytelling or “fabulation” as a mode of minor enunciation. He writes: 
Through a form of enunciation that Deleuze calls fabulation, series express a becoming-
other appropriate to the invention of a people who are “not yet” but who may find a 
means of collective enunciation as a line of variation in the dominant cinematic 
discourse. This is a minor cinema analogous to the concept of a minor literature created 
by Deleuze and Guattari in their short book on Kafka. (1997: 83) 
For Rodowick, minor cinema is constituted through its capacity to provoke a becoming-other 
through unique and differentiated, yet collective enunciations. “Series and Fabulation: Minor 
Cinema” connects the original concept of minor literature in Kafka to Deleuze’s discussion of 
fabulation and Sembene in Cinema 2, the concept of becoming in A Thousand Plateaus and also 
to the analysis of time and history in Difference and Repetition. These connections open up a 
more comprehensive understanding of minor cinema that takes into account Deleuze and 
Guattari’s broader field of interrelated ideas, in order to show how the force of minor arts 
undercuts molar identities. Rodowick rightly emphasizes that “minority discourse cannot not be 
based on an identity politics. By addressing a (minority) people already assumed to exist, identity 
politics falls prey to a schema of reversal that reifies or essentializes the subaltern subject” 
(1997: 153). Rodowick makes it clear that minor cinema posits future peoples through a 
collective enunciation that recognizes, yet challenges the hegemony of molar identities often 
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yoked to the nation-state. In this regard, Rodowick’s work on minor cinema is much different 
from the work of David Martin-Jones, or Mette Hjort’s focus on “small nations,” which I will 
explain shortly. 
Before addressing the role of the nation in Hjort (which rests on what I would argue is 
another misreading of Deleuze and Guattari—which is not surprising, since Hjort was one of the 
contributors to the Post-Theory volume), I will turn to an essay that I mentioned earlier in my 
survey of the impact of Deleuze on film studies, Dudley Andrew’s “The Roots of the Nomadic: 
Gilles Deleuze and the Cinema of West Africa.” In this essay, Andrew builds on Rodowick’s 
conception of minor cinema in relation to national identity and he explains the stakes involved in 
Rodowick’s claims about fabulation in relation to identity politics.  
D.N. Rodowick has fastened on African “fabulation” to dissolve identity altogether. His 
task is delicate, for he applauds films that shatter identity into fragments that can 
recombine in a movement of “becoming-other” while he simultaneously ratifies the 
political goal of African filmmakers to provide an image that will summon a people into 
existence as identity “becoming-other.” This double action of shattering while 
summoning identity liberates the force of cohesion that lies behind what was once termed 
“subjectivity” and “nation” (2000: 242). 
In the above quotation, Andrew highlights how the West African griot tradition’s fabulatory 
qualities shatters the homogeneity of national identity in favour of an indeterminate and 
speculative people to come that destabilizes the identity between subject and nation. Like 
Rodowick, Andrew picks up on the importance of the oral storytelling tradition of the griot in 
Deleuze, especially in order to explicate the political charge of “nomadic” cinema from West 
Africa. Andrew cites Walter Benjamin who contrasts the “common heritage” and “public ethos” 
of the storyteller, (a figure that Andrew compared to the griot) with the privacy of the novelist 
(2000: 237). In doing so, Andrew foregrounds how minor cinema is constitutive of a collective 
enunciation, and his emphasis on a people to come reinforces Rodowick’s reading that the force 
of minor art is one that necessarily undoes identity formations and recomposes subjectivity.   
 Bill Marshall also discusses fabulation at length, especially in relation to Pierre Perrault, 
in his book Quebec National Cinema. Marshall draws on Deleuze’s analysis of Perrault in 
Cinema 2 and argues that fabulation is “future-directed and quite different from the unearthing of 
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the myths of a past people” (Marshall 2001: 29). In “Cinemas of Minor Frenchness” Marshall 
extends his discussion to queer subjectivities in Quebec cinema. Marshall demonstrates how gay 
themes in film can undermine the heteronormative narratives that predominate Québécois 
national cinema. Part of what makes queer subjectivity double as a minor subjectivity for 
Marshall, is its ability to destabilize homogenized, dominant conceptions of national identity in 
Quebec. “The lessons for Quebec are that any national struggle must be predicated on 
provisional and not full or unified notions of identity” (Marshall 2008: 92). Marshall’s insistence 
on a destabilized identity reinforces Rodowick’s argument that “minority discourse cannot not be 
based on an identity politics” (1997: 153). For Marshall, when it comes to escaping the binary 
logic of identity politics, “the way forward is through fabulation” (Marshall 2008: 92). 
Fabulation plays an important role for Andrew, Marshall and Rodowick, because it allows for 
political cinema to form a people to come based on the desire to shake the chains of colonialism 
through collective artistic expressions rather than reverting to unified identities that may generate 
reactionary politics or personal narratives that could eschew politics altogether.xxxv  
 In the article “Hollywood’s Indigenous Other,” Jane Mills discusses the concept of minor 
cinema in relation to Australian Aboriginal cinema, and challenges the concept’s 
appropriateness. One of her main arguments against minor cinema is that it is a “Hollywood-
centred” model. She writes: “[Minor cinema] offers not a de-centred model that might rescue 
First Nation cinema from the margins, but a re-centred model in which the minor cinema’s 
cultural and political significance exists only in terms of it being ‘not-Hollywood’” (Mills: n.p.). 
Mills’ argument is based some misguided assumptions about the theory of minor cinema, and 
neglects to find support in the primary texts on the concept written by Deleuze and Guattari. 
Instead, her argument seems to be based on the secondary scholarship that has developed in 
recent years. As a result, her criticism conflates the concept of the minor with the marginal—a 
distinction that both Deleuze and Guattari are at pains distinguish–and also ignores how much of 
the contemporary discourse on the topic is actually not centred around Hollywood, but various 
other film cultures. As the literature on the topic has grown, scholars have claimed a multiplicity 
of minor cinemas, not a universal division between minor cinemas and a monolithic Hollywood 
foil. If Mills’ article more closely engaged with the Kafka book and the characteristics of minor 
literature that it lays out, then she would likely have come to different conclusions as to its 
pertinence for cinemas of decolonization.  
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 Mills’ second main critique of minor cinema is based on her interpretation that Deleuze’s 
theorization of a “people yet to come” is counterproductive to Indigenous political claims. 
According to Mills, the suggestion “that the populace of First Nations have ‘not yet’ become a 
people, or are no longer one, is simply untrue” (Mills n.p.). Mills’ understanding of Deleuze’s 
“people yet to come” is quite rudimentary and limits its potentially productive confluence with 
theories of Fourth Cinema. Surely, Deleuze would not argue, and in fact he never did, that 
Indigenous populations are not yet a people. The kernel of his theory is simply that in order to 
bring about the conditions for an overturning of the colonial relationship, a recomposition of 
group subjectivity is required. As I will go to some lengths to articulate in the final chapter of 
this dissertation, Fourth Cinema imagines “peoples to come” who still retain, and are actually 
catalyzed by, traditional cultural values that are posited as having therapeutic effects. 
Admittedly, it is important to recognize the risk that minor cinema could occlude other forms of 
Indigenous knowledge, theory and practice. However, a strong case can be made that minor 
cinema is a theory which allows for the allying of Indigenous cinemas to the parallel 
developments in other politicized cinemas with shared concerns. One of the guiding hypotheses 
of this dissertation is that cinemas from different national, cultural, and linguistic contexts can 
share in a deep-rooted affinity based on values that contest the dominance of the global 
capitalism. What I specifically focus on in the following chapters is how Indigenous cinema is an 
important part of a growing, if uneven, activist sensibility in the cinematic arts that is expressed 
through a revaluation of the therapeutic in the development of political praxis. 
The next book that I would like to present in this review of the literature on minor cinema 
is Hamid Naficy’s An Accented Cinema. In two brief paragraphs, Naficy considers the 
relationship between what he terms an “accented” style and minor cinema and argues that his 
accented notion of accented cinema is a variant of minor cinema. He writes: “The accented film 
style is such a gesture, smile, or sneer of refusal and defiance. Although it does not conform to 
classic Hollywood style, the national cinema style of any particular country, the style of any 
specific film movement or any film author, the accented style is influenced by them all, and it 
signifies upon them and criticizes them…. [A]ccented cinema is not only a minority cinema but 
also a minor cinema in the way that Deleuze and Guattari have defined the concept” (26). Naficy 
argues that accented cinema is a minor cinema because it is infused with politics from inception 
to reception and he praises how it offers a model of political aesthetics that breaks out of a binary 
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model of cinema/counter-cinema based on negation and oppositionality, which served as the 
reigning model for understanding the politics of radical filmmaking in the 1970s. 
As part of the Minor Transnationalism anthology, Kathleen McHugh presents ethnic 
women filmmakers whose films feature transnational situations, and whose artistic practices 
contribute to a “transnationalism from below”— “the counterhegemonic operations of the 
nonelite who refuse assimilation to one given nation-state, including ‘everyday practices of 
ordinary people’” (Lionnet and Shih 2005: 6). McHugh argues that the films History and 
Memory (Rea Tajiri 1992) and Crucero (Guillermo Verdecchia and Ramiro Puerta 1994) 
exploit the pleasure of narrative, of humour, of identification, while also emphasizing that 
“becoming minor” is not a question of essence (as the stereotypes of minorities in 
dominant ideology would want us to believe) but a question of position: a subject 
position that in the final analysis can only be defined in “political” terms—that is, in 
terms of the effects of economic exploitation, political disenfranchisement, social 
manipulation, and ideological domination on the cultural formation of minority subjects 
and discourses (McHugh 2005: 172). 
McHugh yokes her theory of minor cinema to minority peoples and marginal art forms that 
cannot be encased by any given national cinema.  
 In more of a nationalist vein, Mette Hjort conceptualizes New Danish Cinema as a minor 
cinema. Hjort takes a different approach to minor cinema than many other scholars who have 
written on the topic, and she does not cite Deleuze and Guattari’s primary texts with the 
frequency or adherence of authors like Dudley Andrew or D.N. Rodowick. Hjort’s deployment 
of the term “minor cinema” refers to “small nations” and their respective “small national 
cinemas” which circulate in a global mediascape dominated by “major cinemas” (ie. Hollywood) 
(Hjort 2005: ix). Hjort conceives of minor cinema on the scale of global markets and her books; 
case study details how Denmark’s “minor” national cinema must compete with major cinemas 
like Hollywood for paying spectators (Hjort 2005: 2). Hjort’s reappropriation of the term minor 
cinema to suit her middle-level research agenda into small national cinemas has influenced other 
scholars with similar interests. 
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 In another European “small cinema” context, the Swedish film historians Lars Gustaf 
Andersson and John Sundholm also use the term minor cinema to theorize instances of amateur 
and avant-garde cinema in 1950s Sweden. Their article “Amateur and avant-garde: minor 
cinemas and public sphere in 1950s Sweden” focus on Peter Weiss, a German-Jewish author, 
dramatist, filmmaker and painter who lived in exile in Sweden.xxxvi The article is guided by 
Hjort’s argument that small national cinemas should be understood as minor cinemas, even if the 
authors offer an analysis of Weiss’ avant-garde aesthetics which are inspired by Kafka’s 
modernist writing as keys to their iteration of Swedish minor cinema. Small nation and 
experimental aesthetics also converge in Anton Pujol’s essay “The Cinema of Ventura Pons: 
Theatricality as a Minoritarian Device.” Pujol argues that the Catalan director Pons uses 
theatricality as a minoritarian device to “disarticulate conceptions and unsettle expectations” 
(Pujol 173). Here, the use of aesthetic experimentation to self-reflexively represent the 
adaptation process of his films provokes prompts a reflection on the Catalan cinema and 
language. 
 Pujol, Andersson and Sundolhm all interpret the theory of minor cinema according to the 
research agenda advanced by Mette Hjort, and position small European national cinemas as 
minor alternatives to Hollywood. Like David Martin-Jones’ work on Deleuze and national 
identity, I include these examples in this literature review to display the scope with which the 
discipline of film studies has incorporated and repurposed the theory of minor literature. 
However, I would like to offer a word of caution and point out that this conflation between small 
national cinema and minor cinema is a very free adaptation of Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas, and 
does not have much basis in their primary texts. Nowhere in any of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
writings on minor literature or cinema do they yoke the concept of minor literature or cinema to 
small nations. I fear that the tendency to celebrate small national cinemas and identities, or even 
“devolutionary” or “postcolonial” identities marks an appropriation of Deleuze’s concept of 
fabulation that breaks from the spirit of his writings and is largely inconsistent with his and 
Guattari’s companion concepts. What these writers forget is precisely what Erin Manning 
suggests must be remembered: that “neither the minor nor the major is fixed in advance. The 
major is a structural tendency that organizes itself according to predetermined definitions of 
value. The minor is a force that courses through it, unmooring its structural integrity, 
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problematizing its normative standards” (Manning 2016: 1). These attempts to fasten the theory 
of minor cinema onto select national cinemas are actually quite majoritarian gestures.  
 Thus far, I have examined how the theory of minor cinema has been activated by scholars 
researching in the areas of women’s and queer cinemas, as well as theories of national identity 
and small cinemas. To conclude this survey of approaches on minor cinema I will highlight some 
studies on avant-garde filmmaking which have also invoked the concept. David E. James’ The 
Most Typical Avant-Garde: History and Geography of Minor Cinemas in Los Angeles examines 
the rich history of avant-garde filmmaking in Los Angeles and argues that the city’s avant-garde 
tradition displays a diverse range of oppositional perspectives to the dominance of Hollywood 
cinema that attempt “to oppose or escape the imperatives of capitalist culture” (James 2005:19). 
James’s work brings to the forefront “minor practices” that “are inevitably framed by the 
dominant industry and determined by its overall structure” (15). James’ chapter entitled “Minor 
Cinemas: Institutions of the Avant-Garde” focuses on institutions such as university film 
programs in L.A. that provide filmmakers with the ability to express viewpoints antithetical to 
those of Hollywood, as well as the independent theatres that screen such films. His focus on 
American avant-garde filmmaking in Los Angeles problematizes Hjort’s pairing of the small 
national cinema with minor cinema, but he, like Hjort, still champions the existence of “minor 
institutions” –which I think, following Deleuze and Guattari, is a contradiction in terms. James is 
cognizant that his take on minor cinema diverges from Deleuze and Guattari's primary texts on 
the subject and in regard to the three characteristics of a minor literature delineated in Kafka, 
James comments that “[t]hough these characteristics are immediately applicable to many of the 
film practices discussed here, my usage of the term does not appropriate them as restrictive 
criteria, ([Deleuze and Guattari’s] reference to Kafka is, in any case, questionable)” (2005: 446).  
Instead of closely following Deleuze and Guattari’s characteristics of minor literature, 
David E. James’ approach to minor cinema is written more in the spirit of Tom Gunning’s essay 
“Towards a Minor Cinema.” The historian of early film first picked up on the term minor cinema 
to describe the tendency of “a specific group of young filmmakers in the late 1980s who were 
supposedly responding to the monumentality of Stan Brakhage's work and the exhaustion of a 
putative “International Style” in the avant-garde comprising structural film and new forms of 
narrativity” (James 446). These filmmakers (Fonoroff, Herwitz, Ahwesh, Lapore, Klahr, and 
Solomon) decisively counter mainstream filmmaking and as Gunning points out, they 
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“consciously maintain a position outside the major cinematic languages even when—especially 
when—they make reference to them” (Gunning 1989-1990: 3). Gunning maintains that minor 
films are conscious of their position amidst flows of majoritarian cultural production. “Minor 
cinema recognizes—cannot ignore—the existence of another cinema” (Gunning 1989-1990: 3). 
To use Gunning's terminology, the “parasitic” images of these experimental films demarcate 
their distance from mainstream film culture while self-consciously referencing dominant 
filmmaking conventions. Gunning’s article focuses on underground artists working in the 
tradition of experimental or avant-garde filmmaking. Taking quite a different approach in “Andy 
Warhol’s ‘Minor Cinema,’” Svein Inge Sather considers Andy Warhol—arguably the most 
popular of all American avant-garde artists—as a minor filmmaker. Sather finds Warhol’s 
filmmaking to be an example of minor cinema because his work is in many ways unclassifiable 
and free from the constraints and categorizations of Hollywood, as well as the artistic conformity 
that arises amidst schools of the avant-garde.  
On a much different note, Hervé Aubron’s article “Minor Movies” in Cahiers du Cinéma 
discusses of a group of American feature films that appeared at the Cannes film festival in 2007, 
such as Zodiac (David Fincher, 2007) Death Proof (Quentin Tarantino, 2007), and No Country 
for Old Men (Joel and Ethan Cohen, 2007). Unlike Gunning and James who focus on avant-
garde cinema, Aubron's collection of minor movies are by well-known directors who share a 
somewhat ambivalent relationship to Hollywood. On the one hand, these directors depend on 
studio financing and they make use of popular stars and genres. On the other, they have been 
praised by critics and audiences alike for re-working Hollywood tropes. Of most pressing 
importance, however, is how these films tie into a minoritarian politics. In expounding how 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Kafka book relates to the films at hand Aubron asks, “where does 
America stand?,” “where do we stand in relation to it?,” and “have we finished with it or has it 
just changed its form?” (Aubron 76). Aubron goes on to also raise the question: “Are Tarantino, 
Fincher, Shyamalan and their consorts a minority in Hollywood? That is not the problem; they 
are not minor in that manner. They do offer a glimpse of something very important: America is 
becoming characterized; it no longer represents a universal land or code (and 9/11 was the 
turning point for that)” (78). For Aubron, the importance of these filmmakers’ minor status is 
less about being minor in relation to Hollywood, but minor in re-imagining America and its 
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relationship to the rest of the world through “quintessentially American” film styles (ie. 
grindhouse movies and detective stories).  
 This section of my literature review has traced the output of film scholars who have 
drawn upon Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of minor cinema to articulate the political strategies of 
diverse film cultures. This group of authors has adapted the concept in assorted ways, some of 
which I argue are quite at odds with the original spirit of minor literature, by yoking the concept 
to one type of identity, genre or film style, or national cinema. This section has highlighted the 
contradictions between these different interpretations of minor cinema. Some authors base their 
arguments on identity politics, while others privilege the force of fabulation to undo such identity 
formations; some stress minor cinema's proximity to, and occasional overlap with dominant 
cinemas, and others situate minor cinema as necessarily outside Hollywood; and still more 
conceive of small national cinemas as minor cinemas whereas opposed scholars argue that the 
becoming-other of a people undercuts national identity and molar formation of the nation-state. 
Overall, the theory of minor cinema has inspired a plethora of writing on cinemas whose political 
valence might otherwise go unnoticed or untheorized. Some of the engagements with minor 
cinema are more pertinent to this project than others, but I presented the widest possible 
perspective on this field as a way to lay out the intellectual terrain surrounding my dissertation, 
and to support my claim for the relevance of a Deleuzo-Guattarian approach to minor cinema 
rooted in their depersonalized and non-identitarian politics of anti-psychiatry and decolonization, 
the former of which has been largely neglected in the literature on minor cinema thus far.  
 
Critical Theories of Depression and Melancholia 
 Another significant field of scholarship that I would like to review is the critical theory 
on depression and melancholia. The most prominent names working in this field include the 
autonomist-inspired thinkers Franco “Bifo” Berardi and Philippe Pignarre, and the feminist 
theorists Ann Cvetkovich, Sara Ahmed, Jasbir Puar, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler and Julia 
Kristeva (though Kristeva is clearly the outlier among this group, for reasons linked to her sexual 
politics that will be explained). Each of these thinkers have invoked either depression or 
melancholia as cultural symptom which can elucidate aspects of neoliberal power’s conditioning 
of the production of subjectivity. 
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 I will begin with a brief synopsis of Bifo’s recent efforts to delineate an autonomist 
politics informed by the depression crisis, since he is the author who has critically engaged most 
deeply with depression in the last decade. His scholarly output during that time includes four 
single-authored monographs with depression being the leitmotif running through each of them. 
These four books are Félix Guattari: Thought Friendship, and Visionary Cartography (2008), 
The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy (2009), After the Future (2011) and The 
Uprising: On Poetry and Finance (2012). Bifo is a thinker in the tradition of Italian Autonomia 
which consists of theorists such as Antonio Negri and Mario Tronti, of which the former 
collaborated directly with Guattari in the writing of Communists Like Us [Originally published as 
Nouvelles espaces de liberté in 1985]). These books of his all make slightly different arguments 
about depression but the guiding premise of them all—evidenced by the theme of depression 
recurring through each of them—is that depression is key to understanding the affective reality 
of contemporary global capitalism. Here I will highlight a few of Bifo’s main ideas (which have 
their roots in Guattari) that reappear across his books.  
The first of these ideas is one which he shares with various other critical theorists of 
depression (such as Philippe Pignarre and Ann Cvetkovich, as I will explain in more detail with 
reference to their works below)—the simple, and seemingly obvious, yet at the same time highly 
contested idea, that there is a political-economic dimension to depression. Bifo is very brash in 
his diagnostic of the economic and cultural causes of depression. For Bifo, the principle culprit 
in the depression epidemic is a system of power that he calls Semiocapitalism, defined as “the 
subsumption and subjugation of the biopolitical sphere of affection and language to financial 
capitalism” (2012: 13). He sees the subsumption of life, language and affect to the service of 
financial capital as causing depression-inducing effects such as the privatization of the erotic 
sphere (2009: 82); a rarification of contact between bodies (2008: 32); the automatization of 
language (2012: 13); and the continued prevalence of activist strategies that have failed to 
achieve their desired results. His thesis is that sensual pleasure is the foundation of well-being, 
but that this pleasure has been privatized and made scarce by the processes of capitalist 
accumulation—“therein lies the source of the current depression,” he says (Bifo 2009: 219). Bifo 
also points to the exhausting routines of the neoliberal workday that invade the erotic sphere of 
pleasure, claiming the “economy of growth” to be a “poison” (Bifo 2009: 218). This leads him to 
assert that depression is an “interweaving and interacting of psychological flows and economic 
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processes” (Bifo 2009: 207). Bifo’s thesis that the depression epidemic is a symptom of the 
neoliberal privatization of Eros leads him to the next main premise of his work: that in the 
coming years, “politics and therapy will be one and the same activity…” (Bifo 2011: 153).  
 Bifo’s writing seeks “to interpellate the people with a language that is more therapeutic 
than political,” (2009: 220) and he calls for the creation of new spaces of activism, “in the 
connection of poetry, therapy and the creation of new paradigms” (Bifo 2011: 163). According to 
Bifo, in the age of Semiocapitalism and the accompanying depression pandemic, therapy is the 
missing key to a political practice rooted in the Autonomia tradition. He concludes The Soul at 
Work with the following lines: “The process of autonomy should not be seen as Aufhebung, but 
as Therapy. In this sense, it is neither totalizing and nor is it intended to destroy or abolish the 
past. In a letter to his master Sigmund Freud, the young psychoanalyst Fleiss asked when it is 
possible to consider a therapy to be over and the patient be told ‘you are ok.’ Freud answered 
that the psychoanalysis has reached its goal when the person understands that therapy is an 
interminable process. Autonomy is also a process without end” (2009: 221).  
In a move that has some resonance with my dissertation, Bifo conceives of poetry as a 
technique for leveraging praxes of therapy and autonomy. The reasons for Bifo’s turn to poetry 
leads in some theoretical directions that aren’t of immediate relevance for my dissertation and 
the way that I conceptualize the production of subjectivity with a focus on experience rather than 
on language, but I think that a brief description of this theoretical turn will be beneficial because 
of some qualities it shares with Pasolini’s cinema of poetry, which is an important concept that I 
use in chapter one to describe how film images—as events—are creative of a psychosocial field 
of experience that precedes the differentiation of subject and object, interior and exterior. The 
reason why poetry plays such a central role in his most recent book The Uprising: On Poetry and 
Finance is that Bifo invests it with the potential to undo the semiotic organization of neoliberal 
labour, or what he calls “Semiocapitalism.” Bifo’s term builds on the fundamental idea of 
“cognitive capitalism”: that the “general intellect” (a concept that Marx activates in the 
“Fragment on Machines” section of the Grundrisse) is completely subsumed by capital, and that 
in recent years, the general intellect has come to include all sorts of cognitive abilities. In a blog 
post on the topic, Steven Shaviro provides a useful synopsis of the theory of cognitive 
capitalism. He writes: 
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According to the argument of [Paolo] Virno, Maurizio Lazzarato, [Michael] Hardt and 
[Antonio] Negri, [Yann Moulier-]Boutang, and others, Post-Fordist capitalism has moved 
beyond just the exploitation of workers’ (ultimately physical) labor-power, and is now 
also involved in the appropriation, or the extraction of a surplus from, all this embodied 
and embedded social know-how. Rather than just drawing on the labor-power that the 
worker expends in the eight hours he or she spends each day in the workplace, “cognitive 
capitalism” also draws on the workers’ expertise and “virtuosity” (Virno) and ability to 
conceptualize and to make decisions: capacities that extend beyond the hours of formal 
labor, since they involve the entire lifespan of the workers. My verbal ability, my skill at 
networking, my gleanings of general knowledge which can be applied in unexpected 
situations in order to innovate and transform: these have been built up over my entire life; 
and they become, more than labor-power per se, the sources of economic value (Shaviro 
2008: n.p.) 
Bifo opts for the term Semiocapitalism to conceive of how the semiotic functions of financial 
capitalism determine the types of cognitive competencies which are valorized and produced. In a 
similar style as his previous three books, Bifo links this state of affairs to the phenomenon of 
mass depression and the privatization of pleasure. He writes: “The subsumption of language by 
the semio-capitalist cycle of production effectively freezes the affective potencies of language … 
The connective generation entering the social scene today fully suffers the pathogenic and 
disempathetic effects of the automation of the word” (2012: 18, 20). By diagnosing yet another 
reason for the epidemic of depression as the automation of language, Bifo is prompted to look 
towards poetry as a means of defying automation and rediscovering Eros, or in his terminology 
“sensuousness and desire.” He explains this function of poetry as follows: “Poetry is the excess 
of sensuousness exploding into the circuitry of social communication and opening again the 
dynamic of the infinite game of interpretation: desire.… We have to start a process of 
deautomating the word, and a process of reactivating sensuousness” (2012: 21). Bifo’s political 
valourization of poetry is heavily indebted to the work of Jean Baudrillard, particularly his book 
Symbolic Exchange and Death, which as Douglas Kellner explains, 
champions “symbolic exchange” which resists capitalist values of utility and monetary 
profit for cultural values. Baudrillard argues that in Bataille’s claim that expenditure and 
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excess is connected with sovereignty, Mauss’s descriptions of the social prestige of gift-
giving in premodern society, Jarry’s theater that ridicules French culture, and Saussure’s 
anagrams, there is a break with the values of capitalist exchange and production, or the 
production of meaning in linguistic exchange. These cases of “symbolic exchange,” 
Baudrillard believes, break with the values of production and describe poetic exchange 
and creative cultural activity that provides alternatives to the capitalist values of 
production and exchange. (Kellner 2007: n.p.) 
What Kellner says here of Baudrillard’s Symbolic Exchange and Death is also true of Bifo’s The 
Uprising and how it champions the therapeutic and political potential of poetry. 
 Bifo’s writings on poetry are quite different from how poetry is used in the following 
chapters of my dissertation. In the way Bifo uses it in The Uprising, poetry is still an entirely 
linguistic concept, and its exchanges, in Baudrillardian fashion, are symbolic. This way of 
conceptualizing poetry certainly has its merits, especially considering that most poetry appears in 
either written or spoken form, and that so much of what makes up the capitalist economy is a 
symbolic exchange of signs. However, for the reasons that I have mentioned earlier in my critical 
review of the psychoanalytic roots of film theory and the alternatives offered by Deleuze and 
Guattari, in this study I opt to embrace the experiential and pre-linguistic dimensions of film 
images (what Guattari would call their a-signifying component) which investigate the politics of 
producing subjectivity in an epoch coloured by depression. Pasolini, who was not only a film 
theorist but also a celebrated poet and literary figure, glimpsed the limits of theorizing cinema in 
linguistic terms. Though he didn’t hesitate to poach concepts from literary analysis, he was well-
aware that the cinema opened onto something irreducible to language—a “brute and “deeply 
oneiric” reality (Pasolini 2005: 168-169). To illustrate his point, he gives the hypothetical 
example of a dictionary of images, or “im-signs” and how, unlike a standard dictionary, it would 
be an infinite and inexhaustible dictionary that could never provide a catalogue of all the world’s 
images (Pasolini 2005: 169). Even Pasolini, a poet and theoretician of the cinema of poetry, 
readily admits that “brute reality” (or what we could call, following William James, “pure 
experience”) overspills the strata of language.  
 Nevertheless, there is a certain affinity between the vital role of poetry in the writings of 
both Bifo and Pasolini. In Pasolini’s cinema of poetry, the protagonist’s mental interiority is 
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dissolved and becomes coterminous with the exterior world through the creation of a free 
indirect relationship between once-discrete subject positions. In the creation of a group 
subjectivity that enunciates free indirectly, it becomes impossible to decipher who is affected by 
the symptoms of psychosis from who isn’t, and on the level of identity, who is psychotic from 
who isn’t. Poetry, not as a linguistic performance but as a mode of relationality that overcomes 
subjective reification around the individual and his or her “direct discourse,” creates the 
conditions for novel, and perhaps even therapeutic, subjective recompositions. Even though Bifo 
develops a theory of poetry in a semiotic register, there is an affinity between the political 
function that he ascribes poetry and the potential that I find in poetry for theorizing the event-
based symptoms of depression in a manner that draws more closely from Pasolini (and Deleuze’s 
rereading of Pasolini).  
 Lastly, there is a degree of nuance to Bifo’s equation of therapy and autonomist-style 
activism that needs to be teased out in order to foreground an important difference between his 
work and the type of therapeutic activism that I expound in this dissertation. While Bifo does, on 
many occasions, proclaim the need to fuse of political militancy and therapy (“it is not about 
being militants, about communicating the truth to those who never received it: no, it is about 
being happy, about communicating happiness: that is the true duty of a militant” [2008: 168]), 
his writing is also punctuated with highly depressive moments where he seems to turn his back 
on activism—or any sort of action more generally. In one of these moments, Berardi writes: 
“There is no possibility of political resistance to the absolute domination of Semiocapitalism, 
since its foundations are not exterior, residing neither in the military violence of the state, nor in 
the economic corporate abuse: they are incorporated in the pathogenic refrains that pervasively 
entered the collective unconscious” (139). Passages like this read as if activism is entirely 
overdetermined by the events in which it intervenes. 
 Due to the way in which Bifo figures activism as always already co-opted by 
Semiocapitalism, the political programme that he ends up espousing is one of total withdrawal. A 
couple of quotations will highlight this point. For example, in The Uprising, he writes: 
“Exhaustion has no place in Western culture, and this is a problem right now, because exhaustion 
needs to be understood and accepted as a new paradigm for social life. Only the cultural and 
psychic elaboration of exhaustion will open the door to a new conception and perception of 
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wealth and happiness” (68). Echoing this statement in After the Future, Bifo argues, “We have 
today a new cultural task: to live the inevitable with a relaxed soul. To call forth a big wave of 
withdrawal, of massive dissociation, of desertion from the scene of economy, of nonparticipation 
in the fake show of politics” (148). Bifo’s call for withdrawal, nonparticipation and an embrace 
of exhaustion might seem strange coming from one of Italy’s most vocal and respected activists 
of the 1970s. Yet Bifo’s strategy is entirely comprehensible (which is not to say that it is 
commendable), when it is situated within the Italian Autonomia’s “refusal of work” strategy. The 
logic goes something like this. Capitalism subjugates labour to its apparatuses of capture to 
create surplus value for the ruling class who own the means of production and uses the capital 
that it accumulates to advance its own class interests, so the best way to undermine this process 
is to refuse to work within the system. Once work has been refused, the next political task is 
“valorizing human activities which have escaped labour’s domination” (2009: 60); activities 
which I’m assuming could have a more passive character, like rest for example, but which don’t 
fall into a state of total resignation.  
 However, numerous other passages of his recent books seem to forget this important step 
of valourizing activities outside of labour’s domination. As a result, much of Bifo’s writing on 
depression seems to reinforce a depressive state in the face of an already depression-inducing 
economic system. Read historically, Bifo seems to be transplanting the autonomist logic 
concerning the refusal of labour onto the sphere of action more generally, and activism in 
particular, and drawing the conclusion that since all actions take place within a capitalist field of 
power relations, then withdrawal from that field is the revolutionary act par excellence. 
 The fact that Bifo does not follow up this call for withdrawal in recent books by 
advocating activities that fall outside of neoliberalism’s domination is curious, since that would 
be more in line with the spirit of his earlier thought (in books like Le ciel est enfin tombé sur 
terre, 1978). Perhaps this is because Bifo understands Semiocapitalism to be all-encompassing in 
ways that Fordism wasn’t during the 1970s. Or perhaps Bifo doesn’t call for activism after 
withdrawal because for Bifo withdrawal is already a political act of recomposition. Despite 
Bifo’s insistence on the need for recomposing the social body, I don't see how simple withdrawal 
on its own would constitute such a recomposition if it is not followed by some sort of activity or 
activism. This call for a therapeutically-oriented activism is present in many fragments of Bifo’s 
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writing but is not adequately foregrounded or theorized—what exactly might these actions be? 
The answer is left totally open and unaddressed, especially since he disavows traditional forms 
of activism as no longer effective (and Steven Shaviro, in his accelerationist turn of Post-
Cinematic Affect, does the same). 
Although Bifo is a post-Guattarian thinker, and one of his books on depression is even 
dedicated to his friendship with Guattari, he is the first to admit that his ideas around activism are 
at odds with what Guattari had in mind and put into practice. He provides a personal anecdote to 
explain their incongruence: 
I remember that in the 1980s Félix often scolded me because I was no longer involved in 
some kind of political activist. I had stopped considering myself a political activist 
already in 1977. For me, the movements of 1977 has actually been a critique of activism 
and a gradual overcoming of modernity’s politico-existential conceptuality.… For me, 
activist will and ideological action had become impotent. This is why Félix reproached 
me, jokingly but no really. He wanted me to get involved with the Italian Green 
movements, as he himself—generously but somewhat ineffectively—was doing in 
France. He wanted me to run for office, in Italy. I said no, even if I went with him to 
several meetings he had with the Parisian ecologists and other activist groups. I found 
those meetings quite senseless.… (2008: 13, translation modified) 
Whereas Guattari remained a committed activist until the end of his life, Bifo’s engagement 
waned after 1977. It makes for a strange sort of disjunction between two intellectual figures 
whose lives were so imbricated with one another, and it makes Bifo’s criticisms of Guattari all 
the more curious, since it was Guattari who ceaselessly insisted on the inextricability of activism 
and therapy. 
Erin Manning critiques Bifo’s dismissal of activism in her chapter on depression and 
neurodiversity in The Minor Gesture, which I cited from a little earlier to supplement my 
discussions on event-based theories of subjectivity. She makes three interrelated criticisms of 
Bifo’s political theory of depression that defend of Guattari’s activist initiatives, which Guattari 
pursued even when struggling with depression in his “winter years.” The first of these criticisms 
is that Bifo’s account of Guattari’s depression falls back onto an individualized understanding of 
depression that Guattari’s theories of subjectivity are at pains to trouble. “Using his friendship 
84 
 
with Guattari as a guarantor (basing his account of Guattari’s mental state on what went on 
between them as friends), Bifo undertakes a specious project, specious because it is based on a 
proposition that uses the personal as the central figure instead of acknowledging, at the very 
outset, Guattari’s lifelong investment in the prepersonal and the group subject” (Manning 2016: 
167). 
 Her second criticism is that Bifo’s dependence on intimate details of Guattari’s personal 
biography forgets the schizoanalytic hypothesis that sees illness “not as a personal problem to be 
analyzed outside of the field of relation, but as an event, an ecology…” (170). She argues that 
Bifo’s efforts to analyze why Guattari never developed a full-fledged theory of depression in 
spite of his longstanding interest in psychic life, falls back onto a psychoanalytic strategy at odds 
with a schizoanalytic understanding of subjectivity as collective. 
 Manning’s third criticism of Bifo has to do with his resignation from the scene of 
activism. Contra Bifo, whose writings on depression and neoliberalism suggest that activism—
and creative acts of all sorts—are futile and only feed into the prerogatives of the market, Erin 
Manning invests collective action with the potential to upset neoliberal modes of valuation. She 
writes: “In the act is something different altogether: precarious, but creative. Not creative of 
capitalism’s ‘newest new,’ but creative of new forms of value, new ways of valuing modes of 
existence… (Manning 2016: 187). Overall, her engagement with Bifo’s recent work reaffirms 
Guattari’s commitment to collective, activist experimentation by using the concept of the minor 
to explain why not all activism is coopted from the start and to assert that some “minor 
gestures”—much like minor literatures and minor cinemas—can inflect events of subjectivity 
production from within in such a way that breaks from neoliberal modes of valuation and their 
resulting range of subjectivities. 
 My dissertation is highly indebted to the Guattarian belief that Manning espouses, and 
that Bifo at times seems to embrace but at other times seems to disavow: that therapy and 
political activism must go hand in hand, and perhaps even become indistinguishable from one 
another if the depression epidemic is to be curtailed and more sustainable compositions of 
subjectivity are to arise in its place. In the second half of my dissertation, I turn to two 
filmmakers (Apichatpong Weerasethakul and Kanakan Balintagos) who offer a couple of 
provocative visions of what therapeutic activism might entail, and what it might have to contend 
with. Thinking with these filmmakers, what I propose instead of withdrawal are the twin actions 
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of peace and war. Peace, in the Whiteheadian sense of broadening feeling and enlarging the 
ecological field to encounter suppressed alterity, and war: the creation of new values (I focus 
specifically on Indigenous ones) that challenge colonial capitalism’s modes of valuation and 
their accompanying modes of subjectivity production.  
  Of the critical theorists who have written on depression since the turn of the millennium, 
Bifo is undeniably the one who has most been most constant in his engagement with the crisis, 
even if his thinking has revealed various contradictions over the years. However, there are a fair 
number of other prominent theorists who have broached the topic of depression in recent years as 
a way of coming to grips with the cultural moment. A number of these thinkers write from a 
feminist and queer perspective, and have accentuated how depression is always gendered and 
sexed. Though their work informs my project less than the ideas found in the Guattarian-inspired 
work cited above, I will briefly gloss some of the perspectives found in these writings to 
emphasize how the critical study of depression has become a growing field in the humanities. 
 A lab of academics, artists and activists called the Feel Tank has been instrumental in 
catalyzing many of these texts. The founders of the Chicago-based lab are Lauren Berlant, 
Vanalyne Green, Debbie Gould, Mary Patte and Rebecca Zorach. In a statement to the 2003 
Critical Inquiry symposium, “Critical Inquiry, Affirmative Culture” Lauren Berlant describes the 
organization and research topics of the lab: 
Comprised of artists and academics, the Feel Tank is organized around the thought that 
public spheres are affect worlds at least as much as they are effects of rationality and 
rationalization…. We study theoretical, historical, and aesthetic materials engaged with 
the affects and emotions. Right now, we are amassing for future research the negative 
political emotions because most U.S. citizens and occupants have abandoned 
participating in the political sphere and because many who do, say, merely vote, do it 
without optimism for the kind of transformative agency that might/ought to have been a 
possibility. Some of these emotions: detachment, numbness, vagueness, confusion, 
bravado, exhaustion, apathy, discontent, coolness, hopelessness, and ambivalence  
(Berlant 2004: 450) 
Berlant’s Cruel Optimism is one of the most concerted efforts to theorize this catalogue of 
emotions that the Feel Tank has collected over the years. The basic premise of the book is that 
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fantasies of the good life which have bound Americans to normative strictures in their political 
and intimate lives have begun to erode. Her book is a queer celebration of this undoing of 
desiring attachments to fantasies such as upward mobility and the nuclear family that she sees as 
obstacles to true flourishing. Cruel Optimism isn’t a book about depression per se, but Berlant 
has claimed on numerous occasions to write from the position of “depressive realism.” In an 
interview with Earl McCabe, she expands on what she means by that term:  
Depressive realism is a phrase from psychoanalysis. I learned it from Andrew Solomon’s 
The Noonday Demon, which is an account of his depression in relation to other people’s 
accounts of it and theories of it. Solomon writes there that most people self-idealize, 
imagining themselves to be more beautiful and more efficacious than they are: and he 
says that this kind of self-optimism is genuinely adaptive. Depressive realists, in contrast, 
are more accurate: their sense of realism isn’t dark or tragic, but less defended against 
taking in the awkwardness and difficulty of living on in the world. So when I said I write 
as a depressive realist, I meant that I see awkwardness, incoherence, and the difficulty of 
staying in sync with the world at the heart of what also binds people to the social (Berlant 
and McCabe: n.p.) 
Berlant fully assumes her depressive position as part of a more comprehensive queer militant 
sensibility of creating alternative networks of sociality out of collective disenchantment with the 
dominant heteronormative currents of American culture.  
 For Feel Tank feminists, much like Bifo, depression is inherently political and can be 
read as a response to the economic and cultural conditions of living out neoliberalism’s affective 
violence. In fact, Feel Tank thinkers use the moniker “political depression” to describe the 
situation. Ann Cvetkovich’s book Depression: A Public Feeling was written in conjunction with 
the Feel Tank and its “Public Feelings” working group, and takes “political depression” as a 
keyword for “new ways to think about contemporary culture” (2012: 13). Her project builds on 
an assumption that undergirds much of the Feel Tank feminists’ work, which is that “we are 
living in a  culture whose violence takes the form of systematically making us feel bad” (2012: 
15). The “we” that Cvetkovich refers to “includes a range of social positions and identities in 
need of specification,” (2012: 14) but she generally tends to emphasize how overlapping modes 
of oppression such as racism, colonialism and patriarchy amplify depressive affects in minority 
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groups such as people of colour, Indigenous people, and queer women whose lives are 
particularly precarious and subject to systematic affective violence. However, as she points out, 
shifting the cause of depression from medical reasons to political reasons doesn’t necessarily 
enable either political action or healing. She writes: 
It is customary, within our therapeutic culture, to attribute these feelings to bad things 
that happened to us when we were children, to primal scenes that have not been fully 
remembered or articulated or worked through. It’s also common to explain them as the 
result of a biochemical disorder, a genetic mishap for which we shouldn’t blame 
ourselves. I tend to see such master narratives as problematic displacements that cast a 
social problem as a personal problem in one case and as a medical problem in the other, 
but moving to an even larger master narrative of depression as socially profound often 
provides little specific illumination and even less comfort because it’s an analysis that 
frequently admits of no solution. Saying that capitalism (or colonialism or racism) is the 
problem does not help me get up in the morning. (Cvetkovich 2012: 15) 
As a way of dealing with this contradiction, Cvetkovich valourizes quotidian practices that 
“mediate between the personal and the social” such as performative writing, art-making and 
yoga, and she goes on to suggest that “feeling bad might, in fact, be the ground for 
transformation” (Cvetkovich 2012: 3).  
 Cvetkovich’s book is an important one in the burgeoning field of critical depression 
studies because her cultural studies approach allows her a way out of medical narratives that 
ascribe limited meanings to depression. Her postmodern feminist background puts her in a 
position to critique the standardization of psychiatric tools for diagnosing and treating depression 
and emphasize that the lived realities of people with depression range widely and are intimately 
bound up with race, gender, class and sexual orientation. Cvetkovich makes these claims through 
close engagement with artworks and films that explore the quotidian experiences of living with 
depression (and other illnesses, like AIDS) such as Gregg Bordowitz’s film Habit (2001), 
Allyson Mitchell’s installation Hungry Purse (2008), and Lisa Anne Auerbach’s textile creation 
Body Count Mittens (2005).  
Another Feel Tank theorist who broaches the cultural implications of depression is Sara 
Ahmed, whose 2010 book The Promise of Happiness works on similar problems as Cvetkovich 
88 
 
and Berlant. Ahmed’s engagement with depression is more oblique, as her concern has to do 
with how ideals of happiness conceal normative expectations. The critique which she levels 
against the societal imperative to be happy is, much like Berlant and Cvetkovich’s writing, 
grounded in a queer cultural politics of celebrating nonnormative attachments. Her driving 
provocation is that queerness is in many ways antithetical to happiness, and requires detaching 
from heteronormative social ideals around work, love and family. Ahmed revels in a sort of 
queer melancholia, where melancholia is the enabling condition for a deeper sense of awareness 
about one’s alienated place in the world either as a queer person whose nonormative aspirations 
are foreclosed in the name of happiness, or as a working person who is alienated from their 
labour. With recourse to Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia” essay, Ahmed argues that in both 
cases, there is a sort of melancholic relationship to a lost object that arises. In the case of the 
queer, that object takes the form of an abstraction and what is lost is a sense of futurity, and in 
the case of the worker, what is lost is the value of their labour. Ahmed frequently turns to artistic 
expressions such as lesbian dime novels or the film Bend it Like Beckham (2002) to illustrate her 
points. Her combination of queer cultural politics, anti-capitalist critique and affect theory as 
practiced by Eve Sedgwick, brings her work into line with the other thinkers of the Feel Tank 
who have also been drawn to examine the cultural and political significance of depression’s 
contemporary ubiquity.  
In some ways, this dissertation resonates with the work of these Feel Tank scholars. I also 
emphasize a politics to depression that breaks from medical master narratives (and clinical 
perception), and I also turn to the arts (including queer and women artists) as a way to 
understand what goes in lived experiences of depression. However, the intellectual traditions that 
I work with are quite dissimilar and have some fundamentally hypotheses with respect to the 
production of subjectivity, the role of identity in emancipatory politics, and the relationship 
between affect and emotion. Berlant, Cvetkovich and Ahmed all have quite an essentialist and 
identitarian understanding of subjectivity, and their politics can be criticized for abstracting a 
queer universalism out of American and Anglo-Saxon cultural coordinates. Their theories also 
maintain a firm divide between the private/personal, and the public/social, which is a divide that 
doesn’t hold up when thinking about the production of subjectivity from Deleuzo-Guattarian, 
Simondonian, Jamesian or Whiteheadian perspectives. Furthermore, they regularly turn to 
psychoanalytic models of illness—Ahmed adopts Freud’s theory of melancholia wholesale, for 
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example—whereas my project uses schizoanalytic concepts pertaining to the event-based 
production of subjectivity that depart from psychoanalytic theories predicated on loss and lack (a 
theoretical move supported by Shaviro’s arguments in The Cinematic Body).  
 A couple of other theorists who have analyzed the cultural politics of depression, but 
whose approach isn’t so much aligned with that of the Feel Tank are Jasbir Puar and Wendy 
Brown. Jasbir Puar is mostly known for her work on Israel’s “pinkwashing” campaigns which 
use gay-friendly rhetoric to brand Israel as a place that is open for business to liberal Westerners 
and to divert attention away from the ongoing occupation and settlement of Palestine. However, 
after the suicide of Tyler Clementi in 2010 which received widespread media attention, Puar 
penned an article in GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies which is heavily critical of the 
“It Gets Better” campaign. This campaign was put into place by controversial American sex 
educator Dan Savage in an effort to prevent suicide amongst LGBTQ teens by sending them an 
optimistic message that their lives will improve. Jasbir Puar tempers this optimism and suggests 
that it doesn’t necessarily get better, and if it does, then there is a cost to getting better. She 
writes:  
The apparently sudden spate of queer suicides is also obviously at odds with the claims of 
purported progress by the gay and lesbian rights movement. As noted by Tavia Nyong’o, 
Dan Savage’s sanctimonious statement “it gets better” is a mandate to fold oneself into 
urban, neoliberal gay enclaves: a call to upward mobility that discordantly echoes the 
now-discredited “pull yourself up by the bootstraps” immigrant motto. (The symbolism 
of Clementi’s transit from central New Jersey to the George Washington Bridge that 
connects northern New Jersey to upper Manhattan is painfully apparent.) Part of the 
outrage generated by these deaths is based precisely on a belief that things are indeed 
supposed to be better, especially for a particular class of white gay men. As I argue in my 
op-ed in the Guardian, this amounts to a reinstatement of white racial privilege that was 
lost with being gay. Savage has also mastered, if we follow Sarah Lochlain Jain on the 
“politics of sympathy,” the technique of converting Clementi’s injury into cultural 
capital, not only through affectations of blame, guilt, and suffering but also through those 
of triumph, transgression, and success (Puar 2012: 151) 
Puar’s argument serves as an important reminder that factors such as race and class can ensure 
that “it doesn’t get better” and that charitable and quasi-therapeutic initiatives, even when they 
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are “queer-friendly” don’t necessarily challenge neoliberal imperatives and its embedded racial 
biases.  
This collection of theorists who write from various left traditions (feminist, queer, 
Autonomist, Guattarian) can be grouped together as advancing—to various degrees—what 
Philippe Pignarre calls a “left wing thesis of depression.” In his book, Comment la depression est 
devenue une épidémie [How depression became an epidemic], Philippe Pignarre identifies two 
major theses concerning the etiology of depression that cleave along political lines. What 
distinguishes the “right-wing thesis” and the “left-wing thesis” is how they attribute the cause of 
depression. The “right wing thesis” posits biology as the cause of depression, and is considered 
right-wing by Pignarre because of the way that it obscures how depression is produced at the 
intersections of sexist, racist, colonialist and class-based oppression. This biological thesis 
advocates pharmacological treatment options above all else and forecloses the possibility that 
social change could bring about improved well-being. Conversely, the “left-wing thesis” posits 
depression as caused by society and is usually highly critical of psychopharmacological 
approaches which it paints as a strategy of social control and free market profiteering off of 
social alienation and existential suffering (Pignarre 2001: 16-17). Both Bifo and Cvetkovich 
make exactly this claim. Bifo sees prescription drugs, like recreational drugs, as enabling people 
to keep up an unhealthy spirit of competition. He writes: “Political culture refuses to 
acknowledge that the legal drugs one can buy at the pharmacy, a source of astonishing profits for 
Roche and Glaxo, as well as the illegal ones, a source of profit for the mafia, are an essential 
factor (and in fact the most important one) of competitive society” (2009: 103). Cvetkovich 
echoes this attitude towards the antidepressant industry when she proclaims her “strongly held 
convictions about the social causes of mental illness” (Cvetkovich 2012: 79). My dissertation 
builds on this left-wing thesis of depression, but in a uniquely Guattarian mode—after all, 
Guattari was a trained pharmacist— that leaves open the possibility that chemicals of all sorts 
can be of aid in exploring new existential territories which may offer lines of flight out of 
depression’s snare. 
 Another theorist whose work I would like to highlight here as a way of showing to what 
extent melancholy and depression have proven to be important interlocutors for critical theory is 
Wendy Brown. I would specifically like to draw attention to her essay “Resisting Left 
Melancholy” because it is somewhat of a harbinger of the other scholarship presented in this 
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section of the literature review. The purpose of Brown’s article, as the title suggests, is to resist a 
certain melancholic tendency that characterizes the Left after the fall of the Berlin wall and rise 
of Thatcher and Reagan. Following Stuart Hall, she embraces the idea that the Left has 
ultimately failed to come to terms with its own collapse and to “apprehend the character of the 
age and to develop a political critique and a moral-political vision” appropriate to it that would 
be able to contest the Right’s hold on power (Brown 1999: 19). Brown’s working model of 
melancholy comes from a combination of Freud and Walter Benjamin, and her article critiques 
the Left’s inability to mourn its attachments to certain antiquated traditions and modes of 
analysis which have proven inadequate. One of her aims is to defend two modes of left-wing 
critique— identity politics and poststructuralism—that became more prominent in the 1980s and 
that have since been made into scapegoats by Left traditionalists. Brown recounts that “the 
conventional charge [against identity politics] from one portion of the Left is that political 
movements rooted in cultural identity—racial, sexual, ethnic, or gendered—not only elide the 
fundamental structure of modernity, capitalism, and its fundamental formation, class, but 
fragment left political energies and interests such that coalition building is impossible” (23). 
With regards to poststructuralism,  
The murder charges here are also familiar: Postfoundational theories of the subject, truth, 
and social processes undermine the possibility of a theoretically coherent and factually 
true account of the world, and also challenge the putatively objective grounds of left 
norms. Together or separately, these two phenomena are held responsible for the weak, 
fragmented, and disoriented character of the contemporary Left (23).  
Wendy Brown responds to these dismissals of identitarian and poststructuralist politics by 
labelling the Left traditionalists as melancholics who have failed to mourn their attachments to 
ineffective and outmoded political worldviews. She describes the Benjaminian concept of left 
melancholy as follows: 
Left melancholy is Benjamin's unambivalent epithet for the revolutionary hack who is, 
finally, attached more to a particular political analysis or ideal—even to the failure of that 
ideal—than to seizing possibilities for radical change in the present. In Benjamin’s 
enigmatic insistence on the political value of a dialectical historical grasp of “the time of 
the Now,” left melancholy represents not only a refusal to come to terms with the 
particular character of the present, that is, a failure to understand history in terms other 
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than “empty time” or “progress.” It signifies, as well, a certain narcissism with regard to 
one’s past political attachments and identity that exceeds any contemporary investment in 
political mobilization, alliance, or transformation.… We come to love our left passions 
and reasons, our left analyses and convictions, more than we love the existing world that 
we presumably seek to alter with these terms or the future that would be aligned with 
them. (Brown 20-21) 
Brown’s analysis of the 1990s leftist landscape and her condemnation of melancholic 
attachments to ineffective strategies leads her to conclude with an appeal for a Leftist auto-
critique. Of interest here, especially considering Bifo and Guattari’s yoking of therapy to 
political activism, is that Brown completely rejects the idea that political critique would benefit 
from integrating a therapeutic praxis. She summarizes her position as follows:  
My emphasis on the melancholic logic of certain contemporary left tendencies is not 
meant to recommend therapy as the route to answering these questions. It does, however, 
suggest that the feelings and sentiments—including those of sorrow, rage, and anxiety 
about broken promises and lost compasses—that sustain our attachments to left analyses 
and left projects ought to be examined for what they create in the way of potentially 
conservative and even self-destructive undersides of putatively progressive political aims. 
(Brown 27) 
Even though Brown disavows the sort of fusion between therapy and activism that my 
dissertation imagines in the Guattarian tradition, I do support her defence of poststructuralist 
approaches to theorizing subjectivity as legitimate contributions to the Left project. However, as 
I have already alluded to with respect to the Feel Tank thinkers, this project moves away from an 
identity politics paradigm (which Brown also defends contra the charges of the Left 
melancholics, as she calls them) because of the way that psychiatric power’s medical gaze is 
propped up by a process of identification that produces depression as if it were a problem of the 
individual subject. 
 Before concluding this review of the literature on the critical theory of depression and 
melancholy, I would like to briefly schematize the thinking of two additional theorists—Judith 
Burtler and Julia Kristeva—whose engagement with the topic is a bit different from what has 
been glossed so far, but nonetheless relevant to my dissertation’s use of melancholy as a 
framework for understanding contemporary models of standardized subjectivity. Both Butler and 
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Kristeva mine the depths of Freud’s theory of melancholia to elaborate the psychic 
underpinnings of being queer and being gendered woman, but in different ways, and to different 
effect. 
 Butler has written prolifically and is the world’s most cited gender theorist, publishing 
regularly since the late 1980s. As a result, the role that melancholy plays in her work changes 
over time depending on the focus of her research. Here I will share two of her main ideas about 
melancholy as it relates specifically to gender and queerness, and to the precarity of living in a 
world that is filled with systematic affective violence. The first iteration that I would like to 
present comes from her 1997 book The Psychic Life of Power. The book is essentially about how 
psychic life is produced through the interiorization of social forces, and how melancholy is 
crucial to this production of subjectivity, both in terms of the role it plays in the “psychic 
economy” and how it doubles as “part of the operation of regulatory power” (Butler 1997: 143). 
Gender identity is the lynchpin to Butler’s argument as to the constitutive role of melancholia in 
psychic and social life. Butler argues that heterosexual culture is inherently a “culture of gender 
melancholy” (140). What she means by this is that heterosexuality is based on an inherently 
melancholic subject position that is incapable of acknowledging, let alone grieving, same-sex 
attachments. She describes the situation in the following words: 
If we accept the notion that heterosexuality naturalizes itself by insisting on the radical 
otherness of homosexuality, then heterosexual identity is purchased through a 
melancholic incorporation of the love that it disavows: the man who insists upon the 
coherence of his heterosexuality will claim that he never loved another man, and hence 
never lost another man. That love, that attachment becomes subject to a double 
disavowal, a never having loved, and a never having lost. This “never-never” thus founds 
the heterosexual subject, as it were; it is an identity based upon the refusal to avow an 
attachment, and, hence, the refusal to grieve.… When the prohibition against 
homosexuality is culturally pervaisive, then the “loss” of homosexual love is precipitated 
through a prohibition which is repeated and ritualized throughout the culture. What 
ensues is a culture of gender melancholy in which masculinity and femininity within the 
heterosexual matrix are strengthened by the repudiations that they perform. In opposition 
to a conception of sexuality which is “said” to express a gender, gender itself is here 




Butler goes on to argue that this psychic operation of constituting gender-normative heterosexual 
subjects through melancholy then doubles as a circuit of social regulation whereby institutions 
such as the U.S. military must resolutely disavow homosexuality in the preservation of its 
construction of masculinity (1997: 143). Her linking of compulsory heterosexuality with 
melancholy is an important theoretical response to the AIDS crisis and can be read in 
conjunction with texts like Douglas Crimp’s Melancholy and Moralism: Essays on AIDS and 
Queer Politics for which melancholy usefully articulates the psychic response to the 
“ungrievable” loss of love objects to AIDS, and to the loss of the gay pre-AIDS utopian 
imaginary.  
 In her more recent book Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, Butler 
returns to the psychic paradigm of melancholy to insist as she had previously on the role of 
melancholy in the mourning process, particularly when mourning attachments which are 
foreclosed by normative powers as ungrievable. Precarious Life moves from Butler’s previous 
analysis of ungrieavable same-sex attachments to ungrievable lives. What she has in mind here 
are the Palestinian lives lost to U.S.-backed Israeli military interventions that fail to register in 
the public consciousness as “life” in the same way as American or Israeli lives. Again, Freud’s 
model of melancholia in The Ego and the Id, where Freud revises his earlier thesis to account for 
the role of melancholia in the work of mourning, provides Butler with a framework for 
understanding the interminable and always incomplete process of mourning under these kinds of 
circumstances. She writes: 
I am not sure I know when mourning is successful, or when one has fully mourned 
another human being. Freud changed his mind on this subject: he suggested that 
successful mourning meant being able to change one object for another; he later claimed 
that incorporation, originally associated with melancholia, was essential to the task of 
mourning. Freud’s early hope that an attachment might be withdrawn and then given 
anew implied a certain interchangeability of objects as a sign of hopefulness, as if the 
prospect of entering life anew made use of a kind of promiscuity of libidinal aim. That 
might be true, but I do not think that successful grieving implies that one has forgotten 
another person or that something else has come along to take its place, as if full 
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substitutability was something for which we might strive. Perhaps, rather, one mourns 
when one accepts that by the loss one undergoes one will be changed, possibly for ever 
(Butler 2004: 21). 
In this sort of schema, melancholia takes on an ambivalent, dual function. On the one hand, it 
attests to the highly strategized and coordinated form of violence that Palestinians are subject to, 
that not only takes the form of military aggression but also of a mediatized, representational 
violence that simultaneously marks these lives as sub-human, unrecognizable, and thus 
ungrievable. But on the other hand, Butler also ascribes to melancholy a positive function of 
assisting in the mourning process, since melancholy bears the traces of its own production and 
points to a loss that can be acknowledged if “the narcissistic preoccupation of melancholia can 
be moved into a consideration of the vulnerability of others … ” (Butler 2004: 30).  
These aren’t necessarily ideas that I engage with in detail in the subsequent chapters of 
my dissertation, but in chapter two I perform a rereading of Butler’s theory of subjection that 
undoes the boundary between the psychic interior and social exterior that Freud insists upon in 
The Ego and the Id and which is maintained by her work out of adherence to Freud, even if there 
are moments such as these, where she highlights the vulnerability and precarity of sociality that 
suggest the possibility of this boundary’s undoing. 
 One final theorist whose work I would like to touch on briefly, for no overview of the 
literature on melancholy would be complete without it, is Julia Kristeva’s Black Sun: Depression 
and Melancholia. Kristeva’s work is less overtly political than the other thinkers mentioned thus 
far, even though she was a regular contributor to Tel Quel during its active years. Her writing is 
more suitably placed next to Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky and Fritz Saxl’s Saturn and 
Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art, a monumental study 
which construes melancholy’s heterogeneous iterations in literary and philosophical texts and the 
visual arts from the time of Artistotle through to the Middle. I position Kristeva’s work more in 
line with this tradition because her method of theoretical elaboration is one of closely reading 
works of visual art and literature. Each one of the chapters in her book is dedicated to an analysis 
of an artist, including Hans Holbein the Younger, Gérard de Nerval, Fyodor Dostoyevsky and 
Marguerite Duras. Kristeva is a practicing psychoanalyst and her readings of these artists is 
supplemented by her extensive clinical experience. What she does with these artists and clinical 
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case studies is no less than reformulate the Freudian theory of melancholy, since she believes that 
only through the arts can certain unsymbolized aspects of psychic life find expression (Radden 
2000: 335).  
A complete account of her revision of Freud is beyond the scope of this analysis, since 
my dissertation draws on concepts that are more allied to Guattarian schizoanalysis than 
Freudian psychoanalysis, yet I will nonetheless provide a brief description of her theoretical 
orientations. I will do so to emphasize her significance to 20th century thinking on melancholy 
and to help show how these psychoanalytic, loss-based theories diverge from the way that I use 
melancholy in this present study. What Kristeva’s theory attempts to explain in psychoanalytic 
terms is the sociological fact that women are more likely than men to suffer from depression. She 
accounts for this gendered disparity by positing that women have the more difficult libidinal 
adaption to make in a heterosexist culture. Jennifer Radden, editor of the melancholy reader 
which includes an excerpt from Black Sun, describes the scenario as follows: 
Male development in a heterosexist culture reflects the easier adaptation: The boy 
eventually replaces the mourned maternal object with an opposite-sex (female) substitute. 
But were the girl to seek such a replacement, it would be a homosexual love choice. 
Freud’s response to this particular developmental disparity between the sexes was not 
linked to his theory of melancholia. He insisted that a mature woman changed her love 
object from female to male. Not accepting this solution, Kristeva’s analysis proposes that 
women maintain the original love object as female but with the risk of depression and of 
homosexuality…. Left uncertain in this text, and in other writing, is the extent to which 
melancholia and depression are the inevitable lot of women, and homosexuality women's 
unfailing disposition. Several of her critics have accused Kristeva of homophobia in this 
analysis and have portrayed her women as “melancholy heterosexuals longing for lost 
love” (Butler 1993: 111 in Radden 336).  
Kristeva draws on Lacan’s concept of the Thing and Melanie Klein’s good and bad part-objects 
to give the Maternal a heightened sense of importance in determining female desire and 
depression. Judith Butler has been one of Krisetva’s most regular critics over the years, despite, 
or perhaps because of, how closely their research topics overlap. To restate the terms of their 
divergence more clearly, Butler effectively posits that melancholia is a result of compulsory 
heterosexuality that prevents the mourning of lost same-sex attachments, whereas for Kristeva it 
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is female homosexuality that is responsible for melancholia, since it thwarts the matricidal 
impulse central to the Oedipal imperative of finding a heterosexual love object. Unlike poetry 
and motherhood which allow the female subject to relive contact with the maternal Thing in the 
symbolic register, Kristeva posits lesbianism as a type of pre-Oedipal relationship with the 
mother’s body that “assimilates to psychosis, an escapist flight from the symbolic and regression 
beneath culture” in a Lacanian paradigm where culture and the symbolic are synonymous with 
the Law of the Father (Fraser 14). Butler’s criticisms of Kristeva’s theory of melancholia also go 
beyond an accusation of homophobia to accuse her of falling into gender essentialisms that fail 
to consider the historical and cultural contingency of gender constructions. In many ways, 
Butler’s disagreements with Kristeva have as much to do with poststructuralism’s disagreements 
with structuralism as with queer theory’s disagreements with orthodox psychoanalysis. 
Nevertheless, Kristeva’s contributions to a theory of melancholia do not fall into line with all of 
structuralism’s tenets, and she challenges the Lacanian principle that the unconscious is 
structured like a language and asserts that the analyst must consider not only what the analysand 
has to say, but also how they say it, taking into account the tonalities, moods, rhythms and 
silences which punctuate it (Kristeva 1992: 204). In moments of Kristeva’s work on melancholia 
it is possible to glimpse lines of flight from the structuralist-psychoanalytic doxa that frame 
much of her thinking on the topic. A significant portion of Kristeva’s work, like Butler’s—albeit 
from a different political allegiance—is highly inventive and allows for new ways of thinking 
about feminine and queer desire that was not given its due place in the psychoanalytic 
formulations of Freud and Lacan. The main reason I do not engage very closely with these 
theories in the following chapters is that I still feel that they fall prey to some of the 
shortcomings that plagued the structuralist underpinnings of 1970s film theory to which Deleuze 
and Guattari offer a viable alternative.  
The Schizoanalytic Unconscious 
 To conclude my review of the scholarship on the critical theory of melancholy and 
depression, I would like to suggest that Deleuze and Guattari’s theories of the unconscious 
provide a way out of what I see as some of the shortcomings of these psychoanalytically-
informed theories of psychic life. There are three main theoretical turns that Deleuze and 
Guattari enact in their reconceptualization of the unconscious which are particularly useful to 
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this study. Firstly, unlike the psychoanalytic theatre of the unconscious which results from the 
repression of desire, the schizoanalytic unconscious is a factory of desiring-production (see 
Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 1-2, 24, 55, 113). Secondly, the psychoanalytic unconscious depends 
on the personalized figure of the neurotic individual to distinguish between the discrete spheres 
of psychic desire and social reality. Counter to this formulation, Deleuze and Guattari propose an 
unconscious that is immediately psychosocial, where it is impossible to distinguish between 
desiring and social production—“The truth of the matter is that social production is purely and 
simply desiring production itself under determinate conditions” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 29). 
And thirdly, whereas the psychoanalytic unconscious is turned towards the past—the childhood 
dramas of reality-testing, navigating good and bad objects, and entering the symbolic—the 
unconscious of schizoanalysis is turned towards the future, “an unconscious whose screen would 
be none other than the possible itself.… Then why stick this label ‘machinic unconscious’ onto 
it? Simply to stress that it is populated not only with images and words, but also with all kinds of 
machinisms that lead it to produce and reproduce these images and words” (Guattari 2011: 10). 
Together, these three schizoanalytic revisions to the psychoanalytic model of the unconscious 
also happen to undo a lot of the presuppositions about the nature of melancholia as it has been 
articulated by post-Freudian theorists, and the nature of depression as it is articulated in the 
psychiatric literature. 
 The error that theorists like Kristeva and Butler, following in the footsteps of Freud, and 
to a lesser extent Lacan, can be accused of making, at least from a Deleuzo-Guattarian 
perspective, is assigning Oedipus a constitutive role in the production of melancholic 
subjectivity. In their invocation of the Oedipus complex to explain how it is that melancholia (the 
clinical neurosis par excellence) is produced, they mistake unresolved conflicts in the Oedipal 
scene as causative of melancholia, when, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest in their book on Kafka 
and minor literature, “it’s not Oedipus that produces neurosis; it is neurosis—that 
is, a desire that is already submissive and searching to communicate its own submission—that 
produces Oedipus” (1986: 10). Ian Buchanan’s entry on schizoanalysis in the dictionary of 
critical theory helps to clarify how psychoanalysis’ theory of melancholia is self-validating in 
this regard and is willfully blind to the forces active in Deleuze and Guattari’s unconscious: 
“Deleuze and Guattari are prepared to say that psychoanalysis works perfectly insofar as it is 
only a matter of dealing with neuroses, but the problem is that neuroses are a second order 
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problem, meaning that—contrary to Freud—they do not tell us anything essential about the 
operation of the unconscious” (Buchanan 2010: n.p.). If neurosis is only ever a second order 
problem which reifies psychoanalysis’ Oedipal models, then it is possible that a different sort of 
approach capable of gleaning the first order operations of the unconscious could discover some 
unforeseen symptoms of melancholia, which may in turn refresh some assumptions about its 
etiology and corresponding therapy. My dissertation adopts Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of the 
unconscious—as productive and machinic, depersonalized and event-based, and sensitive to the 
virtual quanta of potential immanent to its plastic composition—with the expectation that an 
allegiance to this sort of unconscious will facilitate a more nuanced understanding of the current 
depression pandemic as it is articulated by minor cinemas of melancholy and therapy. 
 This literature review has glossed the history of film theory from the 1970s and its 
indebtedness to Lacan through to the rise of Deleuzian approaches to subjectivity which were 
introduced into the Anglophone sphere of the discipline in the early 1990s. I have positioned my 
project within this growing body of Deleuzian approaches to film philosophy which have 
inherited some of the longstanding questions about the production of subjectivity that 
characterized the modern film theory of the 1970s but which had been largely abandoned after 
the crisis of political modernism. I have alluded to the diversity of Deleuzian approaches to film 
and have situated my work within the sub-field of minor cinema. Within this field I have 
excavated an overlooked vein of anti-psychiatric minor cinema based on Guattari’s linking of 
therapy and activism. Furthermore, I have provided a critical review of the political theories of 
melancholy that have grown in recent years, with numerous publications coming out of the Feel 
Tank and Autonomia traditions. I have also glossed the most important psychoanalytic theories 
of melancholia that reflect the shifting landscape of critical theory in the 1980s and 1990s. This 
literature review has concluded with a reiteration of how Deleuze and Guattari’s theories of 
subjectivity and the unconscious provide a viable alternative to the psychoanalytically-informed 
models that have dictated both film theory and studies on melancholia, and to the political 
opportunism of mainstream psychiatry, which has, in a historic move, hegemonically presented 
itself as the only legitimate and professional alternative to the waning discipline of 
psychoanalysis, that despite its reification of Oedipal enclosures, at least had the merit of 
regularly thinking with art, and remaining committed to a hermeneutics of subjectivity. Now that 
I have shared the intellectual genealogy that informs my project, surveyed the fields of inquiry 
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that my dissertation contributes to, and positioned my work in relation to these discourses, I will 
enter into my critical symptomatology of depression through close analyses of films that use the 
aesthetic resources offered to them by the cinema to perceive the pandemic in which they were 


























The Psychosocial Image 
 
 This opening chapter corroborates the Deleuzian idea advanced by Steven Shavio’s The 
Cinematic Body and presented in the preceeding literature review, that the film image can be 
understood as an event rather than a representation of a lost reality. What this chapter adds to the 
argument is that the image, under the right conditions, can be a specifically psychosocial event. 
The stylistic history of the cinema that I chart shows how in 1965 with the arrival of 
Michaelangelo Antonioni’s The Red Desert and Pier Paolo Pasolini’s concept of the cinema of 
poetry, the image overcomes a distinction that had previously been maintained between the 
psyche and the socius. In the expressionist and neorealist currents of the cinema, either the 
psyche was made to represent the socius, or vice versa. The specifically “psychosocial” quality 
of the cinema of poetry and its “free indirect” mode of perception opens the possibility for 
creating images of psychic nonnormativity that are immediately event-based, political and 
collective.  
 
Faith in the Image, Faith in Reality 
The history of film style is structured by a division between two types of images, each 
with a unique relationship to the reality that they have commonly been understood to represent. 
André Bazin’s canonical essay “The Evolution of Film Language” established this critical 
distinction between two “stylistic families with fundamentally different conceptions of cinematic 
expression”: “filmmakers who put their faith in the image and those who put their faith in 
reality” (Bazin 2009: 88). Whereas the silent-era “realists” (epitomized by the work of Stroheim, 
Flaherty, Murnau and Dreyer) exercised their faith in reality through an “objective” style that 
sought to reproduce the spatial coordinates and temporal duration of profilmic reality as 
accurately as possible, the “imagists” (German Expressionists and Soviet Montagists) did 
violence to the “plastic” surface (lighting, décor, composition, acting) or altered the inherent 
duration of filmed events through recourse to montage-style editing, to articulate “subjective” 
states of mind. The imagists dominated the cinema from 1915-1930, but by the late 1930s they 
were unseated by Italian neorealism and the “spatial realism” of American auteurs Orson Welles 
and William Wyler. Bazin famously praised the realist overcoming of the imagists as a 
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dialectical step forward in the history of film style towards ever-greater realism. 
Yet the clear-cut division between the realists and the imagists starts to muddy when 
faced with the following question: How can faith be put in the psychic—and not just social— 
dimension of reality? If Bazin had lived past his untimely death in 1958, he would have 
witnessed the emergence of the “cinema of poetry,” a seismic shift in the history of film style 
whose creative potential is yet to be exhausted. Significantly, it also happens to offer a resolution 
to this schism between the realists and the imagists founded on a metaphysical distinction 
between social and psychic realities. The cinema of poetry was christened by none other than 
Pier Paolo Pasolini, filmmaker and colossal figure of Italian literature, according to whom this 
ground-breaking tendency in art cinema is most fully incarnated by Michelangelo Antonioni’s 
The Red Desert. The 1964 film is remarkable because it puts its faith in the psychic life of its 
protagonist’s neurosis; an artistic commitment that necessitated a stylistic break from Italian 
neorealism’s “objective” orientation. While still very much caring for the reality that Bazin and 
the neorealists held dear, the 1960s cinema of poetry began to re-incorporate some of the 
imagists’ plastic distortions to express the intricacies of character psychology. Faced with the 
artistic task of expressing the psychic pain throbbing underneath the surface of the objective, 
realist image, the cinema of poetry found it necessary to do some violence to the plastics of the 
image and detour through non-realism in order to be true to the psychic dimension of reality; 
effectively overcoming the definitive distinction that Bazin had drawn between the directors who 
put their faith in the image and those who put their faith in reality.  
Dating back to its origins, cinema has regularly articulated character psychology.xxxvii 
What the cinema of poetry invented was an aesthetic that could express mental interiority and 
social exteriority with equal fidelity and undivided faith. The technique deployed by the cinema 
of poetry to hold these two opposing poles of the cinematographic image in experiential tension 
with one another is what Pasolini calls the “free indirect point of view shot” (176). Neither a 
classical point of view shot (the cinematic equivalent of literature’s “direct discourse”) nor a 
non-point of view, objective shot (the equivalent of literature’s “indirect discourse”), the free 
indirect introduces a real ambiguity as to whether or not an image is seen “through the eyes” of a 
particular character. This ambiguity is creative of a situation where many of the binaries that 
structure both Bazin’s classification of the history of film stylexxxviii as well as the etiology of 
depression start to collapse into one another. Subjective and objective, interior and exterior, 
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psychic and social: the image of psychosocial reality that comes to perceptibility in the cinema of 
poetry grasps these categorical distinctions that structure the “faith in reality/faith in the image” 
schism, and reassembles them into relational poles co-inhabiting the very same image.  
 
The Subjective and Objective Poles of the Cinematographic Image 
 To better situate how the cinema of poetry resolves this tension coursing through the 
history of film style, I will trace the two separate lineages of directors who put their faith in the 
image and those who put their faith in reality, and show how each cultivated either a subjective 
or an objective aesthetic orientation. These two tendencies within the history of film style can be 
neatly mapped onto Bazin’s distinction between those directors who put their faith in the image 
and those who put their faith in reality. But as I will show here, expressionism’s 
subjective/psychological focus, or faith in the image, and neorealism’s objective/social 
inclination, or faith in reality, never precluded a concern with the other camp’s emphasis on 
either psychic or social reality. Italian neorealism, the cinema which epitomizes a faith in reality, 
tends towards the objective pole of the image. However, neorealism’s objective orientation and 
aesthetic commitment to a faithful representation of social exteriority never implied an 
abandonment of psychological inquiry. The humanist spirit of neorealism encapsulated by films 
such as Germany Year Zero (Rossellini, 1948), The Bicycle Thief (De Sica, 1948) and The Earth 
Trembles (Visconti, 1948) led to a sincere concern for the experience of living in post-war 
poverty. Germany Year Zero famously ends with the suicide of a young boy who jumps off the 
scaffold of a bombed-out building. He couldn't bear the trauma of war and the moral guilt of 
having euthanized his ailing father with poison. In The Bicycle Thief, an otherwise honest man is 
reduced to petty bike thievery in an effort to gain employment, and is brutally shamed in front of 
his son when caught committing the crime. The Earth Trembles focuses on young Sicilian 
fishermen who face a glum future after their revolt against exploitative fish merchants is 
suppressed. Gripped by the despair-inducing reality of war, neorealism has narrated the 
psychological despair of poverty since its very beginnings. 
 This narration of a wretched socio-political reality and its detrimental psychological 
effects was enabled by aesthetic innovation. As Gilles Deleuze writes in the very first lines of 
Cinema 2: The Time-Image, “Against those who defined Italian neorealism by its social content, 
Bazin put forward the fundamental requirement of formal aesthetic criteria.… The real was no 
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longer represented but ‘aimed at’” (1). For both Deleuze and Bazin, neorealism consists of an 
aesthetic breakthrough that enabled the expression of the Italian post-war experience—an 
experience that would have been impossible to express through past aesthetic strategies. The 
feeling of poverty couldn’t just be plugged into the stylistic coordinates of the white telephone 
drama that previously dominated Italian screens during the fascist era. Rather, it took on-location 
shooting combined with long shot and long take cinematography for the neorealists to express 
the plight of the people with genuine sincerity, to “aim at” expressing their reality, including its 
psychological dimension.  
 Poverty can be filmed with little manipulation of the plastics of the film image and even 
less recourse to montage. War-torn cities show up well in long shot, the arduous search for a 
stolen bicycle lends itself well to long take, and everyday objects like potatoes and fishing nets 
that are charged with narrative significance naturally emerge from the environment in which they 
are filmed. Bazin praised the neorealists for respecting the spatio-temporal coordinates of the 
scene: the situatedness of objects and people in space, and their unfolding in duration. Mobile, 
long-take cinematography allowed the neorealists to craft a newfound respect for the reality they 
aimed at and a renewed fidelity to the social actuality in which they intervened. Through fidelity 
to the social actuality—its materiality, spatiality, and temporality—the neorealists found a way 
of articulating faith, not just in social reality, but even in the psychological reality of post-war 
alienation.  
 For Bazin, the faith that the neorealists put in reality was a humanist and spiritual 
accomplishment that distinguished them from the expressionists who made the error of putting 
their faith in the image. According to Bazin’s definition of “faith in the image,” 
 “image” implies broadly speaking, everything that the depiction of a thing on the screen 
can add to the thing itself. This contribution is complex but it can basically be reduced to 
two kinds: the plasticity of the image and the resources of editing. By plasticity, [Bazin 
means] the style of the make-up and décor and even, to a certain extent, of the acting; in 
addition of course to the lighting and framing, the basis of composition” (Bazin 2009: 
88).  
The expressionist aesthetic of distortion-through-addition included the use of extreme contrast 
lighting, man-made sets, exaggerated makeup and costume, and heavily stylized acting. Though 
operating from a very different set of aesthetic values—from a faith in the image—the 
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expressionists shared with the neorealists a concern for the psychological effects of war. German 
expressionist films made during the inter-war period such as The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (Robert 
Weine 1920), Pandora's Box (G.W. Pabst 1929) and The Testament of Dr. Mabuse (Fritz Lang 
1933) all sought the aesthetic resources to articulate their fears over the rise of fascism. 
Caligari famously concludes in the asylum of an evil psychiatrist with totalitarian 
impulses; The Testament of Dr. Mabuse contains scenes of mind control wherein human 
cognitive faculties are overtaken by the animal magnetism of a villainous hypnotist, and 
Pandora's Box blends sexual desire with murderous impulses in an exploration of Berlin’s 
criminal underworld. The German cineastes expressed an unparalleled mass anxiety about the 
rise of Nazism and return to war that was to come after the fall of the Weimar republic. To avoid 
betraying their subject matter, the expressionists could not help but put their faith in a dark, 
obtuse and violent image—the only kind that could anticipate their nation’s historical 
development. By exploring the interwar unconscious, the expressionists found a way to elucidate 
the coming socio-political actuality of World War II.  
 Siegfried Kracauer’s seminal study on Weimar cinema From Caligari to Hitler: A 
Psychological History of the German Film argues that cinema is the most useful art for revealing 
the depths of the collective unconscious: “What films reflect are not so much explicit credos as 
psychological dispositions—those deep layers of collective mentality which extend more or less 
below the dimension of consciousness” (1947: 6). According to Kracauer, for this psychic 
dimension to be expressed in the cinematographic image, hidden mental processes need to be 
rendered aesthetic through a process of exteriorization. He writes: 
Inner life manifests itself in various elements and conglomerations of external life, 
especially in those almost imperceptible surface data which form an essential part of the 
screening treatment. In recording the visible world—whether current reality or an 
imaginary universe—films therefore provide clues to hidden mental processes.   
(Kracauer 1947: 7) 
By exteriorizing and uncovering “inner” mental processes, the expressionists sought a 
sociological truth: the impending rise of fascism, which could only be possible in a world of 
irrational men, prone to herd mentality and willing to sacrifice their freedom, or even their lives, 
for their collective affirmation in totalitarian values.  
Even though German expressionism and Italian neorealism constitute opposite sides of 
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the realism-formalism divide laid out by Bazin, they unexpectedly mirror each other’s 
preoccupations. German expressionism rendered aesthetic the psychic roots of pre-war social 
actuality, whereas the neorealist image showed the social conditions responsible for post-war 
psychological misery. Both expressionism and neorealism are “partial” cinemas, for both gain 
access to one half of the psyche-social binary, but only by consigning the other half to 
metaphoric abstraction.xxxix In its search for the psychic conditions that made the rise of fascism 
possible, expressionism had to invent an entire set of signifying codes for psychological 
malaise—and it was wildly successful in doing so. As a result, expressionism invented a psyche 
that became quasi-fantastical and broke from social reality through an image that flaunted plastic 
excesses. In its most stylized moments, expressionism invents an abnormal psyche as an allegory 
for pre-fascist society, but never films the social reality with any fidelity to its spatio-temporal 
coordinates.  
 A similar impasse lies at the heart of neorealism, and is only resolved by the cinema of 
poetry’s arrival ten years after its end. In a humanist spirit, neorealism sought to express 
psychological truths about the traumatic effects of war through a sociologically and politically 
committed cinema. Looking at the rubble and decay of bombed-out post-war Europe, neorealist 
films evoked a certain feeling of what it must be like to inhabit such a bleak landscape. The 
neorealist image starts from the exterior social world, and uses its shape to deduce a 
corresponding psychological state. Most orthodox readings of Italian neorealism dismiss the 
psychological current running throughout the neorealist canon as merely incidental and opts to 
emphasize its sociological and objective tendencies of its aesthetic. Robert Kolker’s The Altering 
Eye best encapsulates this view: “An essential component of the neorealist endeavour was its 
concern, really for the first time, to deal objectively with the working class. That it could not 
avoid sentimentalizing its subject is ultimately unimportant…. They replaced psychological 
inquiry with depictions of external struggle with the social environment, the government, the 
economic and political state of postwar Italy” (272). Kolker effectively depreciates the 
psychological pole of the neorealist image as incidental sentimentalism.  
Conversely, I suggest that neorealism’s psychological layer is in fact a fundamental 
component of the image whose brooding presence generated the stylistic conditions for the 
cinema of poetry’s later emergence.xl Neorealism has always carried a concern for the 
psychology of poverty and war. In mirror movement to the operations of expressionism, 
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neorealism detours through the social to arrive at the psychological. Without directly filming the 
psyche, the psychological pole of the image is made felt abstractly through its implication in the 
filmed social actuality. The psychological pole gained increasing prominence as the neorealist 
movement developed historically, interpenetrating with its sociological pole to such a degree that 
the objective-subjective binary eventually collapsed, giving rise to a new type of cinema: the 
cinema of poetry. What follows is an account of this stylistic tension in Italian neorealism 
leading up to the cinema of poetry’s historical emergence, as illustrated through some of the 
most movement’s most significant films. 
Perhaps the only neorealist film to really attempt at crafting an entirely sociologically 
objective aesthetic is Luchino Visconti's The Earth Trembles. In Bazin's analysis of the film he 
describes it as “a film almost entirely composed of long-takes where the concern with embracing 
the totality of the event is expressed by deep focus shots and endless pans” (Bazin 2009: 103, 
translation modified). [Image 1.1] Non-diegetic, voice-of-God narration punctuates the film and 
authoritatively explicates the injustice that saturates the downtrodden livelihood of a Sicilian 
fishing community. Though the film’s images could certainly speak for themselves and make 
this very point, Visconti opts for the closure of any possible misinterpretation by having the facts 
of life dictated aloud. The Earth Trembles strives to capture the totality of the event as 
objectively as cinematically possible.  
Image 1.1 The Earth Trembles 
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Perhaps it was this canonical reading of The Earth Trembles, or assumptions about the 
aims of Italian neorealism that has led to the wide disregard of this film movement’s 
psychological undercurrent which Bazin endeared with great nuance. Influential filmmaker and 
Cahiers du cinéma critic Eric Rohmer even went so far as to erroneously claim that “the whole 
body of Bazin's work is based on one central idea, an affirmation of the objectivity of the 
cinema” (Bazin 2011: 5). While Bazin is indeed quick to notice that many shots in neorealist 
films sought a degree of sociological objectivity, his writings on film realism intrinsically 
recognized the latent psychological pole harboured in the neorealist image. A prime example of 
this overlooked facet of Bazin’s work is his relishing of what he calls the “objective psychology” 
at work in Germany Year Zero (Bazin 2009: 206), a film that expresses a psychological 
dimension through close attention to the social actuality. Prominent historian of Italian film Peter 
Bondanella echoes Bazin when he finds the “moral emptiness” of its child protagonist (Edmund) 
reflected in the “external means” of the film (Bondanella 2009: 81). The film evokes his psychic 
states without delving “into” his troubled mind or modulating the plastics of the image in the 
manner of the expressionists (with unnatural lighting, makeup, props, etc.). For its director 
Roberto Rossellini, such modulations would constitute a superfluous aesthetic excess since the 
filmed social actuality (in neorealist style) is devastating enough for its psychological effects, 
especially on such a young and impressionable lead character, to be conjured up. There are even 
moments when Edmund's psychology is reflected in the urban landscape, in the most objective of 
long shots [Image 1.2]. Unlike Visconti's The Earth Trembles, Germany Year Zero does make 
considerable use of close-up and point-of-view shots that serve to link the bombed-out urban 
landscapes to Edmund's psychic state [Images 1.3 and 1.4]. For example, a point of view shot of 
the bottle of poison that Edmund uses to kill his father raises turns the object into an ethical 
dilemma that bears on character psychology and the overall meaning of the film [Image 1.5]. 
Though the film never goes “inside the mind,” in the style of many expressionist films, its latent 
concern for character psychology hints at the direction of Italian cinema’s eventual development. 
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Vittorio De Sica’s late neorealist work Umberto D (1952) and Roberto Rosselini's post-
neorealist Voyage to Italy (1954) begin to trade off the movement’s earlier proclivity towards 
sociological objectivity in favour of aesthetic techniques that could more directly articulate the 
psychological dimension of the post-war subject’s modern alienation—an alienation that could 
be derived from poverty as much as from bourgeois existential malaise. Umberto D is often cited 
as the last neorealist film.xli It retains a de-narrativized emphasis on the quotidian as relayed 
through the canonized long shot/long take cinematography, yet fully delves into the psychology 
of poverty, old age and single motherhood. The film focuses on the lives of two principle 
characters who share in the weariness of economic precarity: Umberto D (Carlo Battisi) and 
Maria (Maria Pia Casilio), his landlady’s maid. Umberto is an elderly man who has lost his 
pension to post-war inflation and he lives at constant risk of being thrown out of the room he has 
occupied for years. Maria is in an even tougher position, since she is unmarried and newly 
Image 1.2 Germany Year Zero Image 1.3 Germany Year Zero 
Image 1.4 Germany Year Zero Image 1.5 Germany Year Zero 
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pregnant, unsure of the prospective father’s identity. A now-famous kitchen scene conjures up 
the psychological impact of their dire situations. The scene is detailed in Bazin’s essay “Umberto 
D: A Great Work,” and Deleuze reinforces its importance in the opening pages of his book on 
the time-image, where describes it as follows:  
The young maid going into the kitchen in the morning, making a series of mechanical, 
weary gestures, cleaning a bit, driving the ants away with a water fountain, picking up the 
coffee grinder, stretching out her foot to close the door with her toe. And her eyes meet 
her pregnant woman’s belly, and it’s as though all the misery in the world were going to 
be born (Deleuze 2007: 2).  
This scene holds the objective and subjective poles of the cinematic image in tension with one 
another by intercutting long take cinematography of the maid’s wavering movements with close-
up shots of Umberto’s face that punctuate this quotidian scene with his surprise and dread. 
[Images 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8] The scene could qualify as objective due to its cinematography and 
mise-en-scène, yet as both Deleuze and Bazin point out, the scene is expressive of the characters’ 
thoughts, feelings, and dashed hopes. This late neorealist film manages to express a troubled 
psychic interiority just as effectively as a purely expressionist mise-en-scène, but without doing  
the violence to the plastics of the image that expressionism so routinely carried out. Instead, the 
camera dwells in the room with the characters, absorbing their pain and sympathizing with them 
through its extended presence. The long take—a technique allied to the objective pole of the 
image—begins to turn in on itself, to make felt the scene’s subjective tenor, in yet another 
Image 1.6 Umberto D Image 1.7 Umberto D 
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variant of the “objective psychology” paradigm that flashed up at key moments in the neorealist 
canon that I discussed above, such as Germany Year Zero.  
 Released only two years after Umberto D, Voyage to Italy straddles a very thin dividing-
line between late neorealism and the cinema of poetry in its full embrace of the psychological 
pole of the image. It departs from the standard neorealist theme of poverty to narrate the marital 
listlessness and bickering of an English couple that travels to Italy to sell a luxurious estate they 
have inherited. Throughout the course of the film their marriage continues to break down, to the 
point where Alex (George Sanders) and Katherine Joyce (Ingrid Bergman) decide to spend time 
apart. Left alone by her husband, Katherine goes sightseeing around Naples, and the city begins 
to reflect her mental and moral distress by procuring an endless stream of morbid images. The 
catacombs that she visits are lined with skulls, the streets filled with funeral processions, and 
when she is summoned to the scene of an archaeological discovery, she witnesses the excavation 
of a couple who were buried alive during the volcanic eruption at Pompeii [Images 1.9, 1.10, 
1.11, 1.12]. As Bazin evocatively writes: “It is Naples ‘filtered’ through the consciousness of the 
heroine. If the landscape is bare and confined, it is because the consciousness of an ordinary 
bourgeoise itself suffers from great spiritual poverty. Nevertheless, the Naples of the film is not 
Image 1.8 Umberto D 
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false. It is rather a mental landscape at once as objective as a straight photograph and as 
subjective as pure personal consciousness” (Bazin 2011: 169).xlii Entire scenes craft Katherine's 
psyche out of the landscape in which she is found,xliii so that in arguably the last neorealist film, 
Rossellini takes realist aesthetics to their limit, and uses all of its formal resources to express the 
psychic life of its characters.  
 At this limit of expression, Voyage to Italy begins to destabilize the subjective and 
objective poles of the image, but not in so far as to break with the spatial and temporal 
coordinates of reality, as the expressionists had done in the pre-war era. Katherine is a troubled 
character, she is suffering and she is existentially exhausted. As morbid as Katherine's visions 
are, however, they are visions, and not hallucinations. They never break off from the world that 
Images 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12 Voyage to Italy 
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she holds in common with all of the people around her. The other characters in the film observe 
the skulls, skeletons and funeral processions, and bear equal witness to these omens of death and 
signifiers of psychic trouble—these people just so happen to be more well-adjusted and less 
impressionable. Katherine’s neurosis is just that, a personal neurosis, and it never contests the 
foundations of the world in which she suffers. The mental landscape renders her psychology 
palpable through symbolism and metaphor, whereby an inferential leap from the plastic surface 
of the social exterior is required to subsequently deduce her mental interiority.  
The “mental landscape,” as Bazin calls it, is the result of an artistic compromise that 
Rossellini was forced to make when confronted with the dilemma of whether to express full 
fidelity to the singular truth of Katherine’s psychic pain—and the many ways it overspills the 
logic and scope of symbolism (skulls, catacombs, etc.)—or to the social reality before the 
camera. In an oblique manner, Bazin alluded to this privileging of the social over the psychic in 
his “Defense of Rossellini” essay, where he observes how “[Rossellini’s] characters are more apt 
to be affected by the settings through which they move than the settings are liable to be affected 
by their movement” (Bazin 2011: 170). By maintaining the rigidity of the plastic surface, and 
exhibiting the utmost fidelity to spatio-temporal contours of social actuality, the materiality of 
the world cramps and closes in on the psyche, but the psyche never liberates itself and re-makes 
the world. Allowing it to do so would have broken from neorealism’s “faith in reality”—which 
has proven itself to be a faith in social realityxliv—and had character psyches affect the plastics of 
the image. If this were to be the case, Rossellini would have found a way of sincerely filming the 
“totality of the event,” inclusive of both its psychological and sociological poles. He would have 
made the assertion, through aesthetic experimentation, that psychic fluxes, once thought to be the 
domain of an interiorized psychology, shape the social milieu in which they exist. But this 
development in the history of film style would have to wait for the maturity of another Italian 
cineaste, Michelangelo Antonioni, whose cinema of poetry discovered a reality that is 
immediately psychosocial.  
 
The Cinema of Poetry 
 Pier Paolo Pasolini christened the cinema of poetry at a conference roundtable held at the 
1965 Pesaro Film Festival, after seeing films by modernist auteurs such as Jean-Luc Godard, 
Bernardo Bertolucci, and most importantly, Michelangelo Antonioni. What prompted Pasolini to 
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hail the arrival of the cinema of poetry and pen an influential essay expounding its virtues and 
limitations is these auteurs’ reimaginaing of character subjectivity. Each of them, Pasolini 
argues, develops a free indirect relationship between themselves and their protagonists. As a 
result of this new type of image, the longstanding distinction between subjective and objective 
images that was maintained in German expressionism and Italian neorealism was proven 
inadequate. In the lexicon of film form, subjective shots capture a character’s point of view, as if 
through his or her eyes, and objective shots are non-point of view shots that emanate from the 
eyes of the filmmaker who looks at the characters positioned infront of the camera lens. In a free 
indirect schema, the filmmaker and their protagonist share a pair of eyes, and a way of looking at 
the world, so that it is no longer possible to clearly distinguish between subjective and objective 
images. Free indirect images are both objective and subjective, all at once. Of additional 
significance is that these films regularly feature mentally troubled protagonists whose psychic 
nonnormativity aids the free indirect schema in troubling the binary between objective and 
subjective perspectives.  
 Antonioni’s The Red Desert best articulates this shift from neorealism to the cinema of 
poetry and watching it side by side with Voyage to Italy illuminates how differently these two 
film movements conceive of psychic torment. In Voyage to Italy, Katherine’s psyche was 
troubled by the world, but never in turn troubles the world, precisely because neorealism 
preserved the ontological distinction between the objective and the subjective, and remained 
faithful to the objectivity of the exterior, social world until is final days. As much as Rossellini 
cares about the psychological conditions of his characters and goes to great lengths to infer what 
they are thinking and feeling, his deep faith in social reality during this neorealist period 
ultimately grants primacy to the objective pole of the image. It is in this way that neorealism 
implicitly localized the psyche, and its troubles, as residing inside the individual subject and as 
only being representable through the mediation of symbolism. The cinema of poetry offers a 
radically different account of the psyche’s locale and relationship to the social. By harnessing the 
power of the free indirect, it destabilizes the distinction between objective and subjective poles 
of the image, making it impossible to tell where objectivity and subjectivity begin and end. 
Without this clear demarcation, mental distress breaks out of the space it was once-assigned. No 
longer contained by the personal domain of subjective interiority, “mental illness” becomes a 
psychosocial phenomenon.  
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 A close look at some specific images from The Red Desert will help to show how the 
cinema of poetry uses the free indirect to craft psychosocial images of psychic non-normativity. 
The film focuses on Guiliana (Monica Vitti) and the anguish she endures when adapting to her 
newly industrialized surroundings of “economic miracle” Italy. Antonioni’s camera uses specific 
cinematographic techniques that lend the psyche a renewed significance by systematically 
eroding the border between objective and subjective perspectives. For example, in one of the 
film’s most important moments, Guiliana and her companion Corrado (Richard Harris) notice a 
floating piece of newspaper. This sequence opens with seems like a shared point of view shot, 
but before long, the two characters remarkably walk into the shot. What begins as a subjective 
shot ends as an objective shot. But this reversibility to the image indicates that it is of another 
variant entirely. [Images 1.13, 1.14, 1.15]. In other important moments that build on this 
approach, Antonioni uses an extreme shallow focus shot from behind Guiliana’s head that 
Image 1.13 The Red Desert 
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expresses her confusion [Image 1.16]; unnatural colour schemes that reveal her unease with the 
industrial invasion of her psychic life [Image 1.17]; and the sound of a boat horn whose origin is 
ambivalent. The cinema of poetry throws neorealist reality and the cinema’s longstanding 
distinction between the objective and subjective poles of the image into relief: Does the boat 
horn actually sound, or is it just “in her head”? Is the factory smoke actually bright yellow, or 
Image 1.14 The Red Desert 
Image 1.15 The Red Desert 
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does it just appear that way to Guiliana? Is that piece of floating newspaper really there, or is she 
imagining things that don’t really exist? Where the border is to be drawn between her 
perceptions and the “real world” is totally unknown, because the free indirect image creates an 
assemblage that mutually includes both the social and the psyche to arrive at an image that is 
immediately psychosocial and throw divisions between interior and exterior into relief. 
Image 1.16 The Red Desert 
Image 1.17 The Red Desert 
119 
 
 The free indirect’s capacity to create a psychosocial image is first insinuated by Pasolini, 
but is only really conceived in Deleuze’s later rereading of Pasolini where he de-personalizes the 
free indirect schema. In his cinema of poetry essay, Pasolini expounds the free indirect schema 
through the relationship between Michelangelo Antonioni and his protagonist Guiliana:  
Antonioni looks at the world by immersing himself in his neurotic protagonist, re-
animating the facts through her eyes (she, not by accident, clearly needs professional 
care, having already tried to commit suicide). By means of this stylistic device, Antonioni 
has freed his most deeply felt moment: he has finally been able to represent the world 
seen through his eyes, because he has substituted in toto for the worldview of a neurotic 
his own delirious view of aesthetics, a wholesale substitution which is justified by the 
possible analogy of the two views. (Pasolini 2005: 179) 
Pasolini’s formulation of the free indirect privileges the auteur-protagonist relationship and how 
their perspectives dovetail though a free indirect system of enunciation. The strong emphasis he 
places on the auteur as a pivotal figure who establishes the free indirect schema can likely be 
attributed to the historical conditions of its conception. Pasolini was working and writing in the 
heyday of auteurism. As a well-known cultural figure, much like Antonioni, his films were 
largely disseminated and marketed within an auteurist paradigm. Furthermore, film criticism of 
the 1960s was heavily influenced by the auteurist approach of Cahiers du cinema, and Andrew 
Sarris (who spoke on a panel with Pasolini at the 1966 New York Film Festival) published his 
“Notes on Auteur Theory” essay just a couple of years prior to the publication of Pasolini’s on 
the cinema of poetry.  
 Pasolini’s ground-breaking writing on the cinema of poetry creates the conditions for a 
theory of the psychosocial image, yet the passage cited above poses a couple of hurdles to 
contend with, stemming from the gendered connotations of his unabashed auteurism. If taken at 
face value, it implies that neurotic experiences are little more than a substitute for the vision of a 
great (male) auteur who needs to cast a fragile muse to achieve his delirious vision of aesthetics. 
Experience in itself is turned into an alibi for a greater vision. In the free indirect schema as 
Pasolini advances it here, the limit separating the subjective and objective poles of the image is 
dissolved, yet identities (between filmmaker and protagonist), and the hierarchy of values they 
imply, remain intact.  
It is Deleuze who is the first to excavate the impersonal and machinic qualities of the free 
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indirect assemblage and move past the identitarian trap of auteurism and its limited usefulness 
for a therapeutically political theory of melancholy aesthetics. According to his rereading of 
Pasolini in Cinema 1, in the free indirect style, “objective and subjective images lose their 
distinction, but also their identification, in favour of a new circuit where they are wholly 
replaced, or contaminate each other, or are decomposed and recomposed” (Deleuze 2007: 148-
149). In this passage and the pages surrounding it, Deleuze moves away from the auteurist and 
gendered connotations of Pasolini’s configuration cited above by insisting that the free indirect 
initiates a “loss of identification.” Rather than an interpersonal relationship between an auteur 
and his muse, the free indirect is here conceived of as “assemblage of enunciation, carrying out 
two inseparable acts of subjectivation simultaneously, one of which constitutes a character in the 
first person, but the other of which is present at his birth and brings him on to the scene” 
(Deleuze 2007: 73).xlv According to this reading, no longer do two subjects (the character and the 
auteur) bring the free indirect into being. Instead, the free indirect itself brings them into being, 
and modified them in the process, by creating the conditions for a group subject in free indirect 
relation with its component parts. In the cinema of poetry, both subject and object, auteur and 
protagonist, participate in the life of the free indirect schema’s operations by moving across and 
between the psychic and social poles of the cinematic image. 
 Faced with a free indirect system that dissolves the borders of objectivity and 
subjectivity, “one might say, then, that free indirect discourse allows a subtler means by which to 
grant the interior the right to comingle with the exterior” (Horton 2013: 34). At least that is the 
conclusion that Justin Horton arrives at in his recent article on mental landscapes in Cinema 
Journal. And his conclusion is certainly correct, since the free indirect style overcomes the 
mutual exclusivity of interior (psyche) and exterior (social) by equally and simultaneously 
privileging these two poles of the image that have long found themselves opposed in the history 
of film style. Yet in their comingling, the analogical relationship that “interior” and “exterior” 
maintain with the psyche and the social ceases to be tenable, and instead gives way to an entirely 
new reality very different from the one in which the neorealists put their faith; a reality that can 
only be described as immediately psychosocial.   
 The cinema of poetry can then be seen as advancing its own variant of realism, true to the 
psychosocial reality of what philosopher Gilbert Simondon calls the “transindividual.” The 
transindividual is a preindividual force immanent to events of subjectivity production, or 
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“individuation” to use Simondon’s language.xlvi It “appears not as that which unifies individual 
and society, but as a relation interior to the individual (defining its psyche) and a relation exterior 
to the individual defining the collective: The transindividual unity of two relations is thus a 
relation of relations” (Combes 2013: 26). This transindividual relation of relations between the 
interior and exterior is precisely where Simondon situates psychology, and he even goes to the 
length of stating that “transindividual reality is psychological reality” (2005: 281, my emphasis). 
For Simondon, psychology is intrinsically psychosocial, and belongs to the event in which the 
individual takes part rather than to the individual herself. “The psychological world,” Simondon 
reminds us, “should be called the transindividual world because it does not have an independent 
existence” (2005: 279). By perceiving the transindividual through its free indirect aesthetic, the 
cinema of poetry doesn’t just make “psychic interiority” and “social exteriority” comingle with 
one another, it produces a qualitatively distinct third term which is more than the sum of its parts: 
a psychosociality throbbing at their relational limit. 
 The gulf separating Voyage to Italy and The Red Desert attests to this key difference 
between an image that safeguards the mutual exclusivity of interior and exterior, and a truly free 
indirect perception of transindividual psychology’s psychosociality. As previously mentioned, in 
Voyage to Italy, narratively significant symbols, objects, and people are made to stand in for the 
lead character’s interior psychic trouble. Only via these representations does the image access 
her psyche, which is personalized, localized and interiorized. Conversely, in The Red Desert, 
Guiliana’s psychology contaminates and stains every frame of the film. The psychic trouble 
which she undoubtedly endures modulates the plastics of the image, effectuating what Pasolini 
calls a “delirious aesthetic”—even in non-point of view shots—rendering it futile to try and 
anticipate where her subjective hallucinations end and where a stable, objective, social reality 
with common perceptual coordinates begins. This film, like so many examples from the cinema 
of poetry canon, is highly effective at articulating character psychology without resorting to 
symbol or metaphor, because it free indirectly perceives psychology’s transindividual scope, 
effectively confounding the longstanding impulse to aesthetically privilege interior or exterior at 
the expense of the other.    
 The transindividuality undergirding The Red Desert’s film world affects each of its 
characters, and effectuates a depersonalization and delocalization of psychology. The delirious 
hallucinations can’t simply be attributed to Guiliana or to Antonioni, they belong to the 
122 
 
collective psychological atmosphere. For example, when Corrado is away from Giuliana and 
“her” neurosis, giving a speech to a group of workers who are considering moving to Patagonia, 
the camera begins to drift, capturing abstract shapes and intensities of colour in varying degrees 





Images 1.18. 1.19, 1.20, 1.21 The Red Desert 
In another scene, these two characters enter the home of a worker who Corrado is trying to 
recruit for overseas work, the adulterous tension building between them erupts in such a way that 
all of the other guests begin to feel their desire. The couples splay out in a room adorned with 
deep red walls and find themselves interpellated into Guiliana’s hallucinatory psychology. In a 
quasi-fantastical moment, she makes a quail egg transpire out of thin air, to the amazement of her 
friends, who nevertheless corroborate her vision without hesitation. [Images 1.22 – 1.24] One 
person’s psyche cannot be parsed out from another’s, nor can the delirious be parsed from the 







Image 1.22 The Red Desert 




Images 1.24 The Red Desert 
The cinema of poetry’s free indirect images of transindividual psychology depicts various facets 
of psychic life that Deleuze and Guattari delineate in Anti-Oedpius: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, a project which, perhaps not coincidentally, was written in the years following 
the 1965 Festival of Pesaro. In the opening lines of Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari embrace 
the id’s reserve of instinctual energy, and free it from its position within the Freudian topography 
as the domain of that which is negated and repressed by the ego’s mode of organization 
(Laplanche and Pontalis 1988: 199, 474). In Deleuze and Guattari’s eventful and productive 
unconscious, “the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning 
whatsoever” (1983: 2). Deleuze and Guattari elaborate:  
There is no particular form of existence that can be labeled ‘psychic reality.’… There is 
no such thing as the social production of reality on the one hand, and a desiring-
production that is mere fantasy on the other.… The truth of the matter is that social 
production is purely and simply desiring-production itself under determinate 
conditions.… There is only desire and the social, and nothing else. (1983: 27, 28, 29) 
There is only desire and the social, and nothing else, except for the immediate relation of their 
mutual co-production—the point at which psychology, or the transindividual, resides.   
 “Faith in reality” thus takes on an entirely different sense after the cinema of poetry’s 
emergence. Having discovered psychology to be indistinguishable from the transindividual, to be 
a “realist” in the Bazinian sense, entails a faith in reality’s psychosociality. The following 
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chapters are filled with examples of contemporary filmmakingxlvii that build on the cinema of 
poetry’s legacy by embodying aesthetic strategies expressive of such faith. Each of these films 
gives life to the reality of the transindividual by constructing psychosocial images that overcome 
expressionism’s use of the psyche to metaphorize the social and neorealism’s use of the social to 
symbolize the psyche. What the contemporary art films that I feature in the following chapters 
inherit from the cinema of poetry is its penchant for psychosocial images, where, just as in The 
Red Desert, neither psyche nor socius represents the other, but are co-constituted as “empirically 
inseparable”xlviii by the reality of a transindividual relation immanently productive and mutually 
inclusive of them both. Having analyzed how the major schism governing the history of film 
style is reconciled by the development of the cinema of poetry and its remarkable ability to free 
indirectly perceive the creatively co-compositional relations between the social and the psychic, 
the objective and the subjective, the exterior and the interior, it is finally possible to corroborate 
Maurizio Lazzarato’s provocative statement that “Pasolini overcomes the distinction between the 
image and what it represents” (Lazzarato 126). For no longer must the psyche be made to 
represent the social or vice versa; Pasolini’s cinema of poetry puts its faith the transindividual 
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 The second chapter of this dissertation turns to a discussion of the Berlin School, one of 
cinema of poetry’s contemporary inheritors. It provides a close analysis of Angela Schanelec’s 
film Afternoon, supplemented with images from other Berlin School films like Ulrich Köhler’s 
Windows on Monday (2006). Through this analysis, I propose the first of four event-based 
symptoms of melancholy: the depotentialization of neuroplasticity. To explain the political 
significance of this symptom and the reason why the cinema is particularly apt to perceive it, I 
delve into the neuroscience of mental illness and invoke Deleuze’s writing on the neurology of 
the cinematic image. One of the terms that I use recurrently throughout this chapter is “plastics.” 
I use this term in reference to “neuroplasticity,” or the malleability of the brain, and to Bazin’s 
“plastics of the image” which I layed out in the previous chapter.  
 
The Berlin School: A Melancholic Film Movement 
Throughout its twenty-year history, the film movement known as the “Berlin School” has 
proven itself to be one of the most important inheritors of the cinema of poetry. xlix  Film critics 
began using the term “Berlin School”l in acknowledgement of the similarities between 
filmmakers Angela Schanelec, Thomas Arslan and Christian Petzold, all graduates of the 
Deutsche Film- und Fernsehakademie Berlin (The German Film and Television Academy, or 
simply the DFFB). The term has since been applied to an expanding group of filmmakers around 
Germany with different educational backgrounds, including Ulrich Köhler, Christoph 
Hochhäusler, Maren Ade, Henner Wickler and others.li Interestingly enough, a preoccupation 
with melancholy may in fact be the Berlin School’s defining characteristic, particularly when 
faced with the difficulty of grouping the movement’s films together through more established 
categories of criticism. Without unity of place or programme, the Berlin School is a fairly 
dispersed network of filmmakers who only occasionally collaborate with one another and have 
no overarching film manifesto.lii The absence of a clear political programme, coupled with the 
movement’s sustained refusal to narrate topical macropolitical issues in contemporary Germany 
has provoked accusations of political apathy amongst mainstream film critics and cultural 
commentators who are left frustrated and bewildered by the films’ brooding melancholy. In 
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contradiction to these sorts of reactions, what I would like to suggest here is that the Berlin 
School’s melancholy aesthetics are its political gesture, because these aesthetics investigate how 
feeling unwell is a psychosocial problem conditioned by the imperatives of neoliberal power.  
Building on Antonioni’s pioneering work in the field, a number of the movement’s key 
auteurs consistently harness free indirect perception to create film worlds that are psychosocially 
saturated with melancholic transindividual psychology. A few examples should suffice to paint 
the picture of how the Berlin School’s political aesthetics, which are tied to this stylistic 
development, are easily misconstrued. In the introduction to his book-length study of the Berlin 
School, Marco Abel explains that a “common criticism of Berlin School films is that they 
supposedly lack interest in the political and instead present us with, in the words of film critic 
Christina Nord a ‘bourgeois poetics of middle class navel gazing’” (Abel 2013: 12). Director and 
journalist Oskar Roehler echoes this criticism when he characterizes the Berlin School as bitter 
and severe, lacking intelligible narratives. “Nothing actually happens in these films,” Roehler 
laments. “They are always slow, always depressing, nothing is ever really said in them—and that 
is what is called ‘the Berlin School’” (Clarke 2012: 135). Another filmmaker, Dietrich 
Brüggemann critiques the Berlin School auteurs, who in his opinion “‘have digested all of film 
history, who think up one pretentious title after another, but who are not capable of generating 
one single authentic feeling …’” (Baer 2013: 80). The Berlin School’s films are imbued with 
feeling, it just so happens that melancholy doesn’t offer the sort of pleasures that Brüggemann 
hopes to find in his national cinema.  
These reactions are reflective of how starkly the Berlin School’s political aesthetics differ 
from the state-sanctioned German national cinema that has won Oscar nominations and topped 
syndicated critics’ “best of” lists since the turn of the millennium. Whereas Berlin School films 
employ “minimalist aesthetics and long takes, with melancholic slow narratives set in modern-
day Germany,” (Vinogradova 2010: 158) box-office successes usually narrate an internationally 
recognizable chapter in German history with drama and passion. Some of the most familiar films 
of this variety include Downfall (Oliver Hirschbiegel, 2004), The Lives of Others (Florian 
Henckel von Donnersmarck, 2006) and Goodbye Lenin! (Wolfgang Becker, 2003). They 
combine standardized narrative techniques with a sanitized liberal politics to advance plots about 
the downfall of Hitler, state surveillance in East Germany, and the fall of the Berlin wall.  
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 In his provocative essay “Why I Don’t Make Political Films,” Berlin School director 
Ulrich Köhler identifies these “topical, message-driven films, that package political 
enlightenment in stories” as driving the “aesthetic program of social-democratized cultural 
politics” (2009: 11). He takes this tendency within German filmmaking to task by underscoring 
how self-congratulatory and ultimately nationalistic it really is.  
The governmental funding agency likes films that ‘wrap up’ political education in 
narratives—citizens should not strain themselves too hard,” he writes. “Producers know 
that they get money thrown at them as soon as they make projects against racism, 
Nazism, oppression of minorities or poverty in distant lands: political education and 
culture stewing the same pot (Kohler 2009: 11). 
 Köhler’s essay, not to mention his entire body of film work, rails against the institutional and 
economic imperative to cloak didactic messages in neatly wrapped narratives that are ready to be 
consumed by spectators who want to feel good about themselves without ever having to put the 
dominant economic or political order into question. As he points out, it’s easy to cultivate a sense 
of righteousness in contemporary spectators by endlessly exploiting history to show the 
barbarism of Nazi Germany or the Stasi’s violation of personal privacy in the GDR.   
Unlike these examples of supercilious filmmaking that celebrate the “post-ideological” 
lacuna of the present by contrasting it to the totalitarian past, Angela Schanelec’s political 
aesthetics enact a symptomatology of the contemporary moment’s melancholic impasse.liii  
Ulrich Köhler may argue that he does not make political films, in the sense of narrating political 
themes, but his films, like Schanelec’s, are radically political in that they offer a subversive 
symptomatology of the current depression pandemic that free indirectly perceives neoliberal 
power’s conditioning of the production of subjectivity in line with the tenets of individualism, 
which happens to effectuate a depotentialization in the neuroplasticity of the event of subjectivity 
production. Taking her film Afternoon as a case study, this chapter articulates how Schanelec 
assumes the role of artist-physician to perceive a novel symptom of melancholy: the 
depotentialization of event’s (neuro)plastic potential for qualitative subjective change. 
 
The Brain is the Screen 
 As discussed at length in the previous chapter, the cinema of poetry’s use of the free 
indirect overcomes the tenuous distinction between subjective psychic states and objective social 
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facts, in the creation of a psychosocial image that immediately perceives psychology’s 
transindividuality without recourse to metaphor or symbolism. Schanelec’s Afternoon bears 
some remarkable similarities to Antonioni’s The Red Desert, the cinema of poetry’s Ur-text, 
most importantly in its psychosocial conception of psychological suffering. By conceiving of 
psychology in such a light, political power enters into the picture quite suddenly, since the site of 
power’s operations is none other than the relational field of transindividuality where collective 
psychology, or subjectivity, is produced. The film under discussion, like many others in the 
Berlin School, is attentive to the political dimension of psychology’s relational co-composition, 
and in its own way, poses a variance on the question that prompted Judith Butler to write her 
book on melancholia; namely: “What is the psychic form that power takes?” (Butler 1997: 2).  
Butler’s eventual engagement with that question leads to a psychoanalytic theory of 
subjectivity production that lends a crucial role to melancholy. For Butler, “Melancholy is 
precisely what interiorizes the psyche” (170). She goes on to write:  
[M]elancholia involves the production of an internal world as well as a topographical set 
of fictions that structures the psyche. If the melancholic turn is the mechanism by which 
the distinction between internal and external worlds is instituted, then melancholia 
initiates a variable boundary between the psychic and the social, a boundary, I hope to 
show, that distributes and regulates the psychic sphere in relation to the prevailing norms 
of social regulation. (Butler 1997: 171) 
Butler’s theory of melancholia takes its cues from Freud’s The Ego and the Id, where he insists 
on the division between external and internal worlds, the former a real world and the latter a 
psychic one, to explain the conflicts that the ego must endure between its ideals and the 
impositions of its environment.liv At first glance, Butler’s Freudian investment in a distinction 
between internal and external worlds seems inherently incompatible with a psychosocial 
understanding of melancholy, since it separates out a zone of discrete mental interiority. Yet her 
formulation contains the indispensible intuition that one of the most prevalent symptoms of 
melancholy is the sensation that a boundary between psyche and socius does indeed exist. 
Caught in melancholy’s treacherous hold, it is habitual to feel disconnected and alienated from 
the world, and as if one’s life may not even be worth living. In moments like these, moments 
which can go on for months, years, and entire lifetimes in the most chronic of cases, the sense of 
an insurmountable boundary creates an isolated sense of self, and produces the felt fiction of an 
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interiorized melancholic psyche, drowning in a pain that nobody else can see, feel or understand. 
Here, in the midst of melancholic experience, psychology’s psychosocial relationality is betrayed 
by the feeling of being psychically isolated by an insurmountable and interiorizing boundary. 
 Turning to Deleuze’s much-cited aphorism, “the brain is the screen” (Deleuze 2000: 366) 
offers a way to work productively with the contradiction between Butler and Simondon’s 
divergent conceptualizations of the psyche and its relation to the social. To restate: for Butler, 
following Freud, the psyche is a discrete topography divided from the social by a boundary, 
whereas for Simondon the psyche and the social are conjoined by a relation of relations. Deleuze 
situates his concept of the brain at this relational limit straddling the psyche and the social, and 
the qualities he ascribes to it help to see how “relation” and “boundary” need not be wholly 
incompatible terms.  
Deleuze’s conception of the brain may seem a bit counter-intuitive at first; it is not the 
common-sense notion of the brain inside of the human head, which is couched in material 
reductionism,lv but the brain as a depersonalized screen, immanent to the relational movement of 
the psychosocial event. Using language that strikingly anticipates Butler’s terminology in The 
Psychic Life of Power, Deleuze writes: “the brain is precisely this boundary of a continuous two-
way movement between an Inside and Outside, this membrane between them” (Deleuze 1995: 
176, my emphasis). Depending on this two-way movement, the brain is entirely contingent and 
indeterminate, a brain for the making and in the making. As Deleuze goes on to say, 
“subjectification, events, and brains are more or less the same thing” (Deleuze 1995: 176). 
 The emphasis here on a two-way movement shaping the brain’s composition provides a 
clue, corroborated by Schanelec’s film Afternoon, as to what happens when melancholy settles 
into an event of subjectivity production and the feeling of individual isolation begins to take 
hold. Instead of the relational boundary being actively shaped from both sides, in melancholic 
circumstances, it is dominated by a sort of “one-way movement,” heavy and stifling, that is 
analogous to the scene of melancholy-formation Butler describes, where the psychic sphere is 
regulated “in relation to the prevailing norms of social regulation” (Butler 1997: 171). This is not 
to say that neoliberal power is unilateral or unidirectional in its implementation of social 
regulation, but rather to say that in cases of melancholy, power erects a malleable boundary 
immanent to the plastic fluctuations of the brain that creates the felt fiction of living as an 
autonomous and isolated individual, or “being as inert facticity,” to once again evoke Guattari’s 
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description of melancholy mentioned in the introduction. This boundary creates an ossified sense 
of self that obfuscates the stirring of the transindividual and stifles the recomposition of novel 
assemblages of subjectivity that could have therapeutic as well as political effects. To better 
understand how neoliberal power (which works with and through psychiatric power) manages to 
implement such a depotentializing barrier in the relational juncture of brain, a discussion of 
neuroplasticity’s promises and liabilities in the era of the “control society” is warranted.  
 
The Neuroplastic Paradox 
Long gone are the days when scientists thought that the brain finished developing during 
childhood, and that adults were stuck with a “hard wired” brain that could only diminish in 
capacities due to physical trauma, mental illness or aging. The rationale that the adult brain 
can heal from even severe impairments is now commonplace, and constitutes the basis for 
a vast array of therapeutic options, that all seek, through different means, to modify the 
plastic structure of the brain into some non-pathological form. The scientific term for the 
malleability of the brain is “neuroplasticity.” 
Neuroplasticity has become what philosopher of science Catherine Malabou calls “the 
dominant concept of the neurosciences.” “Today,” she argues, “it constitutes their common point 
of interest, their dominant motif, and their privileged operating model, to the extent that it allows 
them to think about the brain as at once an unprecedented dynamic, structure, and organization” 
(Malabou 2008: 4). In the words of obsessive compulsive researcher Jeffrey Schwartz, 
“Neuroplasticity refers to the ability of neurons to forge new connections, to blaze new paths 
through the cortex, even to assume new roles. In shorthand, neuroplasticity means rewiring the 
brain” (Schwartz and Begley 2002: 15). The brain’s ability to be rewired, even into adulthood, 
has promised a new wave of hope for the treatment of mental illnesses (now also frequently 
referred to as “brain disorders”) and a host of other conditions.   
But even from a neuroscientific point of view, plasticity cannot be uncritically celebrated 
in and of itself, for it is as liable to cement patterns of emotional suffering into the brain as it is to 
prompt therapeutic transformations. lvi This contradiction is partially explained by “the plastic 
paradox,” which Norman Doidge describes through the following predicament: “the same 
plasticity which allows for the brain to change and heal, even in adulthood, is also the same 
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plasticity that reinforces patterns of behaviour and habits of perception, and consequentially can 
entrench a number of disorders into the brain” (Doidge 2007: xx).  
Today’s dominant medical strategies for treating depression are built on, and justified by, 
the promises of neuroplasticity. The two most practiced treatments for depression in current 
usage are the prescription of psychotropic medication (antidepressants) and a form of 
psychotherapy known as Cognitive Behaviour Therapy. The rationale behind prescribing 
antidepressant medication is that the depressed brain has a chemical imbalance that can be 
regulated through medication. CBT operates on the principle that depression is characterized by 
a deficit of accurate thinking and a surplus of “cognitive distortions.” The depressed person’s 
thoughts are trapped within the “cognitive triad” (a reinforcing loop of negative thoughts) which 
makes life situations seem worse than they really are. What undergirds both this former 
psychiatric practice and latter psychological one (which differ quite remarkably in their approach 
but are often practiced in unison) is the neuroscientific discovery that the brain can change, either 
by introducing new chemical compounds or thought patterns. What I argue in the following 
pages is that the therapeutic efficacy of these institutionally sanctioned methods can be easily  
thwarted by neoliberal power’s immanence to brain plasticity. Neuroplasticity may provide a 
solid scientific basis for insisting on the possibility of at least some form of therapeutic cure, 
even in the deepest bouts of despair. Yet this optimism fuelled by various neuroscientific 
research initiatives is tempered by a harrowing contradiction: that the epoch of neuroplasticity is 
the same epoch that has witnessed the outbreak of a global depression epidemic.  
What institutionally sanctioned therapies fail to critically engage with, is the political 
operation of how the brain becomes subject. Perhaps unconsciously, or perhaps out of willful 
blindness, the dominant medical strategies in place for treating depression uncritically lend 
themselves to the neoliberal free marketeering of life—the transformation of life into capital. 
They each assist this transformation by creating brain chemistries or thought patterns that 
facilitate the maintenance, or even enhancement, of one’s “human capital.” It is precisely 
through this becoming subject of the brain to assume its role as capital that the plastic paradox I 
would like to foreground here (a politicized variant of the one proposed by Norman Doidge) 
presents itself: that despite its therapeutic promise, there is nothing inherent to neuroplasticity 
which prevents the production of subjectivity in line with affective suffering. After all, neoliberal 
power works immanently to the brain, so that (neuro)plastic qualities of movement, modulation, 
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transformation, or restructuring cannot in and of themselves be valourized for their therapeutic 
value, since there is nothing preventing power from enticing these changes to serve its own 
interests, to the detriment of psychic and social life. The subsumption of mental health services 
to the demands of the market (what Josep Rafanelli I Orra calls “therapeutic capitalism”) may 
not sound all that bad. After all, it is still “therapeutic.” But when analyzing therapeutic 
capitalism’s subjectifying apparatuses, Christian Marazzi’s reminder rings as pertinently as ever: 
“If we want to produce capital through life, we need to remember how little life is worth in the 
eyes of power” (150). 
As the shift in emphasis from the “psy” to the “neuro” continues to intensify across a 
broad range of societal discourses and institutions, especially those pertaining to the management 
of health,lvii the reductionist temptation to desubjectify the depression pandemic presents itself as 
strongly as ever. Take for example, the words of pioneering researcher in brain plasticity, 
Michael Mezernich: “Contemporary neuroscience is revealing, for the first time in our history, 
our true human natures,” he says. “Human wisepersons and societies have had great fun 
pondering about the mysteries of the origins of the ‘self’.… We now have first-level scientific 
answers to these questions. We now understand the basic processes that underlie the genesis of 
the ‘self’” (Mezernich: n.p.). If the self can be reduced to primary brain processes, then what 
distinguishes a life coloured by depression from an exuberant one, a life on the verge of suicide 
from a life with an appetite for more? According to this material reductionist viewpoint, the 
difference between these two tendencies of life lies in the brain. And make no mistake, it 
undoubtedly does, but only if the brain is granted an expanded sense that confounds its orthodox 
usage in the neurosciences.  
As Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s own theoretical turns from the “psy” to the 
“neuro” in the 1980s and 1990s attest, theories of subjectivity production that seek to break from 
established analytic topographies are apt to explore a neurological dimension. The real schism 
between a reductionist scientism and a politicization of subjectivity is that the former thinks the 
brain in isolation, “outside of organism and milieu” (Rose 2016: n.p.), whereas the latter thinks 
the brain as milieu, “event,” or “screen” (Deleuze 2000: 366; Deleuze 1995: 176). By 
constructing an isolated brain as the essence of subjectivity (and psychological affliction), 
neuroscience and the hegemonic therapies couched in it all too frequently treat the “social as a 
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supplement” (Rose 2016: n.p.), effectively effacing the political contingency of the brain’s 
plastic composition.  
Deleuze may have advanced a “materialist psychiatry,” but his take on the brain couldn’t 
differ more from material reductionist schemas. That’s because the materiality of the brain is 
thoroughly psychosocial, a membrane at the limit of the psyche and the social. Such a conception 
of the brain may seem a bit counter-intuitive at first; it is not the brain inside of the head, but the 
brain as the screen, as materially immanent to the plastic movements of the psychosocial event. 
Deleuze elaborates:  
One might equally well speak of new kinds of event, rather than processes of 
subjectification: events that can’t be explained by the situations that give rise to 
them, or into which they lead. They appear for a moment, and it’s that moment 
that matters, it’s the chance we must seize. Or we can simply talk about the brain. 
… I think subjectification, events, and brains are more or less the same thing. 
(Deleuze 1995: 176) 
Rather than the originator of experience, or the building block of some essential human self, as is 
posited by the material-reductionist hypothesis, the brain is an eventful milieu of subjectivity 
production—a milieu that can engender the hardened confines of an unshakeable depression, or 
even the most unexpected of therapeutic recompositions. 
The shift in neoliberal strategies of governance from industrial capitalism’s emphasis on 
discipline towards deployment of control has seized the potential of brain plasticity. “Control 
society” is the term that Deleuze uses to describe a new type of power that emerges in the late 
20th Century, in contradistinction to Europe’s “disciplinary” and “sovereign” societies that figure 
prominently in Michel Foucault’s work on discipline and punishment in the 19th and 18th 
centuries. Strategies of control augment the state-run disciplinary institutions of confinement 
such as the military barracks, the classroom and the psychiatric ward by governance through 
more decentralized and corporatized means. New forms of subjectivity have been produced as a 
consequence of this shift in power. Whereas disciplinarity operates by molding its subjects from 
the outside (through confinement, repetitive drills and exercises as well as moral strictures), 
control works more seductively to induce conformity by way of modulation from within the 
subject who performs its own enterprising sense of self (by incurring debt, seeking motivation 
and conducting self-audits). Significantly for this study of plasticity and power, Deleuze attunes 
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to how these strategies of power are to be distinguished by their tendency to either mold or 
modulate. He writes: “Confinements are molds, different moldings, while controls are a 
modulation like a self-transmuting molding continually changing from one moment to the next, 
or like a sieve whose mesh varies from one point to another” (1995: 178). Of key importance 
here is that rather than restricting change by confining and disciplining movements through 
molds that hold for a set period of time (the school day, the tour of duty, etc.), control societies 
work immanently to change, by directing, inflecting and modulating it indefinitely—“In control 
societies you never finish anything” (Deleuze 1995: 178).  
The rise of the control society poses a whole new set of questions about political 
resistance that were absent from the discourse of political modernism. Neoliberalism has, at least 
in many “advanced capitalist” pockets, ceded to worker demands for more free time and less 
rigid work structures; feminist and queer demands for gender fluidity and non-heteronormative 
relationships; and postcolonial demands for minority recognition. But at the same time that many 
of the 20th century’s desires are seeing themselves fulfilled, and stifling old molds have given 
way to some more flexible identities, schedules and borders, power has not ceded any of its 
capacity to modulate modes of existence.  
This modulatory style of control is emblematic of what Mark Fisher calls “capitalist 
realism,” the idea that it may be easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. 
For Fisher, capitalist realism “entails subordinating oneself to a reality that is infinitely plastic, 
capable of reconfiguring itself at any moment.… We are presented with what Jameson calls ‘a 
purely fungible present in which space and psyches alike can be processed and remade at will’” 
(2009: 199). In the control society, power entices never-ending adaption to a plastic reality in 
perpetual change and modulation, regardless of how ecologically unsustainable or unconducive 
to wellness such economic imperatives have proven to be. Faced with this neoliberal reality, 
political resistance cannot be content with only working towards the abolishment of confining 
structures and identities. 
Catherine Malabou and Marc Jeannerod address this predicament at the heart of the 
neuroplastic paradox in the most politicized passages of the book What Should We Do with Our 
Brain? In order to salvage the concept of plasticity, they propose a distinction between the 
neoliberal economy’s demands for infinite flexibility and the potentially therapeutic qualities of 




Let us not forget that plasticity is a mechanism for adapting, while flexibility is a 
mechanism for submitting. Adapting is not submitting, and, in this sense, 
plasticity ought not to serve as an alibi for submitting to the new world order 
being dreamed up by capitalism.… What flexibility lacks is the resource of giving 
form, the power to create, to invent or even to erase an impression, the power to 
style. Flexibility is plasticity minus its genius. (Jeannerod: xiv; Malabou: 12)  
The distinction that Malabou and Jeannerod set up between plasticity and flexibility posits 
plasticity’s creative capacity to challenge the neoliberal demand of interminable flexibility. 
According to their formulation, plasticity actively shapes the world, whereas flexibility submits 
to the shape that the world has already taken. For these thinkers, the act of giving form, creating, 
inventing, erasing and styling constitute the pragmatic and experimental basis for resistance. 
Conversely, flexibility would entail a subduing of this creative capacity to accept the form of the 
world as it is (perpetually in its becoming), and submit to its modulatory impositions, rather than 
contribute to its ongoing formation through acts of creation. 
It is hard not to see the appeal of this sort of optimistic assertion that creative actions can 
defy the control society’s demand of endless flexibility. Yet what needs to be emphasized here is 
that even plasticity’s creative capacity cannot escape the “plastic paradox” outlined above; the 
paradox that plasticity can habitually reinforce psychological suffering as much as its therapeutic 
overcoming, political oppression as much as emancipation. What scholarship on the various 
incarnations of the control society points to is that the creative capacity to give form far from 
guarantees a break from the logic of “the new world order being dreamed up by capitalism.” In a 
control society, modulatory controls work immanently to plastic creation and change, and find 
ways to strategically revive old disciplinary molds in key instants. 
Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi elaborates this idea in his extensive writings on the political 
conditions that enable widespread depression. His approach advances the view that neoliberalism 
strategically abandons a politics of repression, and instead entices creative expression and novel 
change. This idea comes from Deleuze, who in bemoaning the excess of communication in late 
capitalist society, writes, “repressive forces don’t stop people from expressing themselves, but 
rather, force them to express themselves” (Deleuze 1995: 129). Berardi builds on this idea most 
overtly in his article “Repression, Expression, Depression” where he writes: “The pathologies of 
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our epoch are effectively no longer the neurotic pathologies produced by the repression of the 
libido, but rather the schizoid pathologies produced by the expressive explosion of ‘just do it’ ” 
(189). In “Re-Assessing Composition: 40 Years After the Publication of Anti-Oedipus” he 
reiterates this view: “Psychic suffering does not come so much from repression but mainly from 
the hyper-expressive compulsion…” (Berardi 2012: 114). The overarching concern running 
throughout Bifo’s recent work on the politics of depression is neoliberalism’s ability to promote 
aggressive and exhausting competition by inducing labourious performances for economic gain, 
or even just for mere survival.  
I include these extracts to show how Malabou and Jeannerod’s plasticity-flexibility 
binary that allies plasticity to creativity and flexibility to submission is troubled by the fact that 
neoliberal economics depend on creativity, expressivity and novelty in order to extract surplus 
value and reproduce its lecherous rapport between capital and life. This is not to say that all 
actions are inherently coopted and futile, and that we should follow Bifo in his most depressive 
moments by withdrawing from the scene of activism, but simply to point out that in the control 
society, power is savvy enough to encourage the expressive, creative, and modulatory capacities 
of (neuro)plasticity, but in ways that never risk its dominance. 
This insight that neoliberal power works as much through expressivity as through 
repression was speculatively glimpsed in Anti-Oedipus. In Foucault’s preface to the English 
translation, he famously articulates this strange paradox that repressive forces don’t stop people 
from expressing themselves as inherent to the “molecular fascism” that Deleuze and Guattari 
went to such great lengths in that book to identify and eradicate. Molecular fascism, Foucault 
writes, is “the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behaviours, that causes us to 
love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us” (Foucault 1983: xiii). The 
desire for power, or for fascism, is always already productive. Not coincidentally, what one if the 
subjective formations it is productive of, particarly in a neoliberal, post-totalitarian era, is none 
other than the individual: “The individual is the product of power” (Foucault 1983: xiv).  
One of neoliberal power’s most enduring strategies for maintaining its dominance amidst 
the deterritorializing effects of a plastic reality that incessantly expresses, creates and modulates 
is to reterritorialize onto the site of the individual. If there is a historical through-line linking the 
disciplinary society to the control society, which should be taken as evidence that one type of 
society does not replace the other but that it emerges over and on top of the other, like an 
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archaeological site or palimpsest, it is the enduring and unwavering presence of the individual. 
This individualized subject is not a natural given, though neoliberal ideology often presents it as 
such. It is the result of a highly abstract form of subjectivity production that parses the individual 
from the machinic assemblages in which it is immersed as a component part. Nevertheless, this 
parsing of the individual from the “dividual” is a fundamental aspect of the capitalist production 
of subjectivity that Maurizio Lazzarato calls “social subjection.” Found in regimes of power 
based both on disciplinarity and control, the apparatus of social subjection assigns “subjectivity, 
an identity, sex, profession, nationality, and so forth” to produce “an ‘individuated subject’ 
whose paradigmatic form in neoliberalism has been that of ‘human capital’ and the ‘entrepreneur 
of the self’ (Lazzarato 2014: 24). Though really inseparable from the creativity and novelty of 
the dynamic, plastic assemblages in which it takes part, power parses an individual who is made 
“guilty and responsible for his fate” (Lazzarato 2014: 24). In an ondular reality of endless 
modulations, characterized as “infinitely plastic,” the individual and its lingering mold 
incessantly returns as a dominant refrain, confirming power’s vested interest in an ontology that 
separates self from world and makes the former unduly responsible for all that happens in the 
latter. 
If the individual is the product of power, and if power subjects the individual in such a 
way as to encourage its performance as modulatory “human” capital, then there is no reason to 
believe that the individual’s ability to creatively shape the plastics of its world would somehow 
mark power’s undoing. Nor is there reason to believe that therapeutic methods which encourage 
brain plasticity to move more in sync with the economic demands of life under neoliberalism 
would somehow lead to wellness or flourishing, even if it may lead to being “symptom-free.” 
Plasticity, as much as flexibility, can constitute a total submission to the status quo, without us 
even being cognizant of it—hence the plastic paradox. After all, there is nothing unusual about 
desiring “the very thing that dominates and exploits us,” and thus producing its (and by 
extension, our) very existence.  
 
The Berlin School’s Plastics of Depotentialization 
In the previous section’s analysis, the “plastic paradox” has revealed itself to be 
paradoxical in two interrelated ways: one therapeutic and one political. Therapeutic, because the 
same neuroplasticity “which allows for the brain to change and heal … can entrench a number of 
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disorders into the brain” (Doidge 2007: xx). And political, because plasticity’s capacity for 
modulation, change and creation—the sorts of transformations that can break from disciplinary 
forms of repression—have turned into neoliberal imperatives complicit with control societies’ 
apparatuses of power which also work through social subjection, or individualization. 
Furthermore, we have seen the limits of a reality sometimes described as infinitely plastic: 
Longstanding molds persist within the plasticity of control societies, with the individual—
responsible and guilty—proving to be an important landing site for power’s reterrritorializations.  
Angela Schanelec, like the other artist-physicians whose films fill the pages of this 
project, perceive this play of neuroplasticity for what it is: a contingent production of subjectivity 
conditioned by power. She sees the autonomous individual as a highly abstract entity which is 
not at all natural, but whose production—whose divorce from the world and its relations—gives 
rise to melancholy sentiment that is not liable to be easily overcome. Shift as neuroplastics may, 
neoliberal power has shown itself unwilling to abandon the mold of the individual whose firm 
contours it labours to maintain, even in the most plastic and dynamic of milieus.  
Just like the brain, the cinematic image can also be said to be plastic. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, André Bazin used the phrase “plastics of the image” in reference to “the style 
of the make-up and décor and even, to a certain extent, of the acting; in addition of course to the 
lighting and framing; the basis of composition” (Bazin 2009: 88, my emphasis). In the film 
analysis that follows, Angela Schanelec activates all of these formal resources, particularly the 
lighting and framing (“the basis of composition”), to free indirectly perceive a psychosocial 
symptom of melancholy immanent to the paradox of neuroplasticity. What she perceives is none 
other than the depotentialization of the event for collective subjective recomposition; 
depotentialized because the brain, the milieu of transindividual psychology, is laced with 
modulatory plastic barriers that serve the aims of “social subjection” by creating a really felt 
fiction of an isolated self cut off from the world.lviii  
 Afternoon is a very slow film and homage to Anton Chekov’s The Seagull. Like all 
Schanelec’s directorial efforts, it is almost entirely devoid of dramatic intrigue. Set at the 
summerhouse of a family of writers, it follows their minute actions throughout the course of a 
long, scorching hot afternoon. A gloomy young playwright named Konstantin (Jirka Zett) and 
his girlfriend Agnes (Miriam Horwitz), a university student, discuss their crumbling relationship 
and decide to break-up. Konstantin's uncle Alex muses about his anti-depressant medication and 
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passes his time playing card games. Mimi (played by Schanelec), Konstantin’s mother, lugs 
herself around the house, often speechless, edging toward a total psychological collapse. The 
nonchalant pace of the film is punctuated by two suicide attempts, one unsuccessful halfway 
through, and another at the film’s conclusion when Konstantin decides to take a few handfuls of 
sleeping pills in an effort to end his life. The narrative is very simple and quite unremarkable, but 
it enables an aesthetic exploration of melancholy (neuro)plastics. 
One of the film’s artistic achievements is the development of a free indirect aesthetic that 
perceives the event’s depotentialization by modulatory boundaries that enforce an isolated sense 
of self. It is true that practically all of the characters in this film exhibit some localized 
melancholy traits—on their face, in their body, through their dialogue—and that for this reason, 
the film can be confidently placed within the trajectory of melancholy iconography that 
populates the history of Western art [See Image 2.1 and compare to Images 2.2-2.7]. 
 






Image 2.2 Melancholic Athena (votive stencil, 470-460 
BCE) 
Image 2.3 Saint-Jean Baptiste dans le désert (Jérome Bosch, 
Xvième siècle) 







Image 2.6 Melancolia I (Albrecht Dürer 1514) 
These emphatic, iconographic moments, however, are immersed in a free indirect schema that 
perceives how the brain’s transindividuality is made to feel like a boundary, cutting the 
characters off from sharing in a re-existentializing conjunction. In crafting a melancholy 
aesthetics of evental plastic depotentialization, Schanelec’s free indirect vision perceives the 
emergence of modulatory barriers that relationally move in tandem with the characters, 
delimiting the quality of their interactions, and making them feel all alone, even when they are in 
close proximity. The brain-screen’s melancholic plasticity is just as stifling and unrelenting for 
everyone, leading them all to suffer from a sort of existential paralysis that Agnes briefly 
manages to put into words as she and Konstantin mutually process their seemingly unmotivated 
breakup: “When I came here I suddenly felt paralyzed.”  
The lighting and framing of a vast number of shots construct shifting boundaries between 
the characters, isolating them out from one another and imposing unconscious restrictions on 
their movement. The best example of this is the recurring shots of the chalet’s glass doors 
separating the inside of the home from the patio overlooking the lake outside. [Image 2.8] Seen 
Image 2.7 Melancholy III (Edvard Munch, 1902) 
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on their own, the plastic configuration is banal and unthreatening. It may even read as conducive 
to movement: the open doors and the translucency of the windows connote bidirectionality and 
threshold crossing. As soon as one of the characters enters the frame, however, the function of 
the set’s architecture shifts dramatically. The free indirect is made operative, as a seemingly 
objective shot begins to articulate the melancholic sense of self that haunts the character who has 
entered the frame. The image becomes the brain, coterminous with transindividual psychology’s 
relational movement. Except that here, in a moment of severe melancholic suffering, the 
movement only seems to tend in one direction: neoliberal power’s individualization and 
responsibilization of depression determine the image’s plastics, thwarting the potential for 
subjective recomposition immanent to the group of people who inhabit the space.  
The angle through which the doors are shot tightly frames the characters. For example, 
compare these images of Agnes and Mimi [2.9 and 2.10] to the previous shot of the open doors. 
[2.8] The chalet’s architecture has instantaneously gone from being an open passageway to a 
mobile prison—a modulatory mold—cutting the characters off from one another and their 
surroundings. In these solitary moments, the boundaries immanent to the brain-screen’s plasticity 
insist that these characters live, struggle and suffer alone. It would be impossible to perceive this 
shift were it not for the free indirect and its ability to express with equal fidelity, in one image, an 
objectively true fact (the architecture’s arrangement) and a subjectively true feeling (the way the 
characters are existentially isolated from one another and the world around them).  





One effect of Schanelec’s use of the free indirect is a real ambiguity between where 
melancholy begins and ends, or between whom it does and does not affect. In Afternoon, 
melancholy saturates the entire brain-screen. Konstanstin’s two suicide attempts which punctuate 
the film appear each time as completely startling since he doesn’t appear to be a more likely self-
harm candidate than any of the other characters. The suicides could just as easily have been 
attempted his girlfriend, mother or uncle. Leading into this final suicide scene, Konstantin walks 
Images 2.9, 2.10 Afternoon 
147 
 
into the kitchen to pour the glass of water that he will use to swallow his sleeping pills, and 
crosses right past his family members who are casually conversing at the kitchen table. Not one 
of them cues into his fatal intentions. In a plastically depotentialized world where everyone is 
mired in their own unrelenting sense of self and power has foreclosed re-existentializing 
relational movements, Konstanin’s suicidal behaviour doesn’t even stand out. 
The free indirect is also what enables Schanelec to create an image of plastic 
depotentialization in the film’s harrowing conclusion. In the suicide that closes out the film, the 
shot begins with an empty frame, before Konstantin enters and takes a seat on the edge of his 
bed, facing a dark grey wall. His back faces the camera in a five-minute-long static shot. This 
scene depicts what must be for Konstanin a moment of extreme suffering that has pushed him to 
the brink of self-willed death. Compositionally speaking, it is one of the film’s darkest, as the 
natural light that filters through the rest of the film’s daytime scenes has faded. The tight interior 
framing shows nowhere for his body to move, no possible line of advance, no window to offer a 
fresh view of things, no door to escape through and nobody to reach out to for help. [Images 2.11 
and 2.12]. An ordinary bedroom, with plenty of potential to be inhabited in a myriad of ways,  
when graced with Konstantin’s presence, turns into a hellish confine where suicide seems like 
the only way out. An objective space, turns into a free indirect subjective space, where it is 
impossible to parse its physical manifestation from the psychic pain that inhabits it. The image of 
the room is coterminous with a brain on the brink of suicide. The free indirect is operative here 
in the way that the image never needs to break with the objective reality to construct some 
fantastical or iconographic image that could do symbolic justice to the psychic gravity of the 
scene.  
A luminous bourgeois chalet, where he could come and go and do as he pleases, in this 
moment of suicidal despair, modulates and turns into a malleable and dispersed prison of 
existential paralysis. The walls of the home have turned into barriers preventing Konstantin’s 
world from being otherwise, not because they are fundamentally of such nature, or because he is 
really physically trapped, but because Schanelec’s delirious aesthetic pictures them in such a way 
so as to articulate how neoliberal power’s strategic individualism has made him—one part of a 
collective assemblage of subjectivity—feel responsible for the entirety of the melancholic pain 
saturating the event. The modulatory barriers that depotentialize the brain-screen account for 
why, even when Konstantin swims out to the floating dock to die in the film’s very last scene, he 
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doesn’t have a change of heart and begin to see the beauty of the world, even though the sun is 
shining above a pristine lake with plenty of open air, with room to move and presumably, other 
people to meet [Image 2.13]. Feeling the barriers that usurp potential immanent to the plastics of 
his bourgeois Western European world and reinforce the felt fiction of his individuality, 
Konstantin could sense all too well the usurping of potential for therapeutic subjective 
recomposition, and embraces his death—the only viable release from an inescapable sense of 
self.  
 
Images 2.11, 2.12 Afternoon 
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A similar aesthetic strategy punctuates Angel Schanelec’s other films as well as those of 
her Berlin School contemporaries. A look through some of the images that I have hand-selected 
here show how the cinema of poetry has influenced the Berlin School’s engagement with 
depression pandemic. What these images depict, much like the images of Afternoon that I have 
just discussed, is a free indirect expression of both the subjective and objective in one 
immediately psychosocial image. Yet again, windows—boundaries between the inside and 
outside, just like Deleuze’s brain-as-screen—play an important role in shaping the image plastics 
and their potential for shaking the isolation of a depressive sense of self. In Ulrich Köhler’s 
Windows on Monday, a bourgeois couple named Nina (Isabelle Menke) and Freider (Hans-
Jochen Wagner) are renovating the home that they share with their young daughter Charlotte 
(Amber Bongard). They both seem completely dissatisfied with their lives and relationship, but 
are trying to keep busy and make good financial investments by retiling their floor and installing 
new pine windows. In spite of having these home improvement projects, not to mention a 
daughter in common with her husband, Nina makes a spur of the moment and seemingly 
unmotivated decision to abandon her family. One evening, Nina goes to pick Charlotte up from 
the babysitter while Freider is at home working on the renovations then suddenly decides that 
she would simply rather not perform the familial duties expected of her. Without saying a word 
or giving any noticeable prompt, she turns the car around and drives away from the babysitter’s 
home where Charlotte is waiting. When Frieder calls Nina on her cellphone to inquire as to why 
Image 2.13 Afternoon 
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she still hasn’t come back with their daughter, she shrugs off the situation, says that she doesn’t 
know why she has made the decision that she has, but that she is sure that she will not return. 
This scene of abandonment initiates her wandering attempts at overcoming the melancholy that 
has instilled itself in the fabric of her conjugal and familial life. 
After giving up on her family, Nina goes to visit her brother in the woods where he is 
living in a cabin with his girlfriend. Across the way from their cabin is a resort hotel that piques 
her interest and draws her in. Once inside, Nina is presented with a host of seductive 
opportunities to break out of the monotonous existence that she has tried so hard to escape, but 
malleable boundaries keep separating Nine out from the scenes of her desire. She peeps in on a 
jovial tennis match, a pool party, a chic gala from the opposite side of the windows that cut her 
out of the action. [Images 2.14-2.17]Even after having broken free from the stifling confines of 
her family home Nina finds herself in what seems like and endless string of situations that 
continue to provoke melancholic plastic compositions. 
Images 2.14, 2.15 Windows on Monday 
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Other films in the Berlin School continue to play on the trope of the window as malleable 
boundary that reinforces a depressive sense of self. Much like in Windows on Monday, Christoph 
Hochhäusler’s This Very Moment depicts the frustrations of a bourgeois woman stifled by her 
home renovations. In Forest for the Trees, a school teacher’s car window marks her suicidal 
confinement and in Bungalow the window of a military bus encases a disenchanted young soldier 
on the brink of going AWOL. Other Angela Schanelec films such as Passing Summer, Marseille, 
and Places in Cities repeatedly play on the window motif in Afternoon to render plastic the 
psychological suffering of young women who face amorous discontent, listlessness and 
loneliness. 




               Image 2.18 Forest for the Trees 
Image 2.19 This Very Moment 
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Image 2.20 Bungalow 
 
By free indirectly perceiving one of melancholy’s symptoms as being the 
depotentialization of the event for subjective recomposition, Schanelec manages to corroborate 
Butler’s guiding intuition that there is nothing more melancholic than being made to feel like an 





Berlin School film 
shows why 
transindividual 
psychology, or the 
brain, a relation of 
relations, can in 
cases of melancholy 
double as a 
boundary: because 
as much as 
neoliberal power 
entices the plastic 
expanse of 
boundless 
creativity, it cannot 
yet do without 
strategically 
reinforcing the 
artificial limits of 
the self and its 
ontological 
distinction from the 
world of relations 
in which it is 
immersed, and 
assigning it undue responsibility for managing the melancholic sentiments that arise from this 
alienating divide. In the Berlin School’s existential gridlock, like in the control society, plastics 
shift, shifting possibilities, all while foreclosing potential for collective subjective 
recompositions with therapeutic effects to be made.   
Image 2.22 Marseille 






Belief and the Common World of Experience 
 
 Chapter three builds on the psychosocial understanding of the image rooted in the cinema 
of poetry’s use of the free indirect and Delezue’s conception of the brain as a screen. In chapter 
two, Angela Schanelec’s critical act of perception discovered a symptom of melancholy: the 
depotentialization of the event’s neuroplastics through the presence of modulalatory, yet one-
way boundaries that reify an isolated sense of self. This present chapter which analyzes Kelly 
Reichardt’s Night Moves and the “American Neo-Neorealsim” film movement perceives an 
adjacent symptom that also contributes to the melancholic reification of the individual: the 
erosion of belief in a common world of experience. By closely investigating the plastic 
composition of Reichardt’s images and how they engender a play of asymmetrical beliefs, this 
chapter supplements chapter two’s focus on the materiality of the brain with an emphasis on the 
experiential quality of the production of melancholic subjectivity. It concludes by questioning 
the degree of fidelity to which the cinematic image can ever really depict an experience so 
singular and incommensurate as melancholy, and proposes that the free indirect style offers an 
advantageous means of maintaining an ontological link between the film image and experience 
since it can psychosocially perceive the play of beliefs that give rise to melancholic isolation, 
even if that isolation can never be known in and of itself.   
 
American “Neo-Neorealism” 
 At a historical moment that overlaps with the Berlin School’s productions, a cluster of 
American independent filmmakers also decided to invoke the cinema of poetry tradition to 
aesthetically interrogate the conditions of contemporary melancholy. This loosely connected 
wave of filmmakers that began to emerge around 2005 has come to be called “American Neo-
Neorealism,” and it includes the likes of Kelly Reichardt and her contemporaries such as Julia 
Loktev, Ramin Bahrani, Lance Hammer, Ryan Fleck and Anna Boden. American Neo-
Neorealism is comparable to the Berlin School, since film after film dwells on protagonists 
whose affective well-being is found to be at complete odds with the socioeconomic system in 
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which they live. The most aesthetically refined of these filmmakers, such as Kelly Reichardt, 
augment melancholic themes by crafting psychosocial film worlds out of free indirect 
perspectives that discover yet another evental symptom of melancholy: singular breaks from the 
common world of experience. This symptom of melancholy is especially vivid in Kelly 
Reichardt’s Night Moves, the film which I focus on in this chapter, as it meticulously renders 
aesthetic the psychological dimension of a group of ecological activists who come together to 
explode a hydroelectric dam, but whose collective then fractures once the act is completed, 
leaving three troubled individuals alienated from the world and the beliefs that they once held in 
common. By cueing into yet another symptom of melancholy that resides in the event itself, 
surpassing the individual on all sides, Kelly Reichardt intensifies Angela Schanelec’s implicit 
critique of the psychiatric gaze and its penchant for reducing problems of evental breadth down 
to the scale of the individual. Attuned to the event of subjectivity production, like Schanelec, 
Reichardt’s work taps into the reasons why a given event can produce the melancholic sensation 
of feeling like an isolated individual. In Angela Schanelec’s film world, this feeling was brought 
about through modulatory plastic boundaries that foreclosed the potential for a re-existentializing 
encounter. Here in the parallel world of Kelly Reichardt, a similar operation takes place: power 
conditions what types of collective beliefs are permissible, so that activist desires for real 
political change that could recompose a collective subjectivity, end up abstracting individuals out 
from one another, dooming them to the singular depths of melancholic isolation, to 
incommensurate existential territories fated to never again intersect. 
 Before delving into the aesthetic and theoretical details of this melancholic dynamic in 
the work of Kelly Reichardt, a brief description of American Neo-Neorealism’s history and 
thematic preoccupations will help to contextualize her filmmaking practice. The term was coined 
by New York Times film critic A.O. Scott in his widely read article “Neo-Neo Realism: 
American Directors Make Clear-Eyed Movies for Hard Times.”lix Therein, Scott aptly points out 
that films such as Wendy and Lucy (Reichardt, 2008), Sugar (Fleck and Boden, 2008), Man Push 
Cart (Bahrani, 2005), and Ballast (Hammer, 2008) invoke Italian neorealism’s humanist concern 
with the dignity of the working class and offer a timely critique of the discourse of upward 
mobility which holds sway over so many of the films’ protagonists. Not surprisingly, the struggle 
to deal with economic precarity is a recurring theme in these films that were released amidst the 
U.S. Invasion of Iraq and the impending 2008 Wall Street collapse. In Wendy and Lucy an 
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unemployed young woman (Michelle Williams) stranded in Portland tries to scrounge up enough 
gas money to reach Alaska with her dog, where her hopes for a better future rest on a fish-
canning job. Sugar follows a young Dominican baseball player (Algenis Perez Soto) with his 
eyes set on cracking the major leagues and its seven-figure salaries, all while washing dishes in a 
New York City restaurant. Ahmad (Ahmad Razvi), the protagonist of Man Push Cart, sells 
coffee and doughnuts while desperately counting on a wealthy friend to help revive the short-
lived music career that once earned him celebrity status in Pakistan. In Ballast, Lawrence 
(Michael J. Smith Sr.) holds out faith that the grocery store he owns can catalyze his broken 
family’s recovery from drug addiction, suicide and hunger. All of these protagonists grasp onto 
the slim but real hope that one big break could lift them out of their entrenched class position. 
However, as Scott points out, “in these movies, dreams generally do not come true” (Scott 
2009b: MM38). In spite of the protagonists’ optimism, the film worlds they inhabit are 
unforgiving and thoroughly expressive of “capitalist realism”—the pervasive feeling that there is 
no escape from the dictates of capital (Fisher 2009: 2).  
At least the original neorealists could still turn to the Italian Communist Party for 
affirmation that the miseries abound need not be so. Finding themselves on the brink of Obama’s 
“changed” America, these indie filmmakers carry a deep skepticism towards the mass-
manufactured hope in electoral politics as a catalyst for the redistribution of wealth and the 
creation of a more egalitarian society. In marked opposition to the dominant ideology of 
Hollywood cinema from the same era, these films suppose the futility of hope, and even critique 
hope’s strategic mobilization by hegemonic forces to indefinitely delay the hoped-for’s 
realization. In an intriguing artist-to-artist interview with Gus Van Sant in 2008, Kelly Reichardt 
candidly sums up the situation: “We were watching a lot of Italian neorealism and thinking the 
themes of those films seem to ring true for life in America in the Bush years,” she says. “These 
haven’t been optimistic times” (Reichardt and Van Sant 2008: n.p.). Based on the films that 
Reichardt went on to make in Obama-era America, it’s clear that she didn’t suddenly acquire a 
taste for populist optimism.  
A.O. Scott’s term “Neo-Neo Realism” is useful for connecting Reichardt’s body of work 
to a cluster of filmmakers who also traffic in stock neorealist themes at the same historical 
moment, and for identifying this significant trend in American independent cinema that has 
tackled real life social issues without the sensationalism and spectacle of Hollywood-style 
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realism. However, Reichardt’s relationship to this film movement is a complicated one, because 
she arguably stands as both its most emblematic and most anomalous director. Of all the 
filmmakers who could be included in the movement, Reichardt is undoubtedly the most critically 
acclaimed and has proven to be the most prolific over the years (with six feature length films to 
date). The themes of her films tend to fit with the movement’s persistent focus on the quotidian 
lives of the economically disadvantaged, and her anti-sensationalist ethos coupled with a pared-
down film style evoke its overall sensibility. But to frame her work solely in terms of adherence 
to the neorealist tradition runs the risk of occluding her deep indebtedness to the cinema of 
poetry and its aesthetic creation of the psychosocial image which proves so indispensible to her 
symptomatology of melancholy in contemporary America. In the following chapter, I invoke 
both filmmaking traditions on the premise that they are compatible categories: neorealism’s 
focus on war-wrought poverty can coexist with the cinema of poetry’s psychosocial images. 
Deleuze lends weight to this allying of neorealism and the cinema of poetry through the way he 
structures his cinema books. In Cinema 2, both neorealist and cinema of poetry auteurs are 
grouped together under the more general category of “modern cinema.” Reference to all three of 
these overlapping categorizations will appear where appropriate in this chapter’s reading of 
Night Moves, a film about believing in, and creating, the basis for collective action in the face of 
lost hope.  
The three films that Kelly Reichardt directed leading up to Night Moves all play on the 
theme of hope, particularly as it fades in the face of increasingly dire situations. In Old Joy 
(2006), two long-lost friends whose lives have lead them down very different paths attempt to 
reconnect by taking a road trip to nearby hot springs. Kurt (Will Oldham) and Mark (Daniel 
London) couldn’t be more different. Kurt is a vagabond without a stable job or relationship. 
Clean-cut Mark feels trapped in a stressful domestic situation. Both sense that a meeting with the 
other could provide some insight into how to find the joy that seems to elude them both. In what 
can only be a disappointement for the both of them, the film ends on the same melancholic note 
that it began, with the two characters thrust back into the norms of their respective lives—Mark 
in his home and Kurt wandering the streets—without any noticeable change to speak of. The 
little hope that they had for their encounter proves to be in vain. Wendy and Lucy, Reichardt’s 
follow-up film, is quite similar in this regard. Unemployed and out of cash, Wendy’s future is 
fairly grim. To make matters worse, her dog has gone missing and her car has broken down, 
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barring her from leaving for Alaska, a place that she fantasizes as a sort of promised land. Even 
though she manages to find a helping hand from a cash-strapped security guard who musters just 
enough change for her to buy some gas and get on her way, the film concludes with Wendy in 
just as precarious of a position as she started in, with little promise that she will find the 
economic security and peace of mind that she is looking for. The 2010 period piece Meek’s 
Cutoff is even more dour, and it follows an ill-fated caravan of settlers led across the Oregon 
desert by frontier guide Stephen Meek in 1845. To their demise, the supposed shortcut that he 
takes turns out to be inhospitable and without the necessities to support life. Reichardt’s most 
recent film Night Moves starts out in another hopeless situation, present day Oregon plagued by 
the ecological degradation that comes with encroaching industrialization. Faced with a loss of 
confidence in the prospect that small-scale green actions could cumulatively make a significant 
difference when up against industrial capital’s systematic expropriation of the earth and 
unceasing disregard for ecological health and sustainability, a group of radicalized—and 
hopeless—activists are left with nothing but belief as the basis for their activism. The belief 
which moves their activism and overcomes their loss of hope gives birth to a common world of 
experience that Reichardt aesthetically articulates through free indirect perception. 
 
Belief Contra Hope 
Belief, in the sense that it accrues across Deleuze’s later works, couldn’t be more 
different than hope. Whereas belief affirms this world’s relevance and stages an encounter with 
it, hope unconsciously wishes this world away in the name of a transcendental ideal; the ideal of 
another world or utopian endpoint. There is a cruel irony to hope. What hope hopes for is fated to 
never arrive, since by hoping and waiting, instead of believing and acting, hope implicitly 
accepts the status quo instead of finding a way to change it. As an implicit acceptance of the 
existing state of affairs, it is fair to say that hope is a politically coopted comportment that 
perpetuates the dominant institutions, ideologies, and modes of subjectivity production within a 
given society.lx In just about all of the American neo-neorealist films mentioned above, including 
Kelly Reichardt’s, the film world is hopeless, even if some of the protagonists naively hold out 
hope for an economic miracle that will lift them out of their entrenched class position.lxi Next to 
hope’s political naiveté, hopelessness seems politically astute, and perhaps even the only sound 
state of mind, given the unrelenting hold of capitalist realism. Perhaps this is one of the reasons 
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why the hopelessness of American Neo-Neorealist films has resonated so well with left-wing 
critics. Hopelessness may indeed be a sober-minded response to the present state of the world, 
but in and of itself, it really doesn’t offer any way out, or any avenues for action that could bring 
about therapeutically political change in the fabric of everyday life. Politically astuteness is not 
always politically enabling. 
Hopefulness and hopelessness each carries a beneficial and limiting quality. Hopefulness 
may ward off a despairing and nihilistic melancholy, but it often proves to be a naïve and 
misplaced optimism that negates this world in favour of a transcendental ideal, further cementing 
the exiting status quo. Hopelessness, on the other hand, is undoubtedly liberating, since it lets go 
of a false consciousness, yet once hope is lost, very little is left to dispel the melancholy that 
exhausts so many activist milieus.lxii The total absence of hope closely parallels Andrew 
Solomon’s account of depression, wherein “you cannot remember a time when you felt better, at 
least not clearly; and you certainly cannot imagine a future time when you will feel better.” 
(Solomon 2001: 55). Even though hopelessness has the benefit of washing away political 
naiveté, it is not fix-all antidote to the shortcomings of hope, since it mirrors a depressive state of 
mind. How then is it possible to escape both the political naiveté of misplaced hopefulness and 
the melancholic stasis of a politically warranted hopelessness, and stage an encounter with the 
world rather than wish it away in the name of an unattainable ideal? Deleuze’s concept of belief 
offers a way out of this deadlocked dialectic of hopefulness and hopelessness.  
In Cinema 2, Deleuze lauds the modern cinema for its ability to restore a lost faith when 
confronted with the “modern fact that we no longer believe in this world” (171, my emphasis).  
He goes on to write: “The link between the human and the world is broken. Henceforth, this link 
must become an object of belief: it is the impossible which can only be restored within a faith. 
[…] The cinema must film, not the world, but belief in this world, our only link” (172, 
translation modified). To be intelligible, Deleuze’s argument that the link between human and 
world has been broken, and can only be restored through belief must be read in light film history. 
The division between his two cinema books is telling in this regard. The first book on the 
“movement-image” begins to expound a taxonomy of signs in the pre-WWII “classical cinema” 
whereas the second book on the “time-image” continues this project but with regards to the 
postwar “modern cinema.” For Deleuze, the classical and modern cinemas are characterized by 
two different types of images, with two different relationships to movement and time. In classical 
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cinema, what he calls a “sensory-motor schema” links the spaces of the film together through 
protagonist-driven action. In this stylistic tradition, film space is constructed around the agency 
and motoricity of an action-oriented protagonist. Distances are traversed, rooms are entered, and 
landscapes are conquered. Movement through these spaces serve the goals and desires of a male 
protagonist (solving a mystery, winning over a love interest, serving the nation, etc.). As a result, 
the film worlds neatly correspond to these goals and desires, and space becomes subservient to 
them and predetermined by them. These worlds are made for, and given to, human action. Due to 
this being the case, the aesthetics of the classical cinema are only ever able to produce “indirect 
images of time,” or more simply “movement-images.” The “indirect image of time” has nothing 
to do with the force of the free indirect that so many of the auteurs inspired by the cinema of 
poetry have harnessed to craft psychosocial images. By “indirect images of time,” Deleuze is 
simply referring to how these images never make time felt in and of itself. lxiii  Instead, time is 
represented and implied by the chain of goal-oriented movements performed by a volitional 
protagonist. The protagonist’s actions dictate the construction of time (and space), rather than 
time conditioning his actions. In the movement-image, a causal chain links human to world, but 
makes the world conform to the scale and needs of human action.  
The modern cinema breaks this aesthetic model apart from the inside by liberating the 
force of time from it subsumption to movement. As a result, “pure optical and sound situations,” 
or “time-images” arise that confound the movement-image’s reliance on character intentionality 
and action. No longer determined by these goal-oriented actions of the individual protagonist, 
time’s force is made felt, leading to an amplification of indeterminacy and ambiguity: a cinema 
of wavering, aberrant movement. Once human action has ceased to determine time and space, 
then the classical cinema’s link between human and world is broken. Instead, time makes action 
waver and falter, casting doubt on the human’s link to the world that was assured by the aesthetic 
logic of the movement-image.  
Deleuze’s writing is free from even a hint of nostalgia for this classical link between 
human and world, because to restore it would be to deny the cinema’s discovery of the force of 
time. But his ultimate disavowal of the movement-image’s linking of human and world via 
volitional action should not be mistaken for an abandonment of the world in favour of a higher 
ideal, as is the case with hope, nor as a renunciation of the creative act. Instead, Deleuze turns to 
belief as a way affirm the world, this world, and its eventful and creative activity, even amidst 
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the unsettling effects of time. Belief in this world is synonymous with the transindividual’s 
creativity. Belief “precipitates events, however inconspicuous, that elude control,” and 
“engenders new space-times, however small their surface or volume (Deleuze 1995: 176, 
translation modified). The phrase, “eludes control” warrants extra emphasis because, as was 
discussed in the previous chapter, one of the ways that the control societies of late capitalism 
function is through the reterritorializing function of social subjection that produces a sense of 
existential isolation. Belief’s elusion of control, as we will see, has to do with its creation of a 
common world of experience that can overcome the melancholic confines of feeling like the 
individual that neoliberal power, together with psychiatric power, never ceases to produce.  
Erin Manning builds on Deleuze’s affirmative understanding of belief to further 
underscore its creative capacity. For Manning, “A belief in the world is about crafting the 
conditions to encounter the world differently each time” (2016: 93). Crafting the conditions for 
an encounter with the world is very different from acting on it, or making it conform to the 
human scale, as is generally the case in the classical cinema’s linking of human and world 
through volitional action. Belief, in the sense that Deleuze and Manning give to it, is a belief in 
the potential immanent to the world for novel productions of subjectivity.  
To reiterate, this is why belief is of an entirely different order than hope. Whereas belief 
affirms potential for an encounter with the world that can recompose subjectivity, hope negates it 
in favour of a far off utopia, effectively reifying reigning compositions of subjectivity. Deleuze 
insists that the belief which modern cinema has the power to restore “does not address a different 
or transformed world” but simply “this world … as it is” (2007: 171, 172). Unlike the 
speculative pragmaticlxiv gesture of belief which aims to grasp the world in its really existing 
conditions, in order to stage an encounter with it that opens the potential for subjective 
recomposition, hope negates the world in favour of an ideal that is never actualized because hope 
was never pragmatically invested in the potential of the world to begin with. Hope isn’t of this 
world, but rather exists for the “different or transformed worlds” that Deleuze figured as having 
nothing to do with belief.  
The stakes of this distinction between hope and belief are particularly high for activist 
praxes, since the most transformative examples of activism find a way out of the hopefulness-
hopelessness dialectic that ossifies melancholy’s seeming interminability and stifles an encounter 
with the world, to embrace the creative quality of belief. As believers, activists move with the 
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world’s creative potential for new manners of becoming and relating—of composing 
subjectivity—and to once again paraphrase Manning, of recreating the conditions through which 
the world can be encountered, along the lines of economic, ecological and affective well-being. 
In doing so, activists, like the ones at the centre of Night Moves, find themselves in the midst of a 
commons-in-the-making, a shared world of experience where belief meets belief. 
 
The Common World of Experience 
This common site where belief meets belief has a name: the plane of immanence, or what 
William James calls, “pure experience.”lxv William James is widely regarded as the founding 
figure of American psychology, whose eclectic development of the pragmatic method spans 
topics such as the philosophy of experience, the reality of consciousness and the nature of truth. 
By building on relevant ideas from the essays gathered in the Essays in Radical Empiricism 
collection, such as “Does Consciousness Exist,” “A World of Pure Experience,” and especially 
“How Two Minds Can Know One Thing,” this section explores how the melancholic sensation 
of isolation and hopelessness, as well as its therapeutic overcoming through the collective 
composition of a common world, is brought about by virtue of how belief composes with this 
world of pure experience. The rationale for undertaking this line of inquiry comes from the film 
itself, since pure experience is fundamental to understanding the two psychological compositions 
found in the halves of Night Moves’s diptych structure: the first being the creation of a common 
encounter with the world that enables political action, the second being the alienation from such 
a common world and the sense of melancholic isolation that it entails. In each of these two 
circumstances, belief performs a different function, linking human to the world of pure 
experience in diametrically opposed manners, with two diametrically opposed effects on well-
being.  
Pure experience is “the instant field of the present at all times” (James 2003: 12), “the 
only one primal stuff or material in the world” (James 2003: 2). As “plain, unqualified 
existence,” pure experience knows “no self-splitting … into consciousness and what the 
consciousness is ‘of’ ” (James 2003: 12). It exists anterior and immanent to all senses of self, 
whether melancholic or otherwise, and all individuals hold a share of pure experience in 
common. Or, more accurately, pure experience holds all individuals in common. In the words of 
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David Lapoujade, pure experience “is no one’s state or rather it is not given for anyone” 
(Lapoujade 2000: 191-192).  
The concept of pure experience makes it possible to further nuance how the modern 
cinema exposes the need to film and affirm belief in the world. As recounted above, the link 
between human and world is broken by the modern cinema’s discovery of the force of time. In 
the philosophy of William James, the very fact of being an individual subject implies having 
already broken from the world of pure experience to attain subjective consciousness of an object. 
This splitting of the immediately present field of pure experience into subject and object 
confirms that such a break has taken place. Deleuze refines this idea when he figures that to be 
constituted as an individuated subject is to break from the world of pure experience, because 
such a subject is endowed with reflection, and reflection is possible only when the plane of 
immanence (a “pure consciousness”) is split up into a subject with “consciousness of” an object 
(Deleuze 2001: 26). Pure experience cannot be an object of subjective consciousness, because it 
is the immediately given field of experience that precedes the emergence of a conscious subject 
and its habit of saying ‘I’ (Deleuze 1991: x).lxvi Radical empiricism—the variety of empiricism 
advanced by William James—refuses to create a value distinction between the all-encompassing 
nature of pure experience and singular subjective facts of consciousness. A radical empiricist 
perspective aims to take account of the “full facts” of experience, which includes the reflective 
‘I’ that has broken from the world of pure experience, as much as pure experience itself. James 
describes the importance of accounting for these full facts of experience as follows:  
That unshareable feeling which each one of us has of the pinch of his individual destiny 
as he privately feels it rolling out on fortune’s wheel may be disparaged for its egotism, 
may be sneered at as unscientific, but it is the one thing that fills up the measure of our 
concrete actuality, and any would-be existent that should lack such a feeling, or its 
analogue, would be a piece of reality only half made up.  (James 1936: 489-490) 
Subjects are birthed on the plane of immanence, and break from it to become subjects of 
knowledge, consciousness, and experience. To be a subject is to be broken from pure experience, 
and a radically empirical account of any experience, melancholy included, must account for pure 
experience as much as the singular, “unshareable feeling” of the subjective break from it.  
Two types of belief can link the subject back to the world of pure experience: a terminal 
belief and a non-terminal belief. The terminus is a common site where vectors of belief—or 
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streams of consciousness— meet, before continuing along their respective trajectories, having 
shared this terminal experience “in common.” To meet at a terminus is to transcend the isolating 
threshold of the constituted self, to arrive at “the point at which one state of mind passes into 
another” (James 1932: 132). An encounter of this sort inflects both mental streams along the 
lines of this belief that they now hold in common, momentarily warding off the isolation of 
melancholy’s singular breaks from this common world of experience. A terminal belief thus 
brings the subject’s stream of consciousness to a terminus where it meets with the beliefs guiding 
other individuated subjects, creating a common world of experience and the capacity for 
collective action.  
Conversely, non-terminal belief leads the individuated subject’s stream of consciousness 
to a solitary zone of the plane of immanence where no other streams of consciousness lead. It is 
this second, non-terminal variety of belief that digs the solitary depths of melancholic isolation. 
Melancholy can thus be thought of as analogous to what James calls a “non-substitutional” 
stream of consciousness, in that it does not meet up with any other inhabited streams of 
consciousness or belief (James 2003: 34-35). Two melancholics in the depths of despair do not 
necessarily recognize the pain in one another, nor do they understand the reasons for each other’s 
suffering, since their experiences never meet, but burrow back into irreconcilable zones of the 
plane of immanence.  
In “Immanence: A Life,” an ode to William James and the last text that Deleuze wrote 
before his death, he appeals for a commons of experience, the very sort that could alter a political 
climate engendered by the proliferation of singular, non-terminal breaks from the plane of 
immanence productive of neoliberal individualism and melancholy’s isolated depths. “We need a 
new conception of society in which what we have in common is our singularities and not our 
individualities,” he writes, “where what is common is ‘impersonal’ and what is ‘impersonal’ is 
common” (Deleuze 2001: 14). The impersonal in common is the plane of immanence or the 
world of pure experience on which belief can be shared or lived alone. Equipped with the free 
indirect and its ability to produce a psychosocial image of transindividual psychology, Kelly 
Reichardt’s Night Moves attunes to how the relational play of beliefs active in a given event 
compose subjectivity, connecting humans to the world they have in common, and that hold them 




Belief in Common 
“The cinema must film, not the world, but belief in this world, our only link” (Deleuze 
2003: 172). Kelly Reichardt takes this a step further and films not only belief in the world, but 
shared belief in the world—or more accurately, shared activist beliefs for a changed world. To 
do so, she makes recourse to the cinema of poetry and its deployment of free indirect perception. 
What this film style offers Reichardt, like the auteurs discussed in the previous two chapters, is 
the possibility of creating a film image, and a film world, that is immediately psychosocial. 
Perhaps this is one of the fundamental prerequisites for the modern cinema to film belief in the 
world, since the play of beliefs active in a given event is also a psychosocial phenomenon. To 
recap, the transindividual relation that links the psyche and socius to produce a psychosocial 
event is what Simondon and Deleuze respectively call “psychology” or “the brain.” Belief fills a 
similar role in the work of James and in the Jamesian-inspired pages of Cinema 2 and 
“Immanence: A Life,” since belief’s relationality not only connects the subject to the world, as if 
they were pre-existing entities, but composes a singular assemblage inclusive of subject and 
world, bringing the uniqueness of their relational iteration into existence. It is in the 
pragmatics—in “the how”—of belief’s believing, connecting and producing, that the event’s 
psychology or brain either moves into the clutches of melancholy or wards it off entirely. Free 
indirect perception is put to two distinct uses over the course of Night Moves, a film which 
differs dramatically from the first to the second half. In the first half, it is used to articulate the 
creation of a common world of belief, and in the second half, to articulate the singular 
melancholic breaks from this world once held in common.  
A brief rundown of the plot will help to contextualize these aesthetic techniques. Night 
Moves tells the story of a group of eco-activists who undertake a dangerous direct action, and 
when things go wrong, their belief in the world, and relations to each other, quickly crumble, 
leaving a deep sense melancholic isolation. The film takes place in rural Oregon and focuses on 
Josh (Jesse Eisenberg), who lives on an organic farm co-operative and Dena (Dakota Fanning), 
who works at her mom’s New Age spa. The context of their relationship isn’t entirely clear from 
the beginning of the film. They seem a bit awkward around one another and run strange errands 
together, such as going for walks on top of a hydroelectric dam and buying a used boat in cash. 
Once they meet up with Harmon (Peter Sarsgaard), a hermit-type figure who lives in a 
sequestered trailer in the woods, it becomes apparent that they are intent on exploding the dam, a 
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direct action so big that, as Josh says, “people are gonna start to think.” These three activists are 
brought together by the radical aspirations that they have in common. They live their militancy 
together and relate to each other through their rare conviction in a project of this variety, 
simultaneously binding them together and cutting them off from the rest of society.  
The halfway point of the film contains a scene where the three of them drive the boat to 
the base of the dam in the middle of the night, and Harmon, the ex-military explosions expert 
sets the bomb amidst high tension. They manage to canoe away in just enough time, load into 
their vehicles and escape, with the promise that they are never to speak to one another again, 
since doing so could make them susceptible to law enforcement surveillance. The next morning, 
Josh overhears the other workers at his farm discussing the news. They all speak negatively 
about the action, deeming it futile and fanatical, and go on to say that a man who had been 
camping overnight by the river has gone missing. The rest of the film then deals with the 
activists’ traumatic reaction to realizing that their well-intentioned eco-activism has turned out to 
inadvertently cause the death of an innocent person.  
Josh gets a call from Harmon—breaking their pact of silence—to say that Dena isn’t 
doing too well. Upon receiving this call, a seed of doubt is planted in Josh’s mind, and he is no 
longer sure that the secrecy of what they did together will be respected. He begins trailing Dena, 
speaking to her clandestinely, trying to calm her down and convince her of the righteousness of 
the action in spite of its unintended consequences. Any influence that he once had over her 
seems to be lost. She is so disturbed by the news of the camper’s death that she is no longer sure 
that she can keep her promise of silence to the group. Dena’s being unwell becomes the talk of 
the community, and Sean (Kai Lennox), the head of the organic farm, even confronts Josh to say 
that him and Dena are suspected of involvement in the dam explosion. 
Having all but realized that the bond connecting them has dissipated due to fear, anxiety 
and guilt, Josh shows up uninvited at Dena’s health spa one night as she is on her way out. A 
violent struggle erupts. He eventually finds her hiding in a sauna where he chokes her to death, 
quits town the next morning, and then calls Harmon wanting to meet up. Harmon, the more 
seasoned activist, offers him some final words of advice, to “get lost, get real lost, and stay lost. 
That’s it.” The film ends with Josh in a sporting goods store—the very epitome of unabashed 
consumerism that he detests—filling out an application for a job with the knowledge that he has 
killed a good friend and is banished to a life in hiding. The common world that was ushered into 
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existence by the belief in activism that he, Dena and Harmon shared has eroded, leaving him 
alienated both from those with whom he believed, and a society based on hope that he has long 
since abandoned.  
In the first half of the film, these activists who have lost hope, but who are spurred by 
belief, find one another, and act together, constituting a common world that doubles as a 
therapeutic barrier by warding off the alienating depths of melancholy to which they are 
especially susceptible, given that radical activism is their last refuge of commonality. There are 
three free indirect techniques that Reichardt deploys to aesthetically articulate how belief 
precipitates the creation of a common world in the first half of the film as the activists come 
together to explode the dam: obsessive framing, semi-subjective perspectives, and stylized 
lighting and image composition. 
One important scene that illustrates Reichardt’s obsessive framing takes place when the 
three activists drive to acquire the additional ammonium nitrate fertilizer needed to complete 
their homemade explosives. With fake IDs in hand and a strong desire to remain undercover—to 
keep the beliefs that bind them imperceptible to the outside world from which they have 
broken—they stop at a diner for breakfast on the way to the farm supplies store. They are shot 
together in three-shot as their mealtime conversation develops.lxvii [Images 3.1-3.2] Then a diner 
employee who recognizes Harmon from prison passes by, and they share some back and forth 
banter before the he continues along his way. This discovery leaves Josh and Dena furious 
because they were under the impression that Harmon was not known in the area and that he 
Image 3.1 Night Moves 
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didn’t have any past criminal convictions. Luckily for them, the character who invades the 
shot—the share of the world that they hold in common—was unable to blow their cover and 
detect their true purpose for being there together. [Image 3.3]  
 
A similar scene occurs later as they eat lunch by the bank of the river leading to the dam. 
While sitting around a picnic table, a friendly stranger approaches them and tries to make light 
conversation about the weather and the campgrounds. Now only moments away from embarking 
on the direct action together, they are even more wary of this stranger and manage to act aloof 
enough in his presence so as to subtly encourage him move along. During this interaction, the 
three protagonists are again shown in three-shot with one another, at first separate from the 
stranger, and then alongside him as he eventually manages to invade their private shot. [Images 
Image 3.2, 3.3 Night Moves 
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3.4-3.6] Nevertheless, they keep him at enough of a distance that he never suspects what could 
really be binding them together.  
Reichardt’s emphasis on putting these three figures in the same shot as one another goes 
to some creative lengths. In addition to more orthodox three-shots such as the three of them in 
the front seat of the truck [Image 3.7], there are other more inventive shots that stress the 
aesthetic importance of framing these people together. For example, when they drive into the 
camp grounds with a boat and explosives in tow, Josh and Dena ride in a separate vehicle than 
Harmon, so that they will each have escape vehicles and can drive their separate ways after they 
complete the direct action. Even sitting in different vehicles, Reichardt manages to frame them in 
a three shot through the car’s passenger windows [Image 3.8]. By consistently framing them 
together, and by marking the invasiveness of others who enter their shared three-shots, Reichardt 
underscores how shared belief is productive of a common world of experience.  
 
This half of the film also includes a couple of “semi-subjective” shots that confuse any 
clear-cut distinction that it would be possible to make between wholly objective and subjective 
perspectives. As discussed in chapter one, an ambiguity of this sort is one of the chief 
characteristics of the free indirect style. These “semi-subjective” shots could emanate from any 
one of the three characters, or some undefined place between them, thus undoing any definitive 
distinctions between their perspectival positions. In Night Moves, three of these semi-subjective 
shots offer a de-personalized gaze through a car window or windshield [Images 3.9-3.11]. These 
shots have the effect of linking the characters even more closely together, since it is impossible 
to distinguish between the way that each of them sees the world, since after all, a shared world 
has been co-created through the belief that they hold in common, and that first and foremost, 
holds them in common. Enabled by free indirect aesthetic construction, Reichardt makes it 
Image 3.7 Night Moves Image 3.8 Night Moves 
172 
 
possible to show how each of their individual perspectives on the world is confounded by a 
shared impersonal gaze that corresponds to their group subjectivity—the zone they have carved 
out together on the plane of immanence—rather than any one of them in specific.   
The third, and perhaps most significant, free indirect technique that Reichardt uses to 
articulate the creation of a common world through belief in the first half of the film is stylized 
lighting and image composition. Reichardt goes to great lengths to show the three activists in a 
Images 3.9, 3.10 Night Moves 
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similar light, which is totally consistent with her strategy of framing them in the same shots and 
offering up perspective shots that are “semi-subjective” and could emanate from any one of their 
points of view, or somewhere in between. The most significant example of this occurs in the 
lead-up to the explosion, as Josh, Dena and Harmon ride their canoe down towards the dam in a 
sequence of long, methodical takes. Each one of them is shot in succession, almost completely 
engulfed by the pitch-black of night that shrouds their journey in secrecy and anonymity. 
[Images 3.12-3.14] The stylization encompasses the harrowing psychology that binds them 
together in this moment where they each decide to put their lives on the line for a cause that they 
have mutually agreed upon. What these images render aesthetic is the quality of the pure 
experience that individuated subjects can hold in common when prompted by pre-personal and 
transindividual force of belief. Their voyage is saturated by a grave darkness, yet it is a darkness 
that wards off melancholy, because it belongs to the group’s shared experiential plane. As 
harrowing as these moments in the film certainly are, they are co-created through belief that 
leads to a common terminus, and thus offers a touch of comfort to those who have pout their 










Image 3.14 Night Moves 
Melancholic Breaks 
Belief creates a common link between Josh, Dena, Harmon and the world of pure 
experience, a link that potentializes collective acts of creation. But once belief begins to whither, 
the collective fractures, and they find themselves living in entirely incompatible worlds, so much 
so, that they can no longer understand or feel for one another the way that they could before. The 
second half of the film is the polar opposite of the first. Whereas the film opens with belief’s 
creation of a common world of experience and action, a world that wards of melancholic 
hopelessness, the latter portion details the melancholic breaks that each of the three activists 
make from this world that they once held in common. The transmutation of a belief that 
commons into a belief that isolates begins the morning after the dam explosion, when upon 
hearing the news, it becomes apparent that an innocent bystander has been inadvertently killed. 
Josh, Dena and Harmon each start to digest the event differently and respond to its effects in 
incompatible ways. After making this unfortunate discovery, the only thing that they hold in 
common is the faith that the have lost in one another and in the activist project that once inspired 
them so deeply. By betraying the belief that they once shared, and the pure experience that it led 
to, the melancholy that they had once succeeded in warding off finds its way into each of their 
lives, and they start to feel like isolated individuals. Remarkably, this shift happens in spite of 
their attempts to connect and communicate with one another, in defiance of their pact of silence. 
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Communicate as they may, it only reinforces their sense of alienation and desperation, because 
the communications are actually betrayals of the common world that once held them together.  
Speaking of her earlier film Old Joy, Kelly Reichardt makes a comment that also echoes 
true for Night Moves: “What this threadbare narrative really underscores,” she says, “is the 
unspoken impossibility of their reconnection” (Reichardt and Van Sant 2008: n.p.). After the 
activists each go their separate ways, the film’s aesthetics dramatically shift to account for this 
impossibility. Reichardt still mobilizes the free indirect subjective techniques found in the first 
half, but the key difference is that instead of them being used to articulate an experience held in 
common, they begin to articulate the incommunicability, non-substitutionality, and radical 
singularity of melancholic experience. A close analysis of some key scenes from this second half 
of the film will illustrate how the common world of experience that these three activists shared is 
undone, and how melancholy comes to characterize their link to the world.  
 The second half of the film shifts the focus onto Josh, who in the first half of the film was 
always flanked by at least Dena and was hardly ever depicted alone. In this later part of the film 
his companions have disappeared in an attempt to disguise the reality of their relations. Josh 
makes a serious attempt at keeping up his normal routine and fly under the radar of anyone who 
could be suspicious. Much like the lead up to the dam explosion, this whole second part of the 
film is very mundane and revels in the quotidian. But whereas Josh used to have company, with 
whom he could at least be honest, and honestly share belief, even if they had to mask their shared 
reality from those around them, now his entire existence is a deceit, and the most important 
psychological fact of his life—that he has just blown up a dam—must remain hidden from those 
with whom he spends his days. Keeping secrets is alienating, brooding business and his 
alienation is aesthetically expressed through free indirect subjective shots. 
 Two scenes in particular stand out. In the first of these, Josh decides to confront Dena 
about her having broken their pact of silence by calling Harmon. Apparently she is distraught, 
and Josh intends to calm her down and convince her to honour their secrecy. In a scene unlike 
any other in the rest of the film, a scene that could go unnoticed for its proximity to standard 
continuity editing, Josh and Dena sit in the front seats of his truck, just like they had many times 
before. Yet this time the image composition is completely different. Whereas in the first half of 
the film, Josh and Dena were repeatedly shot through the truck’s window in two-shots that 
depicted them both in crystal-clear focus, in this later scene, they are never captured in focus at 
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the same time. [Image 3.15-3.17] 
 
Images 3.15, 3.16 Night Moves 
  
Josh expresses his frustrations, and Dena her guilt and worry, each one at a time, without ever 
coming to any sort of mutual understanding. The common terminus of belief and its 
corresponding experiential qualities have eroded, leaving two alienated subjects who can 
communicate and connect, but not share in any experiential commonality. They may both have 
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become alienated and melancholic, but they cannot share the singularities of their respective 
melancholy; they may say that they understand one another, but the image says otherwise. Josh 
and Dena are in totally incommensurate streams of melancholic consciousness that undoubtedly 
mirror one another, but never intersect. Their reactions to the event that they brought into 
existence together, and that brought them into existence together, follow different trajectories of 
subjectification, leading them further and further away from the non-melancholic terminus of 
belief they previously shared. Their common world of experience has eroded, spawning two 
melancholic singularities doomed to indefinite isolation.  
  
                Image 3.17 Night Moves  
In the film’s penultimate scene, Josh breaks into Dena’s spa afterhours to confront her yet again, 
enraged that she has been reaching out to members of the small community about what 
happened. He presses up close to her and says, “I just think it’s important that we know what we 
feel” acting as if everything is OK and he genuinely cares about her well-being, right before the 
truth of their feelings comes out and she attacks him with rain stick. The lighting and image 
composition reflect the subjective coordinates of Josh and Dena at this moment of aggression, in 
a manner completely inverse to the shots on the boat that once articulated their belief in a 
common world. In those shots previously mentioned, they are surrounded by darkness, their 
faces barely illuminated from the boat’s interior. Each of the activists is lit from the same source, 
and they are surrounded by exactly the same darkness. In this spa scene, Josh and Dena’s figures 
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turn to blacked-out silhouettes on an orange-red background [Image 3.18]. Instead of emerging 
from the world together, they are cut out from it separately, imaged as what they are: 
melancholic breaks from the common world of experience.  
 
Image 3.18 Night Moves 
The Truth of Melancholy 
 Based on this close analysis of Night Moves’ aesthetics, we can say that Kelly 
Reichardt’s free indirect mode of perception discovers another event-based symptom of 
melancholy: the presence of non-terminal belief that produces totally singular streams of 
incommensurate consciousness. Like Schanelec, Reichardt’s use of the free indirect to discover 
an event-based symptom of melancholy raises both a philosophical and aesthetic problem about 
the truth-value of experience. For how can the truth of a singular experience that is non-terminal 
and that belongs to an incommensurate zone of the plane of immanence ever possibly be 
verified? And furthermore, how could the cinema ever possibly conduct such a verification? 
Acquiring complete knowledge of another’s melancholy is an impossible task, since it would 
require complete knowledge of another, to the extent of actually being this other. It is also worth 
noting that given that melancholy lies in the plastics of the event’s assemblage, in the primacy of 
the transindividual, that nobody can ever have complete knowledge of “their own” melancholy 
either. However, it would be erroneous, or at least a deviancy from a radically empirical ethos, if 
the truth of melancholic experience was cast aside as being a personal hallucination 
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insufficiently linked to the world, since after all, the “full fact” of experience includes singular 
breaks from the common world of experience, even ones that are impenetrable, like those of the 
melancholic variety. Writing of other impervious singularities, like “ether waves and your 
anger,” James pragmatically insists that while he cannot “ever know them directly, perceptually 
terminate in them” he can be led to “their very next effects” (2003: 38). The inability to verify 
the truth of the experience as such, due to its highly singular nature that renders its experiential 
quality inaccessible, does not prevent James, armed with the pragmatic method, from 
considering such singular breaks from pure experience as true. James posits that it is possible to 
consider the unconscious, ether waves, or mystic states to be true by virtue of the reality of their 
“very next effects” (James 1932: 506-507; James 2003: 38). The same can be said of 
melancholy, which James also saw as true, in so far as it “constitutes an essential moment in 
every complete religious evolution” (1932: 25). James may never have known the religious 
melancholy (acedia) of figures like Tolstoy or St. Theresa of Avila, but he would not hesitate to 
consider these experiences, and the supernatural explanations for their overcoming, as true, given 
that they produced real effects.  
If the truth of melancholy is tied to it having real effects, effects that are observable and 
that can be held in common, even if the first-hand experience of it is not, then the cinema is apt 
to corroborate such effects. There are two types of effects that emanate from singular experience, 
each of which lead to distinct ontological assumptions about the nature of melancholy and its 
relationship to the image: residual effects and immediate effects. With regards to melancholy, the 
residual effects are most often expressed through faciality traits, bodily markers, or verbal relay. 
These visible symptoms can be considered as residual effects of a melancholic experience 
because they never actually cue the (medical) observer to either the experiential quality of 
melancholy or to the existential conditions that precipitate it. Not uncoincidentally, this type of 
effect, which predominates western art history’s iconography of melancholy, also lends itself 
unobstructed to psychiatry’s clinical gaze and its corresponding diagnostic models and 
therapeutic methods. 
In spite of the limitations that prevent us from ever possessing another’s share of pure 
experience, there is a radically empiricist manner of analyzing psychology that considers its 
immediate effects. lxviii This type of effect is much more difficult to grasp, and requires an 
abolishment of “professional distance” and the psychiatric regime of visibility that it clings to, 
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since it takes place at the juncture of the individuated subject’s singular break from the plane of 
immanence, rather than it’s report of this break, as mediated through facial and bodily signs. To 
decipher the quality of a melancholic break from the world of pure experience requires a 
completely different mode of perception, one that cannot wait for the individuated subject to be 
constituted and then attest to the experience that it has had. Such a radically empiricist mode of 
perception must perceive the manner of the break that constitutes the subject and its singular 
melancholic experience, in and of itself. If the sought after “really next effects” of melancholic 
experience are to be “full” effects, or at least more fully articulate the experiential truth from 
which they emanate, then an engagement with the existential quality of the production of 
subjectivity, and the way that such productions relationally move the events in which they are 
engendered is of the utmost urgency.  
Hence why the cinema must believe in this world. To film the world is to film the 
residual effects of an experience; to film belief in this world is to film both its residual effects 
and its immediate ones; to film how an experience matters to the world in which it takes place. 
The cinema can most easily, and has most usually, adopted a mode of perception that lends itself 
to capturing residual effects. Facial and bodily movements lend themselves quite naturally to the 
cinematographic conventions and semantic narrative codes to which the film image has most 
often been rendered subservient. For Bazin, an art such as this that limits itself to showing 
reality, instead of rendering it aesthetic, is coarse and unworthy of the title neorealism (Bazin 
2009: 226). Conversely, to film belief in the world is to film the immediate effects of 
(melancholic) experience. Even if melancholic experience cannot be directly filmed due to its 
singular non-substitutionality and non-terminality, it can be immediately “indexed” by the 
relations between beliefs that engender an event and its mode of subjectivity production.  
The truth-value of the cinematographic image has most often been discussed in terms of 
its indexicality; its penchant to attest, in the worlds of Roland Barthes, that “this has been” and to 
“make permanent the truth” (Barthes 1981: 79, 110). Indexicality has proven an especially 
important concept for theories of cinematic realism—and the truth of the film image—ever since 
Bazin proposed an existential link between the film image and reality. Whether such an 
existential link can be justified through the theory of indexicality is another matter. The 
following passages will cue us into the debate.  
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In his widely cited book on Bazin entitled Change Mummified, Phil Rosen argues that 
Bazin’s conception of cinema is inherently indexical. An illustrative passage reads as follows:  
Bazin insists on the pregivenness of the universe to the human. The indexicality of 
mechanically produced images makes it possible to experience that pregivenness in the 
realm of representation, through the temporal relation of the profilmic to the camera. For 
Bazin the photographic or cinematic image always provides the spectator with absolute 
brute knowledge that the objects visible in the frame were at one time in the spatial 
‘presence’ of the camera that they appear from an irrefutable past existence. (Rosen 2001: 
29) 
This indexical reading of Bazin has its roots in Peter Wollen and his seminal work of political 
modernism Signs and Meaning in the Cinema, where he argues that Bazin sees the “indexical 
aspect of the cinema as its essence” (120). Expounding this “indexical Bazin,” Wollen writes: 
It was the existential bond between fact and image, world and film, which counted for 
most in Bazin’s aesthetic, rather than any quality of similitude or resemblance. Hence the 
possibility—even the necessity—of an art that could reveal spiritual states. There was for 
Bazin a double movement of impression, of moulding and imprinting: first, the interior 
spiritual suffering was stamped upon the exterior physiognomy; then the exterior 
physiognomy was stamped and printed upon the sensitive film. (Wollen 2013: 113) 
Wollen’s citation sums up perfectly the cinema’s capacity to index the residual effects of 
experience. Spiritual states, like melancholy, are non-substitutional experiences that can only 
ever be known through their really next effects. The route to knowledge of these effects, 
according to Wollen and his indexical Bazin, is via the exterior physiognomy’s indexation on the 
sensitive film, whose representation is meant to index an experience about which some 
knowledge can finally be produced. The exterior physiognomy is a residual effect of the 
experience that it indexes, and the indexical operation as it is conceived here is a 
communicational means of mediating that unexperienaceable experience, by transducing it into a 
sign that stands in for that singular experience’s unrepresentable complexity. Here, at the 
crossroads of the experience and the film image-as-index, the cinema reaches an artistic limit, 
and must content itself with finding exterior signs to represent the unrepresentable. As a result, a 
certain “lack” is invested into the image. In an indexical schema, the image points to an 
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experience that it attests to, that it indexes, without ever sharing in the experience, or being “of” 
the experience.  
This indexical approach has arguably become the standard reading of Bazin.lxix Yet some 
important objections have been made to the appraisal of Bazin’s ontology of the image through 
the semiotic framework of indexicality. The most recognizable opponent to this semiotic reading 
of Bazin is the early cinema scholar Tom Gunning. In his article, “What’s the Point of an Index?, 
or Faking Photographs” he draws on Bazin and Barthes to argue that thinking the photograph in 
terms of indexicality brackets off its experiential qualities and limits its ability to do more than  
signify. Gunning writes: “Barthes told us that photography was not a copy of reality but rather its 
emanation.… He shares Bazin’s belief that a photograph puts us in the presence of something, 
that it possesses an ontology rather than a semiotics” (Gunning 2004: 46). He goes on to address 
Wollen directly, whose “translation of the ontology of photography into a semiotics involved a 
canny appropriation and transformation of Bazin (who never used the term index, although his 
terms of comparison with photography—death masks, fingerprints, moulds—certainly 
correspond to Peirce’ s examples of indices)” (Gunning 2004: 46). And finally, Gunning takes 
his stand:  
For Bazin, the photograph is not a sign of something, but a presence of something, or 
perhaps we could say a means for putting us into the presence of something, since clearly 
Bazin realizes that a photograph differs from its subject. But is the indexical relation to a 
referent enough to truly explain what Bazin describes as photography’s ‘irrational power 
to bear away our faith’ ? An indexical relation falls entirely into the rational realm. 
Likewise Barthes describes the power of photography as, “A magic, not an art”. 
(Gunning 2004: 46).lxx 
More than just an index, Bazin imagines that “photography plays a real part in natural creation, 
rather than substituting for it” (Bazin 2009: 9). 
This is exactly the notion that Daniel Morgan builds on in his sharp critique of the 
tendency to yoke theories of indexicality onto the writings of Bazin. In a Critical Inquiry article, 
he makes the astute observation that rather than positing the film image as an index of reality, 
Bazin uses a much more evocative phrase: “transfer of reality.” For Bazin, “photography 
transfers reality from the object depicted to its reproduction” (8). This leads Morgan to conclude 
that “the rhetoric of transfer suggests a fundamental incompatibility of Bazin’s position with the 
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index argument” (2006: 449). Thus if it is at all appropriate to say that the film image is capable 
of indexing the immediate, “really next effects” of melancholic experience, or that Kelly 
Reichardt’s cinema does exactly this, then “index” must take on a totally different meaning. In 
this broader and contraventional sense, in line with Peirce’s original formulation of the 
conceptlxxi, the “index” refers not to an absent reality or experience that the image is lacking, but 
to a portion of the plane of immanence whose effects are registered, felt and “transferred” by the 
image that is adjacent to it. The cinema’s fidelity has nothing to do with reproducing the world, 
or indexing the profilmic as it already is,lxxii but with inventing an aesthetic that will allow an 
engagement with the world of pure experience, on the basis of its (psychosocial) reality, even in 
the case of singular experiences—such as the melancholic ones—that can only ever be known 
through their really next transferred effects.  
For James, “thoughts are concrete and made of the same stuff as things are,” that “stuff” 
being pure experience (2003: 20). The very same thing can be said of cinematic images. What 
allows for film images to point to melancholic experience, to “index” it (in the Bazinian and 
Peircian sense), to be true to it, is precisely this experiential constitution that they share. The film 
image only points as an index by virtue of its own stylistics being truly informed by a 
melancholic experience existing on the same plane of immanence. Thus the image could be 
considered indexical, but only if seen not as lacking in any reality, and is not even primarily as a 
signifier, but simply through the fact that the image’s existence, as it is, in this unique 
configuration, attests to—points to—the fact of another adjacent experience that impacts it, 
shapes it, and insists on being taken account of.  
The free indirect image of melancholy aesthetics takes its psychosocial form by caring 
for how a melancholic singularity—a non-terminal stream of consciousness burrowed by belief 
into an incommensurate zone of the plane of immanence—creates an immediate ripple effect on 
the plane of immanence that it shares with the image. Even if the singularity of melancholic 
experience may be non-terminal, its non-terminality impacts the plane of immanence on which 
the image does its aesthetic, compositional work. It takes a free indirect mode of perception to 
register this immediate effect of melancholy experience taking place on the same plane of 
immanence as the image because the singularity of the melancholic experience is engendered by 
the transindividual vectors of belief active in a given event. The cinema may not ever be able to 
film the melancholic experience proper, in all of its singularity, but it can free indirectly film this 
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play of beliefs constituting a world in which such an experience is a fact that needs to be 
considered—and the image can be true to that transindividual event of beliefs-in-relation. 
In rare moments such as these when a filmmaker wholeheartedly adopts a free indirect 
mode of perception and abandons the condemned endeavour of representing the unrepresentable, 
of representing the singularity of melancholic experience through its residual signifiers, the film 
image becomes true, in the same way that ideas do in radical empiricism. For James, “ideas, 
(which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us get 
into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience” (James 2005c: 138). The truth of 
the melancholic image is the satisfactory relationship that it has to melancholic experience, and 
its satisfactory relationship is precisely the manner in which it uses the free indirect to perceive 
the play of beliefs that give rise to melancholic isolation—the dynamics of this play being none 
other melancholy’s immediately “indexed” effects and event-based symptoms. Having used free 
indirect perception to enter into such a satisfactory relationship to melancholic experience, even 
though the singularity of melancholic experience can never be known directly, Kelly Reichardt is 
able to truly perceive a vital symptom of melancholy: non-terminal belief that breaks from a 
common world of experience, once again making people feel like the individuals they are only in 
abstraction, isolated from the event of their own subjectivity production in which they are 
actually and virtually, totally imbricated—even if it doesn’t feel like it.  
Numerous political consequences stem from the aesthetic discoveries of the past two 
chapters, wherein artistic truths about melancholy squarely challenge the monopolistic truths 
produced by the psychiatric apparatus of normalization. If melancholic symptoms no longer lie 
solely on the individual, but the world’s psychosocial transindividuality, then, at least according 
to a radical and speculative etiology-to-come, the same can be said for melancholy itself. Owing 
to these two artist-physicians, Angela Schanelec and Kelly Reichardt, such an etiology-to-come 
has two lines of inquiry upon which to advance. Either it can investigate the potential within an 
event’s neuroplasticity, or assess the qualitative play of beliefs active in a given event. That task 
will need to be taken up at each singular juncture and no standardized, consensual etiology, 
symptomatology or therapy could ever emerge. Yet in both cases, this etiological inquiry, artistic 
symptomatology, and activist therapy will be inseparable from an analysis of the operations of 
power, and power’s conditioning of the event of subjectivity production.  
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If power has a hand in the production of melancholic subjectivity, as these artist-
physicians indeed say that it does, then there is no reason for activists to wait for a 
comprehensive etiology to be delineated before beginning to act on the problem, before 
beginning to experimentally recompose subjectivity in search of therapeutic effects. If there is 
one strategy that therapeutic activism must poach from psychiatry’s therapeutic toolbox, it is its 
trial and error approach. Except instead of experimenting with psychotropics whose efficacy (or 
lack thereof) can only be found in the trial, the challenge facing therapeutic activism is to 
conduct radically empirical research into the recomposition of subjectivity, until, with enough 
experimentation, mixtures of relations that tend towards well-being are discovered. Such a 
process would be nothing less than a well-becoming – a collectively animated well-being whose 
therapeutic and political value lies in the how of its making. The following two chapters looks at 
films that begin to imagine the contours of what a therapeutic activism to come may look like, 
and may have to deal with, to welcome healing right where the profound hurting takes place: in 

























Ecosophy and Peace 
 
“We watch films instinctively,  
as therapy for mental or emotional pain” 
-Apichatpong Weerasethakullxxiii  
 
            At first glance, the two filmmakers who I focus on in this second half of the dissertation 
may seem to have little in common with the likes of Angela Schanelec and Kelly Reichardt. 
Perhaps the most glaring distinction is that the films of Apichatpong Weerasethakul and 
Kanakan Balintagos revel in magic, myth and mysticism, whereas the Berlin School and 
American Neo-Neorealism take place in an entirely disenchanted world.lxxiv Yet all four of them 
share a concern for well-being, and express this concern in a minor mode that deterritorializes 
the meaning of depression and connects this seemingly “personal” problem to a political 
immediacy that is collective. In the works of Schanelec and Reichardt, these auteurs diagnose 
event-based symptoms of an equally event-based melancholy that manages to afflict just about 
everyone in their film worlds, making them feel existentially paralyzed and like solitary 
individuals. Melancholy also looms over the film worlds created by Weerasethakul and 
Balintagos, as both artists make films to work through highly politicized scenarios of loss. In the 
case of Weerasethakul, his films grapple with a specifically Thai form of melancholy that has 
arisen out of the country’s current policies of strict artistic censorship and historic legacy of 
violently repressing communist organizations. For his part, Balintagos, who comes from the 
island of Palawan in the Philippines, makes films to uplift his people who are being methodically 
dispossessed of their lands and culture by multinational resource extraction initiatives and 
subjected to virulent anti-Indigenous racism. These politically astute filmmakers are keenly 
aware of the overlapping modes of oppression that condition the life of their peoples. 
Significantly, they respond to this state of affairs by exploring the potential for therapeutically 
recomposing melancholic subjectivities that that have arisen out of political oppressions by 
activating the re-existentializing forces of alterity and traditional values. These therapeutically 
political activations are part of a dual strategy of peace and war. The Whiteheadian concept of 
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peace offers a way to account for the affective accomplishment of admitting alterity into an 
ecology, and war, as it appears in the work of Taiaiake Alfred, refers to the way that the 
collective performance of Indigenous values can contest the neoliberal and neocolonial 
imperatives which are destroying the earth and the lifeways of its original peoples. Neither 
strategy has much to do with practicing or abstaining from violence, but with finding ways of 
intervening—politically and therapeutically—into contested fields of subjectivity production.  
In this chapter on Apichatpong Weerasethakul’s film Uncle Boonmee Who Can Recall 
His Past Lives, I invoke Guattari’s schizoanalytic cartographies to complexify the claims that I 
have been making about how therapeutic activism can recondition events of subjectivity 
production. Guattari’s cartographies offer working models for exploring how the relational 
movements of an event can give life to new compositions of subjectivity. They consist of four 
quadrants, or “ontological functors” which I will map onto the cinematic image through a close 
analysis of select scenes from Uncle Boonmee. By connecting the schizoanalytic cartographies to 
Apichatpong Weerasethakul’s film work, I show how they both advance a shared ethico-political 
sensibility that is encapsulated by Guattari’s work on ecosophy—a manner of thinking the 
production of subjectivity in tandem with the socius and the environment.  
 
Ecosophy as a Call for Peace 
The fantastically alterious population of Apichatpong’s film worlds—the mystical 
creatures, benevolent ghosts and talking animals who repeatedly appear and disappear in their 
travelling of time—offer an oblique access point into Thailand’s war-torn history, especially the 
American-backed military occupation and communist purging of Isaan province that took place 
from the 1960s through to the 1980s. As a child, Apichatpong became intimately familiar with 
the region and its history after his parents relocated their medical practices to the province out of 
solidarity with its leftist organizing. He witnessed that amidst the violence of the occupation, 
villagers threatened by the military fled their homes and hid in the jungle.lxxv Many of them 
never returned. Uncle Boonmee Who Can Recall His Past Lives is set in Isaan,lxxvi and is 
premised on the affective-historical fact that the region’s purging is still felt by the widows and 
descendants of the disappeared communists, despite the reigning royalist regime's attempts to 
silence and censor this history in the name of national unity.lxxvii 
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Isaan is thus a site of conflicted signification in Thai culture. As a principally rural and 
agricultural province it lends itself to signifying as “rural utopia” and “cornerstone of Thai 
heritage”, two ideological discourses taken up by forces as opposed as left-wing intellectuals and 
royalist-nationalists (Boehler 2011: 293). In defiance of these national heritage discourses, the 
rural space of the Isaan jungle simultaneously signifies as anti-nationlxxviii because of the region’s 
historical association with communist resistance (which itself is tied to various ethnic minorities 
in Thailand such as the Chinese and Laotians).lxxix Uncle Boonmee does more than signify on one 
side of this ideological conflict between nation and anti-nation, geopolitical centre and margin, 
royalist and communist. In defiance of censorship threats and distribution difficulties in 
Thailand, Apichatpong’s cinema endeavours to bring back the disappeared peoples who were 
driven into the jungle and lost to military aggression and to make reverberate the ethos that the 
government tried to extinguish when it disappeared the people of Isaan. From the heart of the 
jungle—a blot on the Thai political unconscious—Uncle Boonmee recomposes the thresholds of 
the three ecologies, and in doing so, brings repressed cultural memories out of obscurity to bear 
on a society that has had great difficulty acknowledging the willed omissions of its history, 
including the peoples and values that have been lost. 
The psyche, the socius and the environment together constitute what Félix Guattari calls 
“the three ecologies.” The practice of ethically-politically thinking the pragmatics of their co-
composition is called “ecosophy,” and its chief problematic “is that of the production of human 
existence itself in new historic contexts” (Guattari 2008: 24). It is possible to read Guattari’s late 
works on ecosophy as a call for “peace,” at least in the sense that A.N. Whitehead gives to the 
word. As process theologist Mary Elizabeth Mullino Moore points out, Whiteheadian peace “is 
not the absence of war and violence, but the presence of other relationships ([in Whitehead’s 
words,] ‘a broadening of feeling’) with the wider world” (Mullino Moore 2006: 205). Finding 
more heteropoetic ways of living with the “other” in “other relationships” is central to the ethico-
political task of ecosophy, and its therapeutic investment in the production of subjectivity. The 
Three Ecologies concludes with an appeal for a revitalized relationship to alterity, “new social 
and aesthetic practices, new practices of the Self in relation to the other, to the foreign, the 
strange … new solidarities, a new gentleness.… Individuals must become both more united and 
increasingly different” (Guattari 2008: 45, 51). With a similar concern for the value of alterity, 
Isabelle Stengers builds on Guattari’s ecosophy to define “peace as the ecological production of 
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actual togetherness where ‘ecological’ means the aim is not toward a unity beyond differences, 
which would reduce those differences through a goodwill reference to abstract principles of 
togetherness, but toward the creation of concrete, interlocked, asymmetrical, and always partial 
graspings” (Stengers 2002: 248-249). To compose peace is to compose togetherness-in-
difference, to assemble a collective that holds, not in spite, but because of its differences in a way 
that broadens the affective range of collective experience. 
Encounters with alterity are opportunities for surpassing established subject positions. 
The adventurous character of peace – its broadening of feeling – comes about through this 
encounter with alterity, where self and other cease to be what they were by bringing a novel 
event of relation into existence. Whitehead writes:  
Peace is a broadening of feeling due to the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight, 
unverbalized and yet momentous in its coordination of values. Its first removal is the 
stress of acquisitive feeling arising from the soul’s preoccupation with itself. Peace 
carries with it a surpassing of personality.… Peace is the removal of inhibition and not its 
introduction. It results in a wider sweep of conscious interest. It enlarges the field of 
attention. Thus Peace is self-control at its widest, at the width where the ‘self’ has been 
lost, and interest has been transferred to coordinations wider than personality.… Peace is 
the barrier against narrowness. (Whitehead 1967: 285) 
By broadening feeling to encompass the play of differences that engender an ecology, peace re-
coordinates the values governing the production of subjectivity, resulting in a jouissance of 
collective resubjectification that recasts the world’s quantum of potential for cohabitation.  
Two scenes in Uncle Boonmee are particularly illustrative of how Apichatpong uses 
ecosophic aesthetics to visualize the processual emergence of such a therapeutic peace. The first 
alters its range of perceptibility—and feeling—to visualize various degrees of alterity under one 
ecologically sensitive image. It clears the way for one of the film’s concluding scenes, which 
enacts peace’s overcoming of reified personality through the aesthetic creation of an event that 
shocks the coordinates of selfhood; coordinates that had started to loosen as soon this alterious 
collective from the first scene came into existence. Apichatpong’s aesthetic composition with the 
imperceptible makes return a repressed ethico-political force that reconditions the ontological 





Encountering Alterity, Broadening Feeling 
The first exemplary scene depicts the film's protagonist, Uncle Boonmee (Thanapat 
Saisaymar), an ill plantation owner, his sister-in-law Jen (Jenjira Pongpas), and his nephew Tong 
(Sakda Kaewbuadee) calmly eating dinner inside of a windowless veranda. Then, out of 
nowhere, a ghost materializes. It turns out to be Huay (Natthakarn Aphaiwonk), Boonmee's 
deceased wife. Overcoming their initial surprise, the three characters speak with her about 
Boonmee’s illness and impending death, until they are joined by an even more surprising guest. 
This time it's (what the subtitles refer to as) a “monkey-ghost” with bright red eyes, covered 
head-to-toe in thick black hair. The monkey-ghost claims to be Boonsong (Geerasak Kulhong), 
Boonmee and Huay's long-lost son who went missing after taking a trip into the jungle many 
years ago. 
This scene, like the entire film, is entirely devoid of point of view shots. In their absence, 
the various depersonalized forces active within the ecology of the film world come to guide the 
logic of the relationship between shots, constituting an ecosophic découpage (and corresponding 
editing structure).lxxxi There is action to propel the scene’s formal organization, yet this action is 
as driven by memories, ghosts, far-off sounds and animals as it is by any human-centered drama. 
The logic of Apichatpong’s cut is irrational from the point of view of the human subject and can 
only be accounted for through a consideration of the unknown and the unseen that are made felt 
in the broader ecology. The scene’s découpage spatially situates the different characters within 
their broader environment and temporally situates them with regards to their past 
transformations. It opens with a long shot of a veranda, as seen from the surrounding jungle 
[Image 4.1]. The interior space marks the only source of light amidst the long shot of the dark 
rural area. The characters’ voices are heard in the distance. Cut to inside the veranda, the 
cinematography squarely lines up within its box-shaped architectural form [Image 4.2]. The 
camera moves in closer to compose medium shots of the three characters sitting at a table 
[Images 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6]. Then the film mounts a dark landscape shot with the veranda now 
completely out of frame, decentered in an unknown direction [Image 4.7]. The sound of an 
approaching storm rumbles across the soundtrack before the film cuts to an adjacent shot of 
bushes swaying and rustling. “What's that sound?” one of the characters asks, before a cut back 
inside, to the original medium shot of the table [Image 4.8]. The subsequent few shots show 
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Boonsong's entrance. On the axis of spatiality, the cutaway shots of the mountain, bushes, and 
neon bug-zappers break from human-centered schemas of scopic organization that coordinate the 
ecology according to an anthropocentric hierarchy of value. The localized, character-driven 
action is fragmented and repositioned by the active presence of the adjacent environment just 
outside the veranda. 
 













Images 4.7, 4.8 Uncle Boonmee Who Can Recall His Past Lives 
The scene also intensively channels Boonsong’s mental history, his recollection of the 
events that have brought him to where he is today and made him what he has become. When he 
recounts the story of his past transformations, the camera takes on a new fluidity, which is 
abruptly juxtaposed with the scene’s darkness and rigidity [Image 4.9]. Through a découpage 
equally sensitive to material and mental intensity, the past is made an ecological force. The film 
sees beyond the actuality of any given plane of temporality and instead renders visible their 
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mutual co-composition of the film world. The present is coloured with a splash of pastness, as 
Boonsong's recollection interjects into the dinner table gathering and its environmental surround. 
In beginning to recount his story, Boonsong says, “There are many beings outside right now… 
spirits and hungry animals, like me.” As a sensitive character in an equally sensitive film 
ecology, he can feel them, even if he can’t see them. Boonsong's story recalls how he 
transformed from an ordinary human photographer to a red-eyed monkey-ghost after he became 
obsessed with finding the strange creature that had once appeared in the background of one of his 
landscape photographs. The images of the past that accompany Boonsong's recollection appear 
as a shared collective heritage. There are no clichéd wipes or dissolves, only an abrupt cut from a 
shot behind the back of Jen's head to Boonsong's human form inside of a dark room for 
photography development [Image 4.10]. The cut is prompted by his narration of the story, words 
that all of the characters hear. These images are not psychologized, residing inside of Boonsong's 
head. These images, as much as they make up Boonsong’s experience and memory, are 
exteriorized and socialized – made a concrete part of the shared ecology (to the extent that they 
can even be affected by others in the scene). At one point in the recollection, Jen says “excuse 
me” and gets up from the table to go sit on a nearby bench. The recollection immediately stops 
and cuts back to the present [Images 4.11 and 4.12]. All of the characters at the table have access 
to the recollection and the ability to stop it, because the recollection doesn't belong solely to 
Boonsong, entrenched in an inaccessible past. It belongs to their shared ecology. Memories 








Images 4.11, 4.12 Uncle Boonmee Who Can Recall His Past Lives 
The ecosophic logic of the découpage described above diverges from découpage en plan 
américain (also called classical découpage), the logic of the relationship between shots that 
governs most classical Hollywood cinema.lxxxii Under the classical system, character-driven shot 
sequences advance a narrative that reproduces visual codes predicated on stock character 
behaviour, gaze, and movement. This shooting style is most often contrasted with découpage en 
profondeur (shooting in depth). In découpage en profondeur each plane of depth within the shot 
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is in equally sharp focus and part of what excited André Bazin about this artistic development 
was its ability to “embrace the totality of the event” (Bazin 1997: 103, translation modified). In 
the oft-cited Wellesian vein of découpage en profondeur, background planes of action 
complexify and enrich the story and allow for an expanded number of associations between 
elements in a single shot to be drawn by the spectator, all without recourse to montage. Uncle 
Boonmee is exemplary of découpage en profondeur, but with a key exception: it has no 
background in or out of focus. It has an “outside”, a blacked-out zone of metamorphosislxxxiii 
without concrete form that puts the foreground of character drama into contact with the 
indetermination of pure opacity.lxxxiv Ghosts (who used to be human) emerge from this zone of 
opacity where the jungle lies, and they come out into the light. They are made visible and their 
memories are depersonalized and made equally accessible to all, provoking a shift in the scene’s 
ontological consistency.  
Guattari’s Schizoanalytic Cartographies advances the theory that each assemblage of 
enunciation, or event, is composed of four ontological functors that together give the assemblage 
its ontological consistency. These functors include existential Territories (T), Fluxes of 
materiality (F), machinic Phyla of diagrammatic organization (Θ) and incorporeal Universes of 
value (U). In a passage from Guattari’s Diagrammatic Thought worth quoting at length, Janell 
Watson provides a very clear and useful summary of the functors that undergird the myriad 
cartographies of Guattari’s schizoanalytic thought experiments: 
Fluxes include physical matter and physical signals; these are subject to the 
coordinates of energetic quanta, space, and time. The abstract machinic Phyla 
comprise evolution; Guattari’s deterritorializing abstract machines; and 
blueprints, plans, diagrams, rules and regulation (in the cybernetic sense of 
control mechanisms). Existential Territories include subjective identity, the sense 
of self, and existential ‘apprehension.’ The incorporeal Universes of reference are 
made up of values, nondiscursive references, and virtual possibility; these ‘escape 
the energetic, legal, evolutionary, and existential coordinates of the three 
preceding domains.’ (Watson 2009: 99) 
Cinematographic images, like any other event of perception, are assemblages of enunciation 
produced through the co-composition of each of the four ontological functors. Firstly, images 
have a material basis in the Fluxes: signifying and asignifying visual and aural material made up 
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of colours, bodies, movements, landscapes, and text. These cinematic Fluxes function in the 
realm of sensuous perceptibility. The machinic Phyla can be read as the set of organizing 
principles at work in an image. Depending on the image, there could be many of these operating 
at once, in sync or in opposition to one another. Organizing principles can refer to generic and 
industrial standards, national cinema traditions, and intertextual references, in addition to the 
social norms and conventions that may be relayed through a film’s dissemination. Both Fluxes 
and Phyla lie on the side of the actual. Incorporeal Universes and existential Territories 
contribute to the image virtually. The Territories inform how characters within the filmic world 
are positioned, often through the granting or denying of scopic agency via point-of-view shots. 
Finally, Universes of value inflect the image’s horizon of references and the coordination of 
value, giving sense to character subjectivities (T), image intensities (F), and the governing 
structures of the film (Θ). Together, the four ontological functors co-compose the filmic 
reality.lxxxv  
For the sake of clarity, the ontological functors have been described separately, but they 
are never in fact separate. An assemblage of enunciation is dynamically composed out of the 
reality of the relation immanent to its functioning. In Guattari’s own words: “They will only be 
able to sustain their own configurations through the relations that they entertain with each other; 
they will be required to change state and status as a function of their overall Assemblage” 
(Guattari 2013: 27). In order live up to its name, a functor must indeed function – it must move. 
Starting from a movement in any one of these quadrants, an entire ecology can be reworked (for 
an ecology is fundamentally an assemblage of enunciation). Or rather, an entire ecology can’t 
help but be reworked by one of the functors’ very functioning, precisely because the functioning 
of a functor is simultaneously a relational movement between the four.lxxxvi 
Uncle Boonmee’s dinner table scene offers an idiosyncratic take on depth of field 
(nourished by the opacity of the outside) to invite consideration of its ontological depth. From 
this perspective, whole domains of desire imperceptible on the surface of the image are if not 
“brought to light” and rendered sensuously perceptible then at least brought nonsensuously to 
thought, in their opacity. Each of the four ontological functors is active in the cinematographic 
image, but only the Fluxes are sensuously perceptible. The domain of Fluxes is both actual and 
real, whereas the machinic Phyla, incorporeal Universes of value and existential Territories are 
all inflected by either the nonsensuous realms of the possible or the virtual.lxxxvii The aesthetic 
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strategy of this scene makes the ontological depth of Apichatpong's film world felt, without 
needing to visually represent all that is virtually active yet out of sight.lxxxviii The spontaneous 
arrival of alterity is certainly registered by the Fluxes, as the image alters its range of 
perceptibility in order to accommodate the bodies that emerge from the darkness of the jungle. 
Huay’s translucent ghost body is registered right next to Boonsong who is covered in pitch-black 
fur. This feat in découpage completely alters the semiotic arrangement (F) of the image in a 
manner that allows for diverse forms of life and modes of existence (ghosts, animals, 
disappeared peoples) to be convoked by the very same image. If this actual semiotic arrangement 
is an index of anything, it is an index of the virtual movements of the four ontological functors in 
the process of recomposition, and not an index of a pre-existing reality (the profilmic). With the 
collective emergence convoked, the abstract machine (Θ) governing the possibility of the event's 
actual development is different than it was before. The table that originally arranged the 
characters around it in the act of eating together has become a locus for the emergence of 
difference harboured by opacity. The real virtual domain of diegetic subjectivity (T) is also 
altered by the unlikely appearances of Huay and Boonsong – the group subjectivity shifts in 
composition, as two others fold into the scene. Through this mutual inclusion, notions of family, 
togetherness, and collectivity take on meanings that extend across species and the divide between 
life and death. In conjunction with all of this movement, which creates a new ontological 
consistency, Boonmee comes to regret his anti-communist violence and attributes his liver 
disease to the bad karma of these past actions. The family’s relational dynamics are renewed and 
they take on a new collective character, accommodating alterious forms of life and modes of 
existence along with memories and premonitions, and whole virtual universes of value that these 
degrees of difference bring into the scene. The renewal is so profound as to constitute a “group 
subject”, in that it becomes a group “that respects the heterogeneity of its component parts, and 
does not try to subsume them under an illusion of unity; that it is a group in process that explores 
and changes as conditions change, instead of hardening into a paralytic hierarchy of mutually 
exclusive terms with assigned value” (Massumi 1988: 440). Values (U), qualities of virtual 
possibility, are also modified in the recomposition of group subjectivity, because when 
Boonsong and Huay emerge from the jungle they carry a repressed set of political values and 
cultural memories with them. The jungle – a space of hiding, fleeing and taking cover for the 
communists liquidated by the military invasion of Isaan province – is here a point of emergence. 
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Boonsong and Huay are different when they come out of the jungle, having been transformed by 
the unrepresentable horrors that took place within it. Emerging and asserting the difference of 
one’s metamorphosis is an unrepresentable historical testimony that demands to be 
accommodated in the scene of presence. Shifting to accommodate the expressive presence of the 
repressed is a relational movement of the four ontological functors that alters the assemblage of 
enunciation, resingularizing the three ecologies. A small group’s subjective orientation shifts, 
making peace with the alterious re-emergence of remnants from an opaque past made virtually 
active and nonsensuously perceptible. The schizoanalytic cartography demands to be redrawn 
once more, to account for this broadening of feeling that we could call peace. 
 
 
Disappearing/Reappearing: Surpassing Personality 
Uncle Boonmee along with short films and installations from Apichatpong’s Primitive 
projectlxxxix extensively use images of male teenage youth from Nabua, a “town of widows”, that 
suffered immensely at the hands of the military occupation and communist purging.xc The choice 
of teenage boys is significant since they are the descendants of the disappeared men and are 
orphans of the town of widows. Their presence carries the legacy of their disappeared fathers and 
widowed mothers along with the story of their past struggles for communism. In another 
important scene that facilitates the peace process, Boonmee has a nightmarish “dream of the 
future” where “past people are made to disappear”. The scene uncannily invokes what Walter 
Benjamin has to say about the ephemerality of historical images: “Every image of the past that is 
not recognized by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably” 
(Benjamin 2007: 255). Uncle Boonmee shows how Benjamin’s observation is true yet 
incomplete. Yes, the present carries a selective function; selecting presence—or what Whitehead 
calls the actual occasionxci—out of the possibilities that a given process has made available to it. 
Yet what Uncle Boonmee adds to this account is that the present not only chooses which images 
to remember and forget based on its own concerns, but that the presence of an image, or a 
remembering, can doubly conceal a disappearance, an active forgetting. The forced 
disappearance of Isaan communists during the Thai military invasion is a prime example. As a 
people made to disappear, their image is charged with that very disappearance, to the extent that 
in order to maintain the status quo, such an image must be concealed and censored, even to the 
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point of the image’s (and not just the people’s) disappearance. The disappearance of the image of 
Isaan communists in Thailand cannot at all be accounted for based on the fact that the present 
does not see it as one of its own concerns. Conversely, the very fact of the communists’ 
disappearance, along with the disappearance of their image, can be attributed to them being a 
pressing concern to the current Thai political context. The present, so concerned that such an 
image could usher in a new ethico-political consistency that calls for making peace with this 
lingering past, restricts the conditions for its appearance. Maybe after long enough the present 
will no longer need to repress this image if the social landscape has changed to such a degree that 
its reappearance loses the power to shock subjectivity. In any case, Apichatpong's work is a high-
stakes wager on the chance that the reappearance of the disappeared, this making active of the 
past, can prompt ecological recomposition.xcii  
Boonmee’s “dream of the future” enacts this wager. On the eve of his death, Boonmee, 
the ghost of his ex-wife Huan, his sister-in-law Jen, and Tong (the same characters from the 
dinner table scene) make a pilgrimage to an enormous cave where Boonmee enters a divinatory 
reverie. The dream is conveyed through ten still photographs that disrupt the film’s live-action 
flow. Boonmee's voiceover monologue reads as follows: 
Boonmee: What's wrong with my eyes. They are open but I can't see a thing? Or 
are my eyes closed? 
Jen: Maybe you need time for your eyes to adjust to the dark. 
Boonmee: This cave is like a womb, isn't it? I was born here in a life I can't recall. 
I only know that I was born here. I don't know if I was a human or an animal, a 
woman or a man. 
[Dream sequence of ten still photographs begins] 
Boonmee: Last night, I dreamt of the future. I arrived there in a sort of time 
machine. The future city was ruled by an authority able to make anybody 
disappear. When they found ‘past people,’ they shone a light at them. That light 
projected images of them onto the screen. From the past, until the arrival in the 
future. Once those images appeared, these ‘past people’ disappeared. I was afraid 
of being captured by the authorities because I had many friends in this future. I 
ran away. But wherever I ran, they still found me. They asked me if I knew this 
road. I told them I didn't know. And then I disappeared.  
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The monologue is interlaced with ten still photos which can be briefly described as follows: 
Photo one: In a straw coloured open field, a person in an ape suit with a rope tied around 
its neck is led by a young man in paramilitary attire. [Image 4.13] 
 
Photo two: A medium close-up shot of three young soldiers laying on the grass. The 





Photo three: An eaten away tree leaf takes on the texture of the camouflage pattern and 
hangs in-between the faces of three young soldiers and the chest of another. [Image 4.15] 
 
Photo four: Again, two soldiers lying on the ground amidst the bushes with the rifles 
resting beside them. They camouflage into their green and brown surroundings. [Image 4.16] 
 
Photo five: A large group of military men dispersed throughout a field similar to the one 





Photo six: Medium straight-on shot of the ape figure roped up by the neck, held by the 




Photo seven: The same young men, now dressed in civilian attire, throw stones out of 
frame to the right. Is the ape figure the target? [Image 4.19] 
 
Photo eight: The ape figure with his arms around a group of six armed soldiers, looking 




Photo nine: Five of the young men take a photo of a shirtless sixth laying out on the 
ground. Is he dead or alive? [Image 4.21] 
 
Photo ten: Crop circles on a dirt path. [Image 4.22] 
 
The phrasing of Boonmee’s voiceover suggests that he is the ape figure – possibly a man 
inside of an ape suit – who arrives in the future “wearing” a different body. However, this is 
merely one possible interpretation. He could very well be one of the soldiers, one of the civilians, 
the group as a whole, or even the photographer of the images. There is a real uncertainty as to 
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where to locate him in his own dream, which fits in completely with the ecosophic logic of the 
dinner table scene's découpage. Boonmee’s dream is not really his dream at all. The sunny 
photographs of the dream rip through the slowly paced and opacity filled images of the present in 
a manner that parallels Boonsong’s earlier recollection. The dream is not localized within 
Boonmee’s psyche, cordoned off from the world. It surpasses Boonmee’s personality, enters into 
the shared ecology. Boonmee is not even identifiable in “his own” dream; he can barely 
recognize himself in it. It makes little difference whether Boonmee is in fact the ape, the soldiers, 
or the photographer taking the pictures of these characters – Boonmee cannot find himself in the 
future. The impossibility of being identified in a dream of one’s “own” future proves unbearable 
to one’s self.  
Boonmee sees the future as a time where a pervasive conflict plays out between the 
people of the future and the people of the past. Even if it remains undetermined exactly where he 
figures in the dream, or what body he identifies with, he is nevertheless there, as are Jen, Tong 
and Huay. They are enmeshed in a future where they do not have a defined place, and yet they 
are implicated in its inter-generational and inter-species violence. The prospect of living in a 
future completely incompatible with one’s notion of both “self” and “future” instigates a 
reappraisal of them both. The future becomes a site in dire need of reconfiguration along the 
lines of a new ontological consistency of peace, to make room for the appearance of the self. Yet 
the very notion of self will need to become other than it presently is to fabricate the future 
condition for its own habitability. For it is largely humankind’s unyielding will to dominate 
difference that led to the prospect of a future where alterity is suffocated to begin with (in other 
words, a future not so different from the past). Boonmee and his companions are caught in a 
double bind: cease to exist or exist amidst the uninhabitable. Making this realization shocks their 
subjectivity (T). Having shaken the existential territory of the self, the future needs to be re-
speculated, accounting for this quality of functional alterity that has rendered the ecology slightly 
more accommodating and less self-assured.  
Now that Boonmee's sense of self has been rattled by the shock of the dream, new 
possibilities for the organization of ontological consistency have been ushered in. Peace is given 
a chance. Here, in Apichatpong’s cinema, the sons of the “town of widows”, marginalized and 
invisible in the Thai political landscape, claim a presence that defies their historical 
disappearance. Diegetically, Boonmee is shocked and this visual confrontation forces him to 
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reassess his very sense of self on the eve of his death. He can no longer rationalize and justify the 
actions of his past (which included purging the communists of Isaan), now that he sees a future 
in which his fate could be as arduous as theirs. Uncle Boonmee has made the absent present and 
the ontological consistency of the film’s images has broadened feeling to accommodate the 
disappeared, in all of their alterity. Apichatpong uses aesthetic experimentation to more fully 
perceive the movement of the ecology in order to make peace with those whose existence has 
been denied, whose way of life has been extinguished and whose values have been denigrated. 
Uncle Boonmee has listened to the disappeared – those who were killed and whose memory has 
been excluded from official nationalist discourse – and has given them presence by expanding its 
range of perceptibility. The speculative risk of the film, which brings back the disappeared in 
defiance of the powers-that-be, is that such a modulation on the plane of the image, a modulation 
that brings the disappeared to perceptibility and enunciation can, when seeded in the world and 
into the Thai mediascape, provoke a similar type of modulation. Putting the ontological functors 
immanent to the film image in touch with the functors of the world in which the film lives and 
circulates: the force of art in life. As such, Uncle Boonmee carries the potential to broaden 
feeling towards an ethico-political paradigm of peace that surpasses personality yet respects the 
right to singularity, and thus cares for the alterious contrasts of the world, even the ones which 




Healing and Decolonization 
 
“I make films to heal my people.” –Kanakan Balintagosxciii 
 
The Soul of Fourth Cinema 
 In a 2002 lecture given at the Auckland University Film and Media Studies department, 
Maori filmmaker Barry Barclay announced the arrival of Fourth Cinema, a feature-length cinema 
made by and for Indigenous peoples. At that point in time, eleven Indigenous features had been 
released worldwide.xciv The canon of Fourth Cinema has now grown and diversified since its 
relatively recent emergence. When Barclay first spoke of Fourth Cinema, he identified a couple 
of organizational principles that brought together geographically, culturally and stylistically 
diverse films. He inferred that Fourth Cinema attested to Indigenous presence and existed outside 
the national orthodoxy of colonial nation-states. For Barclay, Fourth Cinema at its strongest 
fundamentally embodies core Indigenous values—values that often clash with those of the 
colonizer. As he states in his now-seminal lecture,  
If we as Maori look closely enough and through the right pair of spectacles, we will find 
examples at every turn of how the old principles have been reworked to give vitality and 
richness to the way we conceive, develop, manufacture and present our films.... It seems 
likely to me that some Indigenous film artists will be interested in shaping films that sit 
with confidence within the First, Second and Third cinema framework. While not closing 
the door on that option, others may seek to rework the ancient core values to shape a 
growing Indigenous cinema outside the national orthodoxy. (Barclay 2003b: 11) 
In order for a film directed by an Indigenous filmmaker to truly embody the spirit of Fourth 
cinema as Barclay conceives it, the film must revitalize the ancient core values of his or her 
Indigenous culture, values which exist outside, and even challenge, the national orthodoxy of the 
nation-state in which the film was made, distinguishing it from the First, Second and Third 
“invader cinemas,” as Barclay refers to them. 
More so than blood, language, identity or geography, Indigenous values are the essential 
characteristic of Fourth Cinema. They form what Barclay, following Maori scholar Rangihiroa 
Panoho, refers to as the “interiority” of a Fourth text. Barclay identifies numerous core values at 
213 
 
the heart of the very influential Maori feature filmmaking tradition that helped to initiate today’s 
global renaissance of Indigenous cinema. The values include: “whanaungatanga” (family, 
kinship, relationship; rights and obligations that strengthen the ties of a kin group), “wairua” 
(soul or spirit), “mana” (pride, power, effectiveness, prestige; a supernatural force in a person, 
place or object) and “aroha” (to love, feel compassion or pity, to emphasize).xcv As much as the 
previous definitions evoke the meaning of these core Maori values, they are inherently 
incomplete because Indigenous values are lived, shared and embodied, and thus stretch far 
beyond the limits inherent to a linguistic definition. By thinking of values not as abstract ideals 
but as collectively lived, and thus as having concrete effects in the world, the political import of 
Fourth Cinema starts to appear. As was analyzed in the previous chapter on the ontological 
quadrants of schizoanalysis, values condition what is possible in a given event; therefore films 
that embody different values will effectuate diverging effects. 
This counter-power to condition an event of subjectivity production has been invested in 
Indigenous practices of storytelling. In her book, Dancing on Our Turtle's Back: Stories of 
Nishnaabeg Re-Creation, Resurgence and a New Emergence, Leanne Simpson (Michi Saagiig 
Nishnaabeg) shares Nishnaabeg creation stories with the reader to transmit traditional values 
such as “gentleness, re-balancing and love” that the stories—like the Elders who kept them 
alive—embody (Simpson 2011: 19 & 74). The embodiment of values also plays a foremost role 
in Taiaiake Alfred's (Kanien’kehaka) influential writings on Indigenous liberation. Alfred's 
Peace, Power and Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto advances with clarity and force the 
idea that contemporary and future Native political leaders must come to embody traditional 
Onkwehonwexcvi values to radically change the relationship that First Nations have with the 
colonial nation-states that legislate over them. For Alfred, traditional Indigenous values carry a 
resurgent, decolonizing force capable of reconfiguring the social reality of Onkwehonwe that is 
currently dictated in so many ways by neocolonialism’s coercive powers of state and “free 
market.” Alfred understands Indigenous values as the “the heart and soul of indigenous nations: 
a set of values that challenge the destructive and homogenizing force of Western liberalism and 
free-market capitalism; that honour the autonomy of individual conscience, non-coercive 
authority, and the deep interconnection between human beings and the other elements of 
creation” (Alfred 1999: 60). In order to activate their transformative power, values must be 
embodied, they must be made the “heart and soul” of the Indigenous nation. Once embodied, 
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they affirmatively challenge neocolonialism, not in the sense of being its negation or 
deconstruction, but in actively creating the conditions for an Indigenous resurgence on its own 
terms, collectively informed by traditional values operating at the core of Indigenous social and 
ecological life.  
 By emphasizing the role of values in Fourth Cinema, Barclay shifts the lens through 
which Fourth Cinema must be viewed to perceive the soul stirring beneath its plastic 
composition. After all, core values belong to what Barclay calls the film’s “interior,” and the 
burnished surface of a film’s “exterior” can be quite deceiving. The popular New Zealand film 
Whale Rider (2003) is a good example, and Barclay takes issue with this film in an open letter to 
its producer John Barnett. Whale Rider is based on a story “unique to the descendants of the tribe 
Ngati Porou whose lands are centered on the East Coast of the North Island of Aotearoa, (New 
Zealand) and was written by Maori author Witi Ihimaera.” However, the film was adapted for the 
screen, directed, and produced without the involvement of Maori, by an all-white team (Barclay 
2003: 33). In his open letter, Barclay condemns Barnett’s public justification for appropriating 
the Maori story. Barnett claimed that the film’s themes are “absolutely international” and that 
white New Zealanders have the right to use the story in the name of overcoming what Barnett—
offensively—calls “cultural apartheid” (Barclay 2003: 33). The film reaped big profits for 
Barnett, and launched the successful career of director Niki Caro who has gone on to direct feel-
good Hollywood films about other minority groups,xcvii all while sidelining the production of 
Maori films at the New Zealand Film Commission, where, as Barclay points out, an entire 
decade passed without one Indigenous film being produced by the commission (Barclay 2003: 
36). All of these problems characterize the production and exhibition of Whale Rider, despite the 
fact that on the representational level alone, the film could very well be mistaken for an 
authentically Maori film. 
 Whale Rider is based on a traditional Maori story about a young girl who challenges the 
patriarchal orthodoxy within her tribe to emerge as the new leader of her people. The film is 
populated with images of Maori, and Maori actors are cast to play the lead characters of the film. 
The film's representation of Maori people is largely positive: they are dynamic, fleshed-out 
human characters and the Maori community functions as a source of inspiration for audiences. 
The film even positions the Maori as a people that international, non-Indigenous audiences can 
both applaud and learn from, because the film celebrates gender equality in positions of political 
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leadership. Whale Rider looks like a work of Fourth Cinema, but closer investigation reveals that 
its values, at best, are emblematic of liberal feminism (in its pro-gender equality message), and at 
worst, are emblematic of neocolonial cultural appropriation keen at turning a hefty profit for a 
layer of cultural elite. Whale Rider looks Maori, but has a colonial soul.  
 Anticipating the continued cultural appropriation of Indigenous images, Barclay was 
careful to insist on the presence of Indigenous values  for a film to be considered as constitutive 
of Fourth Cinema. He says quite clearly that Fourth Cinema consists of something more than an 
Indigenous “exteriority.” By “exteriority” Barclay is referring to surface-level, plastic elements 
of the image, such as its “language, posturing, décor, use of elders, presence of children, attitudes 
to land, and rituals of a spirit world” (Barclay 2003b: 7). He goes on to assert his belief “that in 
Fourth Cinema―at its best―something else is being asserted which is not easy to access” 
(Barclay 2003b: 7). The “something else” is the “interiority,” the embodiment of Indigenous 
values, and Barclay himself is reluctant to say exactly how to tell if these “interior” values are 
present. As he admits, they're not easy to access. Reaching the “heart and soul” of a film requires 
more than analyzing what it represents, but encountering the values that justify its creation. If a 
film is indeed found to embody Indigenous values, and not just represent Indigenous people or 
narrate Indigenous stories, then it is going to function very differently than a film like Whale 
Rider, even if it looks quite similar. Armed with Indigenous values at its core, Fourth Cinema 
texts enable therapeutic subjective recompositions that facilitate healing from and resurging 
against the weighty legacy of colonialism and its continued aggressions.  
 
Decolonization and Healing 
 In the recent efforts to theorize strategies of decolonization, especially in Canada, for 
reasons I will explain, Indigenous political activism is regularly framed by the concept of 
“healing.” This section of the chapter will present some of the various ways in which this 
concept has been elucidated in the discourse on decolonization produced by Indigenous 
academics, and will subsequently examine the complex stakes of healing for Indigenous nations. 
As we will see, healing can be made to function in two contradictory ways, one that forwards the 
decolonization movement’s focus on “resurgence” or cultural flourishing, and another that 
subjects Indigenous communities to the laws of the neocolonial market in contempt of their well-
being. Faced with this predicament, that healing can work to advance the project of global 
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decolonization or further entrench the neocolonial hold over Indigenous communities, Dian 
Million (Tanana Athabasca) insists that we consistently pose the question: “What kind of order 
does healing serve?” (2013: 144). The following analysis will first highlight healing’s conceptual 
significance to select Indigenous theorists, before moving to elucidate how healing also carries 
the latent risk of being coopted by neocolonial interests if not undertaken in line with traditional 
Indigenous values.  
 Healing is an important concept because it can be made to acknowledge the under-
recognized reality that Indigenous nations are the survivors of genocide,xcviii and connects this 
historical violence to the elevated rates of Indigenous suicide, depression, alcoholism and 
substance abuse worldwide.xcix A number of influential Indigenous authors on the topic of 
decolonial resurgence advance this two-pronged understanding of healing as both historical and 
medical to articulate how rebuilding strong Indigenous nations capable of redressing the 
countless effects of genocidal colonial policy necessarily entails restoring holistic wellness 
through mental, physical, emotional and spiritual renewal.  
One of these authors is Ann N. Dapice (Lenape-Cherokee), who turns to the medicine 
wheel and the holistic sense of health it diagrams to show how colonial violence has precipitated 
losses in each of the wheel’s quadrants: the mental, physical, emotional and spiritual realms. For 
example, she cites the loss of language and elders’ teachings (mental), the loss of identity 
(emotional), the loss of strong bodies (physical), and the loss of religious ceremonies (spiritual) 
as particularly damaging aspects of the colonial legacy (Dapice 2006: 256). Dapice offers tactics 
for healing from these losses that specifically address each of these four areas, a selection of 
which include elder-led experiential pedagogy (mental), culturally competent psychotherapy 
(emotional), outdoor exercise (physical), and ceremony participation (spiritual) (2006: 259). 
These remedies work to address concrete health problems as much as the historical injustices that 
continue to precipitate them. For instance, the revitalization of religious ceremony brings about 
spiritual healing while at the same time strengthening connections to the land and pre-colonial 
ancestry, making the practice an overtly political act that may disrupt both the colonial imaginary 
of terra nullius as well as neocolonial resource extraction interests. Furthermore, acting on the 
spiritual domain affects the three other domains of the medicine wheel. A ceremony can also be 
a time for the sharing of traditional food (physical), enacting land-based pedagogy (mental), and 
nurturing family relationships (emotional). To act on one of the four areas of health found in the 
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medicine wheel is to create an opening for acting on them all and thus for strengthening the 
resolve of Indigenous nations in their self-defence against continued neocolonial encroachment.   
 Taiaiake Alfred’s work builds on this connection between the medicine wheel’s four 
elements of health and overtly politicizes it by staging how it can further the decolonization 
movement. In an emblematic line that alludes to the holistic conception of Indigenous health, he 
rhetorically asks, “How can anyone confront the depressing, disintegrating reality of this world 
without the restorative strength of spirituality?” (2005: 250). Spirituality saturates his political 
writings and one of his books is even organized around the leitmotif of “wasáse,” an ancient war 
ritual known in English as the Thunder Dance. This specific dance calls Indigenous warriors to 
serve their nations by adopting the necessary customs and ethics. Alfred goes so far as to offer an 
entire checklist of qualities that a resurgent nation of warriors should put into practice, may of 
which put an emphasis on reclaiming health through temperance and moderation: “Simple 
lifestyles, disciplined surroundings, and a healthy existence characterized by cleanliness and 
organization are the traits of a warrior … as opposed to the slovenly and poisoned lives expected 
of colonized beings” (2005: 88). This celebration of health’s political dimension should not be 
lost. The Thunder Dance interpolates warriors, and offers them the restorative strength of 
spirituality, which in turn encourages the self-discipline necessary to live a healthy lifestyle, 
which subsequently makes Indigenous nations stronger and better able to contest neocolonial 
power. In this scholarship, healing works equally as a concept of subjective recomposition and 
political transformation whereby recovering from past trauma enables the conditions for 
resurging into a decolonized future with undeniable macropolitical consequences, such as land 
title transfers.  
 Thinkers such as Waziyatawin and Michael Yellow Bird in For Indigenous Minds Only 
contribute to the activist discourse on healing by foregrounding how the mental makeup of 
Indigenous peoples constitutes a battleground in the struggle for decolonization. Their work 
“reflects an understanding that decolonizing actions must begin in the mind, and that creative, 
consistent, decolonized thinking shapes and empowers the brain, which in turn provides a major 
prime for positive change.” Building yet again on the connectedness of the medicine wheel, they 
argue, “Undoing the effects of colonialism and working toward decolonization requires each of 
us to consciously consider to what degree we have been affected by not only the physical aspects 
of colonization, but also the psychological, mental and spiritual aspects” (2013: 2). In their 
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paradigm of decolonization, healing is a process of undoing belief systems that have been 
instilled by the colonial imagination, and replacing them with decolonial ways of thinking in line 
with traditional Indigenous values. According to their theorization, decolonizing actions capable 
of bringing about a more just relationship between Indigenous peoples and settler states are 
unfathomable without first healing the mind by unlearning the colonial thought patterns that have 
shaped it.  
One of the ways to overcome this “mental imperialism,” as Leanne Simpson refers to it, 
is through pedagogical storytelling. Simpson’s work consistently reactivates her nation’s 
ancestral stories, and the rich cultural heritage and traditional values that they embody, to 
promote the flourishing of Indigenous life. Her strategy for doing so can be read as equally 
therapeutic and political. Stories enact a healing function by immersing people in a collective 
heritage from which they have traditionally been alienated, offering the strength of community, 
belonging and cultural pride. At the same time, they implicitly dispute colonial myths, and 
reclaim the freedom of Indigenous peoples to narrate their past, present and future existence 
along the trajectory of their desired political resurgence.  
 Dance, storytelling, land-based pedagogy, language learning, traditional feasts, sweat 
lodges, sacred fires and drumming circles are some of the healing practices cited by grassroots 
Indigenous activist initiatives. The authors discussed above repeatedly emphasize how healing 
activities such as these advance the decolonization movement. To summarize, healing techniques 
prove themselves to be a vital component of decolonization strategies for a number of important 
reasons: They challenge colonial myths, strengthen the relational fabric within communities, 
increase the physical health of peoples who may find themselves in direct confrontation with 
colonial police and military, fortify title claims over contested land and help to bring a 
decolonized future into the Indigenous cultural imagination. Hence the political efficacy of 
healing, and why these healing techniques double as what could be called therapeutic activism. 
Yet in spite of what a word like “healing” connotes, healing in the age of neocolonialism is a 
double-edged sword that is burdened by the risk for political cooption with detrimental 
consequences for Indigenous nations. 
 The political ambivalence of healing is illustrated by the work of Glen Coulthard 
(Yellowknives Dene) and Dian Million who each offer a critique of “state bio-political programs 
for healing” which subtly abnegate Indigenous self-determination efforts (Million 2013: 6). Their 
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critiques focus on the specific relationship between First Nations and the Canadian government, 
since this official relationship has engendered a discourse and set of policy initiatives that 
embraces “healing” as a way to reconcile the history of abusive treatment towards First Nations, 
Métis and Inuit peoples.c In 1998, the Canadian government responded to the Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples (1996) with its policy document Gathering Strength: Canada’s 
Aboriginal Action Plan and the allocation of a $350 million dollar fund for healing from the 
abuses suffered in the residential school system. This allocation of moneys was used to establish 
the Aboriginal Healing Foundation (AHF), an organization that provided health services up until 
2014 when its programming was discontinued. The goal of the AHF was to “help create, 
reinforce and sustain conditions conducive to healing, reconciliation, and self-determination” and 
it “committed to addressing the legacy of abuse in all of its forms and manifestations, direct, 
indirect and intergenerational, by building on the strength and resilience of Aboriginal peoples.”ci  
According to Indigenous studies scholars Julian Robbins (Mi’kmaq) and Jonathan Dewar 
(Huron-Wendat), this “positive development” was remarkable for its willingness to flow 
government funds to an Indigenous-run arms-length organization, and marks “unprecedented 
support for community-based approaches to healing” (2011: 11). The healing initiatives that 
were funded by the program were truly grassroots in orientation, and bottom-up in structure, as 
each community was able to choose their own healing strategies. A glance through the AHF’s 
archived website shows that different nations chose to enact their healing through different 
techniques, geared towards their specific needs and traditions, often blending western, 
traditional, and alternative therapeutic methods.cii The healing enabled by the AHF is 
undoubtedly commendable, and has positively affected the lives of tens of thousands Indigenous 
peoples in Canada.ciii One AHF report even suggests that around 98% of abuse survivors who 
accessed its services had never before participated in a similar healing program (2013: 89). 
How could such grassroots healing possibly raise the suspicion of Indigenous scholars? 
The answer lies in how the Gathering Strength report frames “reconciliation” and “self-
determination.” Coulthard and Million raise three serious concerns. The first concern cited in 
Coulthard’s work is that the political discourse that gave rise to the AHF effectively denies the 
reality of the colonial present, and situates colonial wrongdoing as firmly in the past: “Gathering 
Strength begins with a ‘Statement of Reconciliation’ in which the Government of 
Canada recognizes ‘the mistakes and injustices of the past’ in order ‘to set a new course in its 
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policies for Aboriginal peoples.’ … The result,” he suggests, “is an approach to reconciliation 
that goes out of its way to fabricate a sharp divide between Canada’s unscrupulous ‘past’ and the 
unfortunate ‘legacy’ this past has produced for Indigenous people and communities in the 
present” (Coulthard 2014: 121).civ By situating colonial wrongdoing solely in the trauma of the 
past, the state is able to advance its settlement of Indigenous lands without acknowledging the 
hardship that such actions are causing in the present. Made to function in this light, “healing” can 
assist an ideological sleight of hand that distracts from the intensification of colonial control over 
Indigenous land and life.  
The second objection that Coulthard makes to Gathering Strength is that this strategic 
move to situate colonial wrongdoing in the past buoys the state’s rhetoric of reconciliation. 
Using the funds it has allocated for healing as an alibi, the colonial state clams the injustice to 
have been “reconciled” as a way to avoid true “restitution,”cv which would entail the transfer of 
significant portions of occupied lands back to Indigenous peoples. Coulthard sums up this 
position as follows: “Rather than affirm Aboriginal title and substantially redistribute lands and 
resources to Indigenous communities through a renewed treaty process, or recognize Indigenous 
autonomy and redistribute political authority from the state to Indigenous nations based on the 
principle of Indigenous self-determination, Gathering Strength essentially reiterates, more or less 
unmodified, its present policy position as evidence of the essentially just nature of the current 
relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state” (2014: 122).  
 The third major objection to colonial state sponsored healing programs, as expressed by 
Dian Million, is that they can be made to lend themselves to the free marketization of Indigenous 
nations. For Million, “Indigenous cultures may represent the only living models for different 
economic and social systems on the planet, ways of life that have the power to challenge capital 
cultures, even when they are not pure or untouched by capitalism” (Million 2013: 161). But 
having undergone government-sponsored healing, “reconstituted, ‘self determining’ Aboriginal 
nations are envisioned in part as a form that might be prepped to compete in the marketplace” 
(Million 2013: 133). Her critique aptly questions the government’s supposed goodwill in 
supporting healing programs, and demonstrates how they can actually be made to serve the 
interests of colonial capital. “Healing,” for the neocolonial state, is a financial investment in 
human development that seeks to make “self determining”cvi communities seeking government 
recognition more easily incorporated into a resource development economy and hierarchical 
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colonial governance structure that really only benefits colonial interests and inherently 
contradicts Indigenous ways of valuing land and labour. 
Yet in spite of attempts to render healing in the service of the neocolonial project, Million 
still insists that “colonized communities actively perform healing as liberatory practices” 
(Million 2013: 155). Parsing out the difference between a resurgent, decolonizing healing and 
reconciliatory, neocolonial healing is no easy task because these competing political interests 
overlap over the very same healing practices. A decolonizing act of community resurgence 
through a healing ceremony may very well be funded by the state seeing to advance its own 
colonial objectives, and this contradiction is very difficult to escape. But nor would it necessarily 
be a beneficial strategy to try and resolve this contradiction outright. If there is to be any criteria 
for whether or not healing can constitute a decolonizing act, I propose that it is useful to 
transpose the criteria that Barclay uses to define Fourth Cinema. For Barclay, above all else, it is 
the presence of traditional Indigenous values that determine whether or not a film is indeed 
“Indigenous” and whether it will challenge colonial orthodoxy. The same can be applied to 
healing: methods that are undertaken wholeheartedly in line with traditional Indigenous values 
will inherently function to heal in a manner that contests neocolonialist modes of valuation. The 
efficacy of healing, and what prevents its cooption, even when it must bear the contradiction of 
being funded by a colonial state with an antithetical political investment, lies in its unfurling of 
value systems that animate people and the many relationships which engender their lives, so that 
when these values brush up against colonial demands, they win out. 
 
Palawan Fate’s Core Values 
 This section turns to analyze a work of Fourth Cinema that not only represents healing 
practices, but actually seeks to heal by transmitting core Indigenous values and the modes of 
relationality that they engender. For director Kanakan Balintagos (also known as Auraeus Solito) 
who is cited in this chapter’s epigraph, filmmaking is a healing practice and he makes films for 
no less of a reason than to heal his people. For this reason, I engage with his film Busong 
(Palawan Fate) (2011) to articulate how Fourth Cinema can play a vital role in a decolonizing 
politics of resurgence that incorporates healing in accordance with traditional values. The reader 
will undoubtedly remark that the bulk of the analysis on healing above references Canadian, 
American and to a lesser extent, Australian colonial contexts, but that this film comes from the 
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island of Palawan in the Philippines. Furthermore, in contextualizing the film’s healing motifs, 
this section will offer examples from films that take place in very geographically diverse 
locations. I permit this potentially disorientating shift because it responds to Fourth Cinema’s—
like the Fourth World’scvii—geographic dispersal across the global North as much as the global 
South, and the East as much as the West. Certainly, the decolonization movement within every 
country must contend with a unique set of state institutions, legal frameworks and occupation 
strategies. However, there are many traumatic experiences that the world’s Indigenous peoples 
hold in common, especially when it comes to displacement from ancestral lands, and it is no 
coincidence that Indigenous cinema from around the world—a global constellation of Indigenous 
flourishing—is punctuated by images of healing, and images that aim to heal.   
 Growing up in the mainland Philippines, Auraeus Solito’s Palawan heritage was kept in 
the closet because of anti-Indigenous sentiment in Filipino society. In his young adult life, Solito 
began to investigate his family origins more deeply and discovered that he is the descendant of a 
long line of shaman-kings.cviii In an effort to discover these long repressed facts of his mother’s 
ancestry and become the Palawan he didn’t know he could be, Solito changed his name to 
Kanakan Balintagos and decided to make a film on the island of Palawan, with the Palawan 
people. The result is Palawan Fate, the first Indigenous Palawan feature film ever made. 
 The island of Palawan is considered the “last frontier” of the Philippines and has attracted 
many resource developers interested in Palawan lumber, minerals, and especially pearls (Eder 
85). The contemporary tribal peoples of Palawan have lived as the ancient stewards of the trees, 
water and mountains since time immemorial, in harmony with the natural surroundings. The 
traditional Palawan way of life is highly imbricated with the richness of the land and Palawan 
regularly live off the wild food that grows, and that they grow, on the island. These staples 
include rice, coconuts, local fruits and to a lesser extent, various sorts of fish and game 
(Macdonald 2007: 46). Since the Palawan way of life is so directly imbricated in the vitality of 
the ecological surrounds, Palawan livelihood is in constant threat from the expansion of 
industrial powers onto the island whose impacts are registered directly in the environment. The 
intimate relationship between the Palawan and their land has come under increasing duress over 
the past 115 years with the number of inhabitants on Palawan island increasing 25-fold between 
1900 and 1980 due to lowland migration (Eder 87). This influx of non-Palawan to the island has 
resulted in wage labour becoming the increasingly dominant mode of survival, and Palawan 
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peoples are frequently employed to work for lowland farmers. The result is what anthropologist 
of the Palawan James Eder calls a “subsistence economy consisting of a desultory combination 
of hunting and gathering, shifting cultivation, collection and sale of forest products, and wage 
labour, all underwritten by a heavy reliance on credit and clientage” (Eder 1989: 88). The 
intensification of neocolonialist presence on the island of Palawan also continues to have a 
severe impact on tribal culture, including its ritual healing practices. In reference to the Batak 
tribe, Eder explains that “the incorporation of the Batak of Palawan into wider social and 
economic systems has eroded traditional ritual life, particularly shamanistic curing ceremonies” 
(1989: 81) and that “such processes of ‘deculturation’ and ‘detribalization’ can be destructive of 
the welfare of contemporary tribal people,” (1989: 82) including the non-Batak tribes of 
Palawan. 
 Kanakan Balintagos inserts himself into the midst of these ecologically destructive 
developments on the island (for the Palawan, the land and the people are completely 
inextricable), to fulfill the dual role of shaman-king and storyteller that had been long denied to 
him due to separation from his people. In his director’s statement accompanying the film, 
Balintagos draws an evocative connection between the storytelling tradition of the Palawan 
people and his independent filmmaking practice.  
My mother told me stories about her hometown in South Palawan to put me to sleep 
when I was a child. She used to tell me that the Tultol, or epic chants that were sung from 
twilight till dawn, were her ‘movies.’ She would imagine each myth in her mind and wait 
each night for another myth to be retold. Perhaps now, as a modern filmmaker with an 
ancient lineage, it is my turn to retell these stories and visualize them through film. 
(Solito 2011: n.p.) 
Taking his turn at retelling these stories, Solito crafts a film that embodies traditional Palawan 
values and revitalizes ancient Palawan stories as a way to confront the resource development 
projects destroying the island’s environmental, social, and psychic ecologies, long expertly 
maintained by its Indigenous inhabitants. 
 In keeping with Barclay’s Fourth Cinema criteria, two traditional Palawan values guide 
the film’s narrative structure and aesthetic composition: “busong,” the Palawan concept of 
instant karma or fate, which serves as the film’s original language title, and “ingasiq,” a term that 
translates roughly as “giving disposition, empathy, sympathy, compassion, and pity, which infers 
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a sharing of one’s resources … an expression of solidarity” (Macdonald 2011: 135). Through an 
investigation of how these two values are narratively and aesthetically articulated in Palawan 
Fate, Barry Barclay’s notion of “interiority”—the inherently Indigenous quality of Fourth 
Cinema—starts to come to perceptibility, because the film form emerges organically from 
ancient Palawan values, so that the “soul” of the film and its aesthetic expression are consistent 
with one another.  
Palawan Fate focuses on the title characters of the Palawan epic “Punay and 
Angkadang”: Punay, a woman who is covered in skin lesions so painful that she is unable to 
walk, and her brother Angkadang, who wraps her body in a hammock and carries her around the 
island in search of a shaman who can heal her wounds. The film opens with the call of the sap-od 
bird whose squawk warns of the sadness that saturates the three Palawan landscapes (forest, 
mountain and sea) that Punay and Angkadang move through in their search for healing. The film 
foregrounds major resource development projects currently taking place in each of these locales 
that are detrimental to Palawan livelihood: illegal logging (forest), mining (mountain), and 
dynamite fishing and pearl hunting (sea). The film’s serial narrative structure puts the 
protagonists into contact with three consecutive strangers who help them locate a shaman 
capable of healing Punay’s wounds.  
 The serial narrative emerges immanently from the influential presence of “ingasiq” in 
Palawan life. Charles Macdonald, in his anthropological work on the Palawan, points out that 
“ingasiq” gives life to a mode of relationality predicated on “weak ties.” cix A weak tie “is not 
only a tie that is not strong (and thus disposable); it is a tie that is always available (or, rather, 
reusable). It is a transferable tie. Weak ties may be a fundamental characteristic of human 
gregariousness” (Macdonald 2011: 128). In all of their gregariousness and transferability, “weak 
ties” break from the sense of duty encompassing “strong ties,” wherein the burden of care in 
times of healing is distributed according to familial and professional duty. Weak ties are not 
about duty or “being committed,” since “to be committed is completely alien to the Palawan 
ethos. This is why Palawan people cannot really commit themselves to any program, leader, or 
cause, a situation that baffles indigenous rights activists” (Macdonald 2011:138). “Ingasiq” 
conditions Palawan society in such a way that there is a collective appetite for care that extends 
beyond familial or professional duties (or even the duties embedded in dominant structures of 
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Indigenous rights activism), so that care, which may very well be expressed through traditional 
healing, is available to anyone in the ecology, simply by virtue of being a part of it.  
 The mode of relationality catalyzed by the value of “ingasiq” intersects with the workings 
of “busong.” As both a value and cosmological law, “busong” functions to immediately manifest 
the karmic consequences of actions. As Punay and Angkadang encounter the helpful strangers, 
each one of them recounts a tale, told in flashbacks, that shows the mystical force of “busong’s” 
fatal retribution. Cutting the sacred Amugis tree leaves one character’s husband dead, and 
privatizing a Palawan beach causes an Australian businessman to step on a poisonous stonefish. 
Yet in one of the film’s most politically potent and aesthetically daring scenes, “busong” is 
constructed as more than a retributive karmic force, punishing wrongdoers. It takes on a 
distributive force that makes acts of healing felt across the fields of relation that compose the 
ecology. 
The film concludes with a climactic scene of traditional healing. By this point in the 
story, Punay and Angkadang have encountered a character named Aris. He is a mixed-race 
Palawan who has just abandoned his shamanistic training. Aris is upset with himself for failing 
his apprenticeship and the film recounts his failed attempts to heal a young child who ultimately 
dies. In spite his supposed inadequacy, the sound of the sap-od bird leads Punay to believe that 
Aris could be the healer that she needs. Then, Aris enacts a healing ceremony in a concluding 
scene that intensifies the mystical moments of “busong.” The first part of the traditional healing 





Images 5.1, 5.2 Palawan Fate 
  
The film aesthetics shift dramatically here to signal that the healing ritual is opening up onto a 
supernatural realm. Aurally, disembodied voices accompany fast-paced tribal music that have no 
on-screen source. The image’s colour scheme shifts as the intensity of the ceremony rises, and 
the island becomes a shade of grey. A triangle mask abruptly appears over the image. The 
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intensity of the ceremony continues to rise, past its breaking point, and as the fast-paced music 
gives way, the film abruptly cuts to a calming, tender shot of Punay in front of a waterfall—a 
shot with no aesthetic resemblance to the former [Image 5.3]. In a long take that moves the film 
into a mytho-poetic register infused with magic, and breaking completely from the struggles of 
the Palawan reality under neocolonialism, Angkadang delicately moves his hand over Punay’s 
face, removing the fleshy lesions and turning them into butterflies [Images 5.4 & 5.5]. In 
reaching out to one another in gestures of mutual care reflective of “ingasiq,” the Palawan of 
Palawan Fate meet their “busong,” in an event of healing feeling so intense that it literally 
transcends the coordinates of the known reality. In a full embrace of the mystical, the film 
astonishingly concludes on the plane of a truly decolonized future governed by ancient core 
Palawan values and healed from the scars left by the ongoing history of colonialism. 
 
Mystic Healing in a Time of War 
 It is through this recourse to mysticism that Palawan Fate’s images of healing become 
healing images in their own right. This final section of the chapter examines Fourth Cinema’s 
healing potential. By invoking Henri Bergson’s little-used concept of mystic intuition, I suggest 
that Fourth Cinema should be regarded as a healing art that contributes to the decolonization 
movement’s resurgent flourishing of Indigenous life, and acts as a tool for resisting healing’s 
Image 5.3 Palawan Fate 
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cooptation into a neocolonial politics of recognition and reconciliation. Fourth Cinema can be 
thought of in this healing light because its mystic quality incarnates traditional values, making 
them felt as an affective force that prompts subjective recomposition in the grasping for a 
decolonized future. By catalyzing subjective recompositions in line with core Indigenous values, 
values that brush up against those propagated by colonial-capitalism, Fourth Cinema has a key 
Images 5.4, 5.5 Palawan Fate 
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role to play in the conflict between these two inherently contradictory value systems and the 
politics they engender. 
 As a way to express the deep antagonism of this conflict and burst any fantasies about the 
colonial state’s benevolence in a “post-reconciliation” era, Taiaiake Alfred has declared, “the 
war is not over yet” (Alfred 1999: xv).cx Why this recourse to war, especially a war that cleaves 
along more-or-less ethnic lines, in the era of multiculturalism? There comes a moment when one 
community’s flourishing is impinged upon by a predatory colonizing community and to consider 
this sort of offence as anything less than an act of war and outright hostility, even if it comes 
couched in ideologies of multiculturalism or “Aboriginalism,”cxi would be to fall prey to the 
mystifying traits of Eurocentric ideology that Robert Stam and Ella Shohat point out in their 
seminal book on the topic.cxii Some value-systems are so utterly incompatible that to invoke 
“peaceful coexistence” in their moments of conflict is tantamount to espousing the extinction of 
one of the parties, the one with the more fragile value-system under attack. In the midst of a war 
that doubles as a what Guattari calls a “war of subjectivity,” the therapeutically political import 
of Fourth Cinema lies in the fact that films subject—they subject along the lines of the values 
immanent to them; values that defy neocolonial norms and expectations. 
One of the most important attempts at theorizing the cinema’s production of subjectivity 
appears in Cinema 2’s passages on fabulation. Fabulation is a term originally mobilized by Henri 
Bergson, and later taken up in an overtly political usage by Gilles Deleuze to theorize the 
creative force of fiction that convokes “a people to come” (in political cinemas responding to a 
colonial relationship).cxiii  Writing on filmmakers such as Ousmane Sembene, Pierre Perrault and 
Glauber Rocha, Deleuze uses the concept of fabulation to account for individual speech-acts 
(legending, “storytelling”) that cross the boundary separating private business from politics in 
the production of collective utterances that call forth “the lines of potential collective 
development that are immanent within the present [psycho]social field” (Bogue 2007: 98, my 
modification). Deleuze’s focus on the fabulatory speech-act as an immediately collective 
utterance productive of a revolutionary people to come has proven particularly useful for 
analyzing political cinemas of orality. It may even seem like a well-suited theory for 
conceptualizing the healing force of Fourth Cinema, given that it grows out of the world’s most 
ancient oral traditions. Yet in dwelling on this final, wordless scene of Palawan Fate, and 
thinking about the most visceral moments that punctuate the Fourth Cinema canon, there seems 
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to be “something else,” to paraphrase Barclay, at work in its method of fabulatory 
subjectification beyond the oral tradition.  
 Many of Fourth Cinema’s most poignant moments are literally speechless scenes filled 
with mystical healing. These are the moments of another—decolonized—world being birthed out 
of the present colonial reality. A brief gloss of the canon springs the following examples to mind: 
The childhood fantasies of a boy whose family overcomes its history of separation through 
magic in Taiaka Waititi’s Boy (2010) [Images 5.6, 5.7 & 5.8]; the brooding Maori statues, 
angered over being stolen from their people and trapped in a Berlin museum whose magnetism 
produces an international social movement, in Barry Barclay’s Te Rua (1991) [Image 5.9]; the 
concluding scene of Sterlin Harjo’s Barking Water (2009) when the elder protagonist must 
announce the death of her best friend to a family member, yet the death is too grave to be spoken 
of on film, so she silently kisses a baby on the top of the head [Images 5.10 & 5.11]; the non-
diegetic inserts in Sherman Alexie’s The Business of Fancydancing (2002) where poet 
protagonist Seymour Polatkin performs a shawl dance in front of a blacked out background, 
queering Native American culture and Native Americanizing Seattle’s gay culture in an act that 
fully embraces the contradictions of the two worlds that he straddles [Image 5.12]; and Samson 
& Delilah (Warwick Thornton, 2009), a feature length film almost entirely devoid of dialogue, 
where in a bout of gasoline induced hallucination, Samson’s girlfriend Delilah appears to him as 
an angel who, in an unexpected, decolonizing détournement of terra nullius, whisks him off to a 
wide-open, seemingly unpopulated, land of limitless possibility and mutual recovery [Image 5.13 




















                Image 5.4 Samson & Delilah 
These non-discursive moments, pulled from some of the most significant Indigenous 
feature films ever made, shows that the values constitutive of Fourth Cinema’s “interiority” 
come to expression, and convoke a people to come, in ways other than just the speech-act. 
Rather than orally convoking a new social condition, these moments excavate the affective 
tonality of a possible world through a technique that approximates what Bergson calls “mystic 
intuition.” For Bergson, the mystic’s intuition delves into a virgin plane of ecstatic experience 
never previously felt, which is then shared with humankind, interpolating it into that affective 
quality of rapture: “William James used to say he had never experienced mystic states; but he 
added that if he heard them spoken of by a man who had experienced them ‘something within 
him echoed the call’” (Bergson 1935: 210). Great mystics, by making their experiences 
reverberate in the world “lift the soul to another plane,” (Bergson 1935: 182) and by uplifting the 
soul, an affective image is awakened that anticipates what is to come:  
When the darkest depths of the soul are stirred, what rises to the surface and attains 
consciousness takes on there, if it be intense enough, the form of an image or an emotion.  
The image is often pure hallucination, just as the emotion may be meaningless agitation. 
But they both may express the fact that the disturbance is a systematic readjustment with 
a view to equilibrium on a higher level: the image then becomes symbolic of what is 
about to happen, and the emotion is a concentration of the soul awaiting transformation. 
(Bergson 1935: 196) 
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If Fourth Cinema can be endowed with a healing capacity, and not merely be recognized as 
representing or narrating healing, it is precisely because its mystic intuition firmly holds onto 
core Indigenous values (assuring it has a soul) while at the same time speculatively entering into 
the affective plane of a decolonized world-to-come where these values have won out in the war 
of subjectivity and are granted the license to proliferate. By entering into this fabulatory, 
decolonized future, absorbing what it feels like, and bringing that feeling back to the colonial 
present, Fourth Cinema offers itself up as a healing presence to an Indigenous present bearing the 
wounds of systematic harm. According to Bergson, the method of the mystics consists in 
supposing possible what is actually impossible in a given society (1935: 63), and this is exactly 
what Fourth cinema does. Fourth Cinema’s mysticism, the non-discursive analogue of Deleuze’s 
fabulation, makes echo a decolonized way of feeling that beckons a response—a mode of 
subjectification that defies, and in defying, that attacks—the neocolonial appropriation of 
Indigenous health and resurgence. 
The mystic intuition of Fourth Cinema’s therapeutically speculative images explains, 
finally, why Barry Barclay had such a hard time putting his finger on his own invention, and 
identifying the “interiority” of Fourth Cinema as anything more than an ambiguous notion of 
ancient values. For inside of the ancient values transported to new generations, lands and peoples 
through cinema, there is an affective stirring—a mystic intuition—that eludes stable form, 
precisely because it does not yet know the collective future that it echoes forth. This mystic 
intuition which spills out from the Fourth Cinema’s interior—the seat of its core values, or 
soul— is at once an act of resurgent flourishing and act of political antagonism, an act of healing 
and act of war. Indigenous filmmakers are thus what we could come to call “therapeutic 
activists,” at once artists and storytellers, clinicians of a neocolonial wartime reality and 





Conclusion: For Therapeutic Activisms 
 
“The work of art, for those who use it, is an activity of unframing, a rupture of sense … 
which leads to a recreation and a reinvention of the subject itself” 
-Félix Guattari cxiv  
 
How is therapeutic activism? It remains to be developed, but by challenging the 
psychiatric consensus around depression’s etiology, symptomatology, and therapy, filmmakers 
like Apichatpong Weerasethakul, Kanakan Balintagos, Kelly Reichardt and Angela Schanelec 
create the intellectual conditions for its proliferation, and legitimize the sorts of grassroots 
practices that have historically grown in response to pandemics.  
In response to the cataclysmic events of the 1980s, Paula A. Treichler turned to visual 
culture and art to protest the hegemonic discourse of “scientists, physicians and public health 
authorities who argued repeatedly that AIDS represented ‘an epidemic of infectious disease and 
nothing more’” (1999: 1). Defying their authoritative consensus on the matter, she asserts, 
“AIDS is more than an epidemic disease, it is an epidemic of meanings” (1999: 1). Once the 
authority of the disease model was contested through recourse to visual culture, it became 
possible to reimagine the nature of the pandemic and initiate ways of acting in and on the crisis. 
In the 1980s-90s, HIV/AIDS activists seized the opportunity offered by the crisis in which they 
lived and loved to prompt a collective reimagining of modes of relationality and sexuality, 
particularly with regards to health and well-being. Much of the activism that arose utilized the 
media of the time, especially VHS tapes, but independently published magazines as well, to 
change the narrow set of meanings that network television and its policies of fear mongering 
stapled onto the pandemic. New images and perspectives that constructed the subjective 
cartography of life with HIV/AIDS in a much different light than either science or the 
mainstream media vacated a role for non-professional involvement.  
Acting therapeutically in the grips of the AIDS crisis came to imply a multiplicity of 
relational practices, such as collective quilting, gatherings and vigils to mourn the mounting 
deaths, caring for sick partners or friends, sharing knowledge about different treatment methods 
and their side effects, and promoting overall health in one’s community. These collective acts 
ultimately became as indispensible for well-being as going to the doctor or taking one’s 
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medication, in part because of their psychological benefits, but also because it was a way of 
breaking the silence, which as the slogan goes, equals death. Even when these collective 
practices were primarily catalyzed by concern for well-being, they undoubtedly doubled as 
activism, since they intervened in a crisis perpetuated by political negligence, and refused to let 
the brokers of power dictate the subjective coordinates of at-risk communities. Carrying on this 
tradition today, therapeutic activism ceases to relinquish subjectivity to power’s dominant 
modelizations, and works on the premise articulated by Erin Manning, that “it is impossible to 
abstract conditions of well-being from the relational field” (2016: 128). 
Working therapeutically on the relational field is exactly what the auteurs discussed in 
the preceding pages make possible, because their critical acts of perception have discovered the 
relational field to be the eventful site where melancholy is produced. Lit-cases of minor cinema 
such as these lend support to the growing wave of politicized mental health activism that, 
building on the tradition of HIV/AIDS activism, has begun to experiment with recomposing 
subjectivity without waiting for the sanction of medical authorities. A living example of this is 
Sheffield-based Designing Out Suicide, an open submission zine that holds workshops on suicide 
prevention. “The workshops that support the making of the zine are a means of peer support in a 
non-hierarchical environment,” says founder Lisa O’Hara. “It’s good to share experiences or just 
get together to talk with no experts present” (Bedei: n.p.). The zine is one of many activist-
oriented “DIY resources for self-care, support and intersectional debate” which include the Doll 
Hospital Journal, Black Women & Self Care: Thoughts on Mental Health, Oppression, and 
Healing, and Bad Therapy/Rad Therapy, among others.  
Grassroots initiatives to support mental health have also manifested a strong presence 
online. One particularly active online community is called the Bunz Mental Health Zone, a 
closed Facebook group with over four thousand members mostly based in the Toronto area. The 
group is a place where people ask for advice, share their experiences navigating the city’s mental 
health system and make friends who encourage their wellness efforts, usually by checking-in or 
organizing shared activities. It is also a regular occurrence for people on Bunz to announce their 
suicidal intentions, and for other members to offer support in the most urgent of moments by 
extending sympathy, compassion and shared presence. Whether it be a zine workshop or an 
online group devoted to suicide prevention, these platforms of relation carry the seeds for a more 
sustained and concerted therapeutic activism premised on the subjective contingency of the 
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encounter. In addition to working interpersonally by connecting individuals based on their 
mutual mental health needs, these platforms also work through the transindividual, by prompting 
spontaneous collective formations (whether in-person or online) based on a mutual concern for 
well-being which leave no parties unaffected. To respond to another’s call for help in a time of 
crisis is to encounter alterity and to move with some of the most ancient values known to 
humankind. Psyches and socius are bound to be affected, recomposed into novel, and perhaps 
therapeutic, assemblages. Contemporary cinema’s aesthetic mapping of melancholy justifies 
these sorts of activist praxes by affirming the therapeutic value of tending to the relational field’s 
conditions of subjectivity production. It’s minor cinemas of melancholy and therapy offer a 
perceptual optique, a symptomatology of civilization, through which these collective 
experiments can be seen as more than supplements to medical treatment, but the very basis of a 
radically relational and experimental therapeutics based on the ethos of schizoanalysis.  
The cinema’s relationship to the burgeoning therapeutic activisms-to-come is partially 
one of inspiring and legitimizing initiatives such as these. To conclude on an even more 
speculative note though, I would like to propose a line of inquiry for future research: that we take 
these filmmakers at their word, or at least extend to them a hypothetical sympathy,cxv when they 
espouse faith in the healing potential of cinema. When Kanakan Balintagos explains how he 
makes films to heal his people and Apichatpong Weerasethakul says that film viewing functions 
as therapy for mental or emotional pain, they are not speaking metaphorically. Nor is Guattari, 
who echoes their faith with conviction when he asserts, “It is even possible for a film to upset 
our whole existence” (2009b: 266).  
The minor films of anti-psychiatry that populate the pages of this study are comprised of 
images that perceive the therapeutic potential of encountering alterity, creating common planes 
of experience, and building alterious relationships predicated on sustainable and mutually 
beneficial Indigenous values. They broaden perception from the limits of the clinical gaze to 
critically re-envision a speculative and eventfully-contingent etiology, symptomatology and 
therapy of melancholy embedded in the dynamism of diverse relational fields of subjectivity 
production. In turn, as these films are folded into the world’s assemblages at large, their images 
offer themselves up as “vectors of subjectification” (Guattari 1995: 25) on the chance that they 
may catalyze the sorts of subjective recompositions that they go to such lengths to picture.  
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How these types of images are taken up remains to be seen, and the effects of these 
artists’ concern for melancholy and investment in a relational therapy of the encounter cannot yet 
be assessed. But one thing is for certain: through aesthetic experimentation, they have initiated a 
process of re-existentializing and re-politicizing the depression pandemic, and made it possible 
to act, politically and therapeutically, in the midst of a crisis whose subjective dimension has 






i  For more statistics on depression see the World Health Organization’s factsheet (2016a).  
  
ii Politicians are increasingly making mental health a policy priority. Take for example the UK 
secretary of health Jeremy Hunt’s recent admission that mental health services are the NHS’s 
greatest area of weakness, and his subsequent announcement of £1.4 billion for children and 
young people’s mental health care (Campbell 2016: n.p.). In Canada, mental health funding has 
become a hot-button issue in failing budgetary negotiations between the federal government and 
the provinces, due largely to Federal Health Minister Jane Philpott’s insistence “that billions in 
new federal money be devoted specifically to mental health care” (Curry 2016: n.p.). 
 
iii A recent meta-analysis published in the American Psychological Association’s Psychology 
Bulletin shows that Cognitive Behaviour Therapy is proving less and less effective as a treatment 
for depression (Johnsen and Friborg 2015). In the UK, more than a million people have received 
free CBT as part of a public health inititative that economist Richard Layard launched with the 
help of Oxford psychologist David Clark (Burkeman 2016; Department of Health 2012). Despite 
these massive governmental efforts, rates of mental illnesses such as depression are still higher 
than ever in the UK (Campbell 2016).  
 
There is also a mounting body of literature that questions the effectiveness of psychotropic drugs 
prescribed in treating depression and points to the economic incetives in place for maintaining 
their primary role in treatment programs. One of the best summaries of this literature comes from 
Marcia Angell, the former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine. In “The Epidemic of 
Mental Illness: Why?,” a lengthy 2011 review of three authoritative books, she makes echo the 
criticisms found in Irving Kirsch’s The Emperor’s New Drugs: Exploding the Antidepressant 
Myth; Robert Whitaker’s Anatomy of an Epidemic: Magic Bullets, Psychiatric Drugs, and the 
Astonishing Rise of Mental Illness in America; and Daniel Carlat’s Unhinged: The Trouble With 
Psychiatry—A Doctor’s Revelations About a Profession in Crisis). She describes the books as 
“powerful indictments of the way psychiatry is now practiced” and she recounts in some detail 
how they “document the ‘frenzy’ of diagnosis, the overuse of drugs with sometimes devastating 
side effects, and widespread conflicts of interest” (Angell 2011b: n.p.).  
 
The criticisms that Angell shares is corroborated by trends in the medical literature. For a recent 
patient-level meta-analysis that has raised doubts about the effectiveness of SSRIs for “milder 
forms” of depression, see Fournier et al. 2012.  
 
 
iv Depression recurrence statistics show “50 percent of those who recover from a first episode of 
depression having one or more additional episodes in their lifetime, and approximately 80 
percent of those with a history of two episodes having another recurrence” (Burcasa and Iacono 
2007:  960) 
 
For depression recurrence statistics, see Burcasa and Iacono’s “Risk for Recurrence in 
Depression.”  
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v For more on moving past the binary between “culture” and the “individual,” a true “chicken 
and the egg problem,” see Brian Massumi’s chapter “The Political Economy of Belonging and 
the Economy of Relation” in Parables for the Virtual. Massumi explains, “it is an absurdity to 
speak of them as if they were discrete entities that enter into extrinsic relation to one another, let 
alone to wonder which term takes precedence over the other in determining stasis and change…. 
In other words they might be seen as differential emergences from a shard realm of relationality 
that is one with becoming—and belonging” (71).  
 
vi In The Birth of the Clinic, the term “medical gaze” (regard médical) is sometimes translated by 
A.M. Sheridan as “medical perception,” as an acquiescence to the unprepared reader (2003: vii). 
 
vii Foucault clearly writes: “It seems to me that insofar as power is a procedure of 
individualization, the individual is only the effect of power” (2006: 15). 
 
viii A word of caution is warranted here. Like many of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts, the 
concept of assemblage proves quite malleable across their two bodies of work. In their rereading 
of structuralist linguistics in A Thousand Plateaus, the most systematic development of the 
concept distinguishes between “machinic assemblages” and “collective assemblages of 
enunciation” which together comprise the two poles of the “abstract machine’s” horizontal axis. 
The machinic assemblages are segments of content and the collective assemblages of enunciation 
are segments of expression. These poles of the abstract machine’s horizontal axis are paired with 
a vertical axis that stretches from deterritorialization to reterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987: 88). In various other texts, particularly those authored solely by Guattari, the distinction 
between machinic assemblages and collective assemblages of enunciation starts to collapse. For 
example, Guattari’s later essays cited in this study, such as Schizoanalytic Cartographies and 
“Subjectivities, for Better and for Worse” make next to no mention of “machinic assemblages” 
and are wholly preoccupied with the pragmatics of collective assemblages of enunciation. One 
reason for this slight but significant terminological shift could be that by the late 1980s and early 
1990s, Guattari had already justified the expressivity of content and no longer felt the need to 
dialogue with the postulates of Saussurean linguistics in the same way.  
 
ix The François Dosse biography, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives, recounts 
Guattari’s recurring struggles with depression. A collection of Guattari’s essays from the 1980s 
even bears the title The Winter Years (Les années d’hiver) in reference to the severe depression 
he experienced towards the end of his life (Dosse 16-17; 425-427). 
 
x For a Canadian example of a highly concerted corporate media effort to reify psychiatric 
power’s understanding of mental illness, see the Bell “Let’s Talk” campaign.  
 






                                                                                                                                                             
xii These symptoms are by no means exhaustive. Art cinema’s melancholy aesthetics is much 
more extensive than the case studies that comprise the following pages, and I claim no interest in 
reconsolidating a definitive list of symptoms. The inherent ambiguity of the term “melancholy” 
offers the advantage of sidestepping the clinical drive towards establishing sharply defined 
disorders. 
 
xiii Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky and Fritz Saxl’s Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the 
History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art is the touchstone text on melancholy’s various 
historical iterations.  
 
xiv See Aristotle’s “Brilliance and Melancholy” in Radden’s The Nature of Melancholy.  
 
xv See Theresa of Avila’s “Melancholy Nuns’ in Radden’s The Nature of Melancholy. 
 
xvi See Baudelaire’s “Autumn Song” and “Spleen” in Radden’s The Nature of Melancholy. 
 
xvii The ossification of the term “melancholia” is attributable to the fact that his “Mourning and 
Melancholia” essay has been so heavily influential in 20th Century thought, effectively eclipsing 
all previous iterations of melancholy and melancholia and cementing the latter term as the one of 
serious study. In all fairness to Freud, he himself was sure to acknowledge the hypothetical 
nature of his theory, and “from the outset drops all claims to general validity for our 
conclusions” (Freud 1957: 237). 
 
xviii My use of the term therapy here, and throughout the study, should not be confused with the 
personalist connotations that the term comes loaded with, and that Anti-Oedipus rails against. 
Dana L. Cloud describes the connotations as follows: “the discursive pattern of translating social 
and political problems into the language of individual responsibility and healing is a rhetoric 
because of its powerful persuasive force” and its rhetoric a form of “therapy” because “of its 
focus on the personal life of the individual as a locus of both problem and responsibility for 
change” (xiv).  
 
xix The term “therapeutic activism” is inspired by Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi and Josep Rafanell i 
Orra. Channeling the ethos coursing through Guattari’s life work, Bifo writes, “Political action 
must happen according to modalities analogous to therapeutic intervention” (2009: 140). 
Rafannell i Orra reinforces this idea by exposing how psychotherapeutic services of all kinds 
have become an uncritical appendage of the neoliberal economy, indissociable from new 
technologies of control, which he calls, “therapeutic capitalism” (Rafanell i Orra 268). He goes 
on to make a claim very similar to Bifo, and equally indebted to Guattari, when he writes: 
“Healing, before wanting to ask, ‘How can I heal?’ presupposes a prior question: ‘What world 
must be actualized?’” (2011: 284.) 
 
xx Lars von Trier’s Melancholia (2011) clearly springs to mind here, as does recent Hollywood 
fare such as Silver Lining’s Playbook (2012), Helen (2009), Side Effects (2013) and 




                                                                                                                                                             
 
xxi The four criteria that Galt and Schoonover identify can be summarized as follows: an “impure 
spectator at the level of textual address and in the history of its audiences”, “ambivalence with 
regards to location,” an “ambivalent relationship to stardom and authorship,” and lastly, a 
“troubling of genre” (6-8). 
 
xxii Andrew gives the example of Taiwanese auteur Edward Yang who refused to let Yi-Yi be 
screened in the country where it was shot (Andrew: x). 
 
xxiii The defining frameworks for understanding art cinema has traditionally been split into two 
camps: one which conceives of art cinema as institution, the other as an aesthetic practice or 
genre. Steve Neale advocates the former approach in his widely read essay Screen article, “Art 
Cinema as Institution.” The latter approach is derived from David Bordwell’s equally well-
recognized essay, “The Art Cinema as a Mode of Film Practice.” 
 
xxiv A defining characteristic of Schanelec’s oeuvre is its wandering protagonists who move drift 
beyond zones of local belonging. For example, Marseille (2004) follows a woman who travels 
between and the city in southern France, and in her more recent Orly (2010) is shot in the Orly 
airport as an homage to Jacques Tati’s interstitial epic Playtime (1967). 
 
xxv The bibliographic information of the publications that Andrew references here is as follows : 
Jean Mitry, Esthétique et psychologie du cinéma (Paris: Éditions Universitaires; 1963, (vol. I), 
and 1965 (vol. II); Christian Metz, “Le Cinema: Langue ou langage?,”  Communications, no. 4 
(1964): 52-90. 
 
xxvi The radical changes of the post-1968 intellectual landscape coincides with the emergence of 
film studies departments in American universities, and what could be identified as the first 
widespread institutionalization of the study of film in North America. However, the study of film 
took place in more uncoordinated ways and with less of a disciplinary focus during previous 
decades of the 20th Century. For a detailed history of the study of film in America in the decades 
preceding World War II, see Dana Polan’s highly regarded book Scenes of Instruction: The 
Beginnings of the U.S. Study of Film.    
 
xxvii In his essay “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?” Deleuze explains how structuralism 
conceives of a subject that could not be differentiated from the structure that gives rise to it. He 
writes: “The subject is precisely the agency [instance] which follows the empty place: as Lacan 
says, it is less subject than subjected [assujetti]—subjected to the empty square, subjected to the 
phallus and to its displacements” (Deleuze 2004: 190). 
 
xxviii Of course, the logic of this train of thought never really matched up with how actual 
psychoanalysts made contributions to their field, since many historical examples exist of analysts 
finding inspiration for new psychoanalytic theories in the arts. Writers such as Julia Kristeva and 





                                                                                                                                                             
xxix Dudley Andrew offers a description of the dream that parallels the film image in modern film 
theory: “To Freud the contents of the unconscious are truly inaccessible. Dreams and images 
themselves are only representations of the real forces giving rise to them, forces which are 
constitutionally repressed” (Andrew 1984: 139).  
 
xxx Accelerationism is an orientation within political theory that espouses the acceleration of 
capitalist processes in the name of bringing out its contradictions and prompting the eventual 
demise of capitalism. For more on the topic and its historical antecedents see #Accelerate: The 
Accelerationist Reader. 
 
xxxi One of ways that Deleuze crafts a film theory based on the image as event is through a 
seemingly simple yet highly significant gesture: he writes about images rather than the imaginary 
(Mullarkey 2009: 180).   
 
xxxii Neoliberalism’s power to produce subjectivity is what Brian Massumi terms “ontopower.” In 
his book The Power at the End of the Economy, he describes it as follows: “An ontopower, as a 
power of becoming, is a creative power. The economic model, Foucault said, is now one of 
existence itself. Existence itself: where being is becoming” (15). 
 
xxxiii The English translation of this collection of essays on minor cinema can be found in the 
“Cinemachines” section of Chaosophy: Texts and Interviews 1972-1977, p. 235-273.  
 
xxxiv See the chapter entitled “Politics” in Molecular Revolution in Brazil (Guattari, Félix and 
Suely Rolnik. Trans. Karel Clapshow and Brian Holmes. Cambridge and London: Semiotext(e), 
2007.) 
 
xxxv Fabulation is a term that Deleuze borrows from the French philosopher Henri Bergson. For 
more on the concept of fabulation in cinema see Erin Manning’s introduction Nocturnal 
Fabulations: Ecology, Vitality Opacity in the Cinema of Apichatpong. Also see Janelle 
Blankenship, “Preface”, in the Polygraph special issue on Deleuze. Issue 14, pages 3-15. 
 
xxxvi Interestingly, Peter Weiss (1910-1982), like Deleuze and Guattari, was inspired by Franz 
Kafka’s modernist writing. Many of his German-language novels and plays were written in a 
minimalist and estranged style. 
 
xxxvii
 Early film theorists such as Béla Balázs and Hugo Munsterberg were enamoured with the 
psychological dimension of cinema, and even considered psychological expressivity to be one of 
the cinema’s defining features, distinguishing it from otherwise comparable art forms such as 
theatre. For an example of this perspective, see Balázs’ Theory of the Film as well as 
Munsterberg’s The Film: A Psychological Study. 
 
xxxviii Bazin’s history of film style has found a renewed importance for contemporary authors who 
have attempted to broach the “crisis of indexicality” that has accompanied the shift from analog 




                                                                                                                                                             
Cinema Is!), D.N. Rodowick (The Virtual Life of Film) and André Gaudreault (The End of 
Cinema? A Medium in Crisis in the Digital Age). David Bordwell’s authoritative On the History 
of Film Style is also heavily influenced by Bazin’s distinction between the imagists and the 
formalists, and the book investigates cinematic techniques such as montage and découpage, 
which for Bordwell’s reading of Bazin, structures the division between these two tendencies of 
the cinema. 
 
xxxix It should go without saying that by using the word “partial” here to refer to how German 
expressionism and Italian neorealism each directly access only one half of the psycho-social 
binary, I by no means intend to impart a slighted value judgment. Both cinemas artistically 
flourished within the means and concerns particular to it, and fulfilled its historical role in 
Bazin’s dialectic of film language. They are “partial” only in the sense that they have committed 
their aesthetic fidelity to one half of the psyche-social binary.  
 
xl In his essay, “Pasolini’s Exquisite Flowers: The ‘Cinema of Poetry’ as a Theory of Art 
Cinema,” John David Rhodes also makes the argument that the cinema of poetry grows out of 
“the experiments of [Italian] neorealism” (149).  
 
xli For an example of this standard film-historical demarcation, see David A. Cook’s A History of 
Narrative Film, page 363. Kristin Thompson and David Bordwell are more flexible in marking 
the end of Italian neorealism, but also admit, “By the early 1950s, the Neorealist impulse had 
spent its force” (333). See page 331 of their Film History: An Introduction for a timeline of the 
movement that ends with Voyage to Italy.  
 
xlii
 In his “Mental Landscapes” essay in Cinema Journal, Justin Horton makes recourse to 
Voyage to Italy argue convingly that Bazin was much more nuanced than the “naive realist” that 
critics writing in the political modernist tradition accused him of being, precisely because his 
theory of realism took account of both the subjective and objective poles of the image and 
anticipated Pasolini's discovery of the free indirect subjective in 1965. 
 
xliii
 Commenting on these “surprising” architectural landscapes and “direct aesthetic” expressive 
of this psychological dimension, Jacques Rivette boldly hailed Voyage to Italy as an example of 
“modern cinema” (Rivette 1985: 192, 198). Some Italian critics, like Guido Aristarco, saw this 
“modern” development as a regression, a slippery slope away from the supposed purity of 
neorealism's earlier years. Yet in his essay “Defence of Rossellini,” Bazin countered this 
criticism by advancing an understanding of neorealism as “an ideal” that is only “approached 
more or less” (Bazin 2005: 127). For Bazin, there is no neorealist purity to be lost, only a 
creative striving for fidelity to the events it depicts. 
 
xliv
 Neorealism’s faith in a particularly social reality explains why the controversial miracle 
sequence at the end of Voyage to Italy is, as Bazin points out, a very particular type of miracle, 
that Rosselini claims is nothing but “noise and crowd movements that people are in the habit of 
calling a miracle” (Bazin 2011: 170). Rossellini approaches even the most supernatural scene 




                                                                                                                                                             
integrity of its plastic surface (which in this case happens to be crowd movements). 
 
xlv It is noteworthy that Deleuze’s rereading of Pasolini’s essay on the cinema of poetry detaches 
the free indirect schema from the model of auterist agency, especially since one of the common 
critiques of Deleuze’s cinema books their adherence to the Cahiers du cinema canon of great 
auteurs. While his books do certainly deploy the auteurist canon to construct a taxonomy of 
cinematic signs, he privileges above all else the impersonal and machinic quality of the 
cinematic image-as-event and the quantum of experience that it expresses.  
 
xlvi Simondon’s concept of the transindividual is not to be confused with the more widespread 
notion of “intersubjectivity” or interactivity between individuals. He clearly distinguishes the 
concept of the transindividual from what he calls the “interindividual.” Whereas the 
interindividual “goes from individual to individual” but “does not penetrate individuals,” 
(Simondon 1989: 191), the transindividual “characterizes the real relation between all interiority 
and exteriority with regards to the individual” (1995: 281). 
 
 
xlvii Film studies scholars John Orr and John David Rhodes have argued that contemporary art 
cinema is the inheritor of the cinema of poetry. In his foreword to Contemporary Cinema, Orr 
singles out the cinema of poetry as “a dominant and guiding feature in the development of the 
cinema over the last thirty years [1960s-1990s]” (ix) and in his essay, “Pasolini’s Exquisite 
Flowers,” Rhodes asserts that Pasolini’s cinema of poetry essay provides the theoretical basis for 
a discrete mode of political filmmaking called “art cinema” (which differs from Bordwell’s 
depoliticized formulation of the term) (see pages 151, 154 and 158-159 in particular in 
Bordwell’s On the History of Film Style)  
 
xlviii A transindividual conception of psychology conceives of the psyche and the social much in 
the same way that Brian Massumi describes individuals and societies as “not only empirically 
inseparable,” but “strictly simultaneous and consubstantial” (Massumi 2002: 71). As 
simultaneous and consubstantial, neither precedes nor produces the other, because they are not 
discreet entities. Instead, they “can be seen as products, effects, coderivatives of an immanent 
relation that would be change in itself. In other words, they might be seen as differential 
emergences from a shared realm of relationality that is one with becoming—and belonging” 
(Massumi 2002: 71). Psychology, in the Simondonian sense, is this immanent relation (“exterior 
to its terms”); “change in itself,” whose relational movements produce singular psychosocial 
compositions where “individual” and “society” can only be spoken of as abstractions out from 
the psychosocial event. 
 
xlix In his essay on the Berlin School, film critic Dennis Lim cites Antonioni as an influential 
predecessor of this “cinema of drift and alienation” (89).  
 
l Film critic Merten Worthmann is credited as being the first to use the term “Berlin School,” 
though not without some confusion. In their article on the history of the Berlin School first 




                                                                                                                                                             
Baute, Ekkehard Knrer, Volker Pantenburg, Stefan Pethke and Simon Rothler originally 
identified Rainer Gansera as coining the term in his article on Angela Schanelec, Thomas Arslan 
and Christian Petzold, “Glücks-Pickpocket” (“Pickpocket of Happiness”) published 
in Süddeutsche Zeitung on November 3, 2001. After the publication they “received an email 
from the film critic Rüdiger Suchsland in which he pointed out that the term ‘Berlin School’ had 
already been used prior to this date, namely by Merten Worthmann in Die Zeit. In an article 
entitled ‘Mit Vorsicht genießen’ (‘To be taken with a pinch of salt’) on Angela Schanelec’s Mein 
langsames Leben (Passing Summer), Worthmann writes: ‘… watching the films of the ‘Berlin 
School’, one notices a very similar treatment of time and space’ ” (Baute et al.: n.p.). 
 
li For a more exhaustive list of the Berlin School filmmakers, particularly one that is sensitive to 
the chronology of how its two different waves have emerged, see Marco Abel’s canon-forming 
text The Counter-Cinema of the Berlin School. 
 
lii The Berlin School’s absence of a manifesto seems all the more glaring when the movement is 
considered in light of its direct historical antecedent, the New German Cinema and its 
Oberhausen manifesto. These two movements constitute German Cinema’s two “new waves” but 
are not to be confused with one another despite their sometimes being referred to with the same 
terminology. In French film criticism, it is common to see the Berlin School referred to as la 
nouvelle vague allemande.  
 
liii The Berlin School is made up of truly contemporary filmmakers, not only in the sense that it is 
a fairly recent film movement (originating in the mid-1990s), but more significantly because all 
of their films take place in the moment of their production. The Berlin School is typically 
characterized by a stark focus on the daily lives of historically insignificant people. This began to 
change in 2012, when two of the movement’s foremost auteurs (Christian Petzold and Thomas 
Arslan) released historical dramas Barbara (2012), Gold (2013) and Phoenix (2014). Petzold and 
Arslan are two of the movement’s founding figures, but I think their turn to the historical drama 
constitutes a break from the original ethos of the Berlin School, and should thus be considered as 
the start of a new phase whose developmental arc is still not entirely intelligible. Ulrich Köhler 
has also recently modified his aesthetic strategies, evidenced by Sleeping Sickness (2013) which 
ends on a magical realist note. As a way to make the point that some of the movement’s directors 
have began searching for new forms and strategies, Berlin School auteur Christoph Hochhäusler 
has declared, “school’s out” (Hochhäusler 28). 
 
liv Freud writes: “Conflicts between the ego and the ideal…ultimately reflect the contrast 




lv Materialist reductionism is a cluster of beliefs within neuroscience research that explains all 
human experience, especially mental illness, in terms of biological processes. Jeffrey Schwartz 
explains this position as follows: “To the mainstream materialist way of thinking, only the 




                                                                                                                                                             
Begley 2002: 24). It is easy to see how such a perspective is commensurate with the 
depoliticization of mental illness since it completely disengages the brain from the psychosocial 
field of relation and its conditioning by power.  
 
 
lvi Even though neuroscience has nothing to say on the question of how the plasticity of the brain 
is conditioned by the operations of power in the field of its emergence, philosophers of the brain 
do not miss out on this crucial point. Drawing on the work of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello 
in The New Spirit of Capitalism, there are moments where the Deriddean philosopher Catherine 
Malabou echoes, perhaps unconsciously, Deleuze’s formulation of the brain as a decentralized 
eventful screen composed in tandem with the psychosocial flows of desire. Malabou writes: 
“Neuronal functioning and social functioning interdetermine each other and mutually give each 
other form (here again the power of plasticity) to the point where it is no longer possible to 
distinguish between them” (Malabou 2008: 9). As a result, “the functional plasticity of the brain 
deconstructs its function as the central organ and generates the image of a fluid process, 
somehow present everywhere and nowhere, which places the outside and the inside in contact…” 
(Malabou 2008: 35). 
 
lvii For more on this shift from the “psy” to the “neuro” see Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-
Rached’s Neuro: The New Brain Sciences and the Management of the Mind. 
 
lviii The difference between potential and possibility is an important distinction to make, since 
foreclosure of potential for subjective recomposition, when the brain begins to feel like the 
unforgiving boundary of a one-way movement, is what signals that melancholy has settled into 
the event’s plasticity. In a blog post about Whitehead and Kant’s influence on Deleuze, Steven 
Shaviro offers a concise and instructive reading of the possible. He elaborates as follows: 
For Deleuze, the possible is an empty form, defined only by the principle of non-
contradiction. To say that something is possible is to say nothing more than that its 
concept cannot be excluded a priori, on logical grounds alone. This means that possibility 
is a purely negative category; it lacks any proper being of its own. Mere possibility is not 
generative or productive; it is not enough to make anything happen. (Shaviro: n.p). 
Whereas potential, on the other hand, is a positive and productive quality: it perpetually 
introduces novelty into the movement of the event, producing real change (Massumi 2011: 1-2) 
 
lix The article prompted a minor scuffle with New Yorker critic Richard Brody, who took 
exception to the premise of Scott’s article that America has never before had a neorealist film 
movement. Scott replies to Brody’s criticisms in a New York Times blog post that reiterates his 
vision of neorealism and why the American films that Brody cites do not fit the category. The 
exchange is also notable for how it teases out the often-held assumption, this time advanced by 
Brody, that neorealism puts “emphasis on outer life at the expense of inner life.” See Brody’s 
“About Neo-Neo Realism” and “A.O. Scott Responds to New Yorker Blog on the Value and 





                                                                                                                                                             
lx In interview with Mary Zournazi, Brian Massumi points to this problem with hope, particularly 
when it is future oriented and connected to expected success. He opts for the concepts of belief 
and affect that allow for a lived immersion and belonging in the world. See their interview in the 
book: Zournazi, Mary. Hope: New Philosophies for Change. New York: Routledge, 2003.  
 
 
lxi It is no coincidence that American Neo-Neorealism came to fruition at the very same moment 
that Obama rode a carefully manufactured wave of populist hope right into the White House. 
Looking back, this film movement offers a sober skepticism towards American macropolitics 
that anticipates how Obama’s presidency failed to resolve the economic, and especially racial, 
injustices that his campaign promised to address. 
 
lxii The growth of depression, melancholy and exhaustion within activist milieus, and activist 
responses to this phenomenon have inspired the writings in various online venues. For one high 
quality contribution to these discussions that received a lot of attention in 2014 is the Plan C 
collective’s “We Are All Very Anxious.” 
 
lxiii Deleuze distinguishes between the movement-image and the time-image based on their 
relationship to the signaletic force of time. He writes: “As long as signs find their material in the 
movement-image, as long as they form the singular expressional features, from a material in 
movement, they are in danger of evoking another generality which would lead to their being 
confused with a language. The representation of time can be extracted from this only by 
association and generalization, or as concept. Such is the ambiguity of the sensory-motor 
schema, agent of abstraction. It is only when the sign opens directly on to time, when time 
provides the signaletic material itself, that the type, which has become temporal, coincides with 
the feature of singularity separated from its motor associations” (2007: 42-43).  
 
lxiv Brian Massumi provides an authoritative and concise definition of speculative pragmatism in 
Semblance and Event. He writes: “The speculative aspect relates to the character of potential 
native to the world’s activity, as expressed eventfully in the taking place of change. The 
pragmatic aspect has to do with how, in the taking-definite-shape of potential in a singular 
becoming, the relational and qualitative poles co-compose as formative forces” (Massumi 2011: 
12). 
 
lxv In David Lapoujade’s article on the presence of James in What is Philosophy?, he writes 
explicitly that “pure experience” “is the name that William James gives to the plane of 
immanence” (2000: 190). In that very book, Deleuze and Guattari make clear that belief takes 
place on the plane of immanence. They write: “It may be that to believe in this world, in this life, 
has become our most difficult task, the task of a mode of existence to be discovered on our plane 
of immanence today” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 75).  
 
lxvi The importance of habit to the production of subjectivity opens Deleuze’s study of Hume and 
human nature. “We are habits, nothing but habits – the habit of saying ‘I’. Perhaps there is no 




                                                                                                                                                             
 
lxvii A “three-shot” is a film studies term that refers to three people being framed by the same 
shot. “The terms one-, two-, and three-shots are used to describe shots framing one, two, or three 
people – usually in medium close-ups or medium shots” (Hayward 2000: 328). 
 
lxviii This approach which I expound here, and which is enacted by the films discussed in this 
project, is a variance on the pragmatic type of analysis encouraged by William James. For James, 
there two interrelated ways of studying every psychological state: “First, the way of analysis: 
What does it consist in? What is its inner nature? Of what sort of mind-stuff is it composed? 
Second, the way of history: What are its conditions of production, and its connection with other 
facts?” (James 2005a: 59). Both of these lines of inquiry are absent from the psychiatric gaze 
which has little to no interest in the qualities or histories of the assemblages animating 
psychological states, but solely in their visible and quantifiable residual effects—symptoms that 
can be supressed through psychiatric treatment. 
 
lxix For examples of other indexical readings of Bazin, see Brigitte Peucker’s The Material Image 
and Francesco Casetti’s “Style as site of negotiation: the case of realism and neo-realism.” 
 
lxx Also see Gunning’s “Moving Away from the Index” in differences: Journal of Feminist 
Cultural Studies. In this article Gunning builds on his critique of semiological approaches to 
film. “The index,” he writes, “may not be the best way, and certainly should not be the only way, 
to approach the issue of cinematic realism” (Gunning 2007: 31).  
 
lxxi It is worth noting that the Bazinian definition parallels how C.S Peirce defines the index, as 
not needing a mediator or interpreter. Peirce writes: “An Index is a sign which refers to the 
object that it denotes by virtue of it being really affected by that Object” (Peirce 1974: 143, my 
emphsasis). Wollen, Rosen and the standardized interpretation of the index, tends to miss this 
earlier emphasis found in Peirce’s original writings on the topic. See Peirce’s essay, “Division of 
Signs.” 
 
lxxii Étienne Souriau offers the founding definition of the profilmic: “The opposite of the afilmic: 
everything that really exists in the world (ie. The flesh and blood actor; the studio’s art design, 
etc.), but which is specifically destined for cinematographic use; notably, everything found in 
front of the camera and impressed onto the films strip” (Souriau 1953: 8). The issue with this sort 
of conceptualization of the relationship between image and reality is that it mitigates the 
relational dynamic of the act of filming. The profilmic connotes a stable world of actuality that 
wholly lends itself to the recording apparatus. One the other hand, the plane of immanence is 
pure virtuality. Kelly Reichardt shows that the cinema of poetry is capable of composing with 
these virtual forces, as imperceptible, or afilmic, as they may be, and making them felt through 
the stylistic and temporal composition of the image, attesting to their truth.  
 





                                                                                                                                                             
lxxiv An exception to this rule of thumb is Kohler’s recent film Sleeping Sicknes which abandons 
the Berlin School’s original aesthetic strategies, possibly after having been influenced by 
Apichatpong Weerasethakul. 
 
lxxv For an autobiographical account of Apichatpong’s intimate relationship to the occupation and 
more anecdotes about the role that the jungle plays in Apichatpong's engagement with the Thai 
political unconscious, see “A Memory of Nabua. A Note on the Primitive Project” in 
Weerasethakul (2009a: 192–206). 
 
lxxvi Isaan is still today one of the most economically disadvantaged regions of Thailand, making 
it a bastion of red shirt sympathies with an antagonistic relationship to yellow shirt urbanites In 
2005–2006 the Thai People’s Alliance for Democracy or colloquially, the Yellow Shirts, 
organized mass protests against former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra resulting in a coup 
d’état. The pro- and anti-Thaksin tensions continue to dominate the Thai political landscape with 
a subsequent political crisis in 2008 and yet another coup d’état which deposed Thaksin’s 
younger sister and business magnate Yingluck Shinawatra in 2014. 
 
lxxvii Censorship is an active challenge to politicized filmmaking in Thailand, and Apichatpong 
Weerasethakul is one of the nation's most prominent voices of opposition to the censorship 
legislation in place. The Motion Pictures and Video Act B.E. 2551 (2008) recently modified the 
1930 Film Act implemented a new rating system, yet it still allows for the state to ban films from 
being shown in the Kingdom if they are deemed by the National Film and Video Committee 
(which includes the nation’s chief of police) to “undermine social order or moral decency, or that 
might have an impact on the security and pride of the nation” (Rithdee 2007). For Apichatpong’s 
critique of the (then proposed) legislation, see Weerasethakul (2009b).  
 
lxxviii Philip Rosen (1996) sets up the nation/anti-nation dialectic in order to emphasize how there 
exists an anti-national component that always troubles national cinemas. 
 
lxxix See Casella (1970) for a historical account of how communist insurgency in Thailand is tied 
to the political activities of Chinese and Vietnamese minorities based in Khon Kaen (the city 
where Apichatpong would later grow up). Alpern (1975) also outlines the ethnic and linguistic 
makeup of the northeast and its importance to the Communist Party of Thailand’s guerrilla 
strategies in the 1950s–60s. Thomas (1986) traces the rise and decline of Communist Party 
organization in Thailand from the 1960s through to the 1980s. 
 
lxxx I use the term “repressed” here because it best articulates the psychic and social character of 
the targeted militarized purging seen in Isaan province. In Deleuze and Guattari's chapter “Social 
Respression and Psychic Repression” in Anti-Oedipus (1983) they detail how psychic repression 
and social repression reproduce and reinforce one another, in order to prevent desire's 
revolutionary force from disrupting established social structures. This psychosocial conception 
of repression posits that both desiring production and repression are inherently collective acts 
which condition the life of an ecology and thus overrun the limits of Freud's individualized 




                                                                                                                                                             
repression throughout this paper should not be confused with repression as used in the more 
limited Freudian sense, wherein repression is “an operation whereby the subject attempts to 
repel, or to confine to the unconscious, representations (thoughts, images, memories) which are 
bound to an instinct. Repression occurs when to satisfy an instinct – though likely to be 
pleasurable in itself – would incur the risk of provoking unpleasure because of other 
requirements” (Laplanche and Pontalis 1988: 390).  
 
lxxxi I use the term “découpage” here mostly in the Bazinian spirit of the term that Timothy 
Barnard evokes in his updated translation of What is Cinema?. For Barnard's Bazin, découpage 
is “editing’s corollary at the mise-en-scène stage of production” and a way of “organizing the 
profilmic” (2009: 265, 279). Bazin has also referred to découpage as “composition and camera 
movement” (2009: 264) and as “the aesthetic of the relationship between shots” (as they are 
conceived, Barnard tells us, not as they are edited) (2009: 264). Elsewhere, Noël Burch (1981: 4) 
has described découpage as the “underlying structure of the finished film”, which Barnard argues 
should in fact be called “formal treatment” (2009: 264). In spite of Burch’s apparent blindness to 
the fact that the process of découpage starts longs before the film is finished and can be used to 
discuss creative aspects of film production, Burch’s notion of “underlying structure” best 
encapsulates how découpage can be seen and felt in a film. In the following analysis my use of 
the term then borrows from both Burch and Barnard as I use the term to speak simultaneously of 
the film’s underlying formal structure (of which editing certainly plays a part in determining), its 
shot composition, as well as the aesthetic relationship between shots as they are conceived and 
then edited in line with this guiding directorial vision. I opt to analyze the film’s “découpage” 
rather than solely its “editing” because “découpage” holds onto the importance of shot 
composition (which is inextricable from how a film like this is structured and later edited) and 
also because it recognizes that the film's underlying structure is given birth in the filmmaker’s 
mind before being shot, and that the editing of the film is then carried out in line with this 
original vision, in order to actualize it, rather than suppress it, by cutting it up into short takes 
that are easily digested by the commercial spectator. 
 
lxxxii Découpage en plan américain refers to the logic of shot organization at work in classical 
Hollywood studio era productions. See the chapter on découpage in David Bordwell’s History of 
Film Style (1997) for a discussion of this term (which contrasts quite sharply with Timothy 
Barnard's later usage of the term découpage in his footnotes to the translation of What is 
Cinema?).  
 
lxxxiii For Deleuze, the outside is “always an opening onto a future [where] nothing ends, since 
nothing has begun, but everything is transformed” (Deleuze 1988: 89). 
 
lxxxiv  While the opacity of the outside may not be a background, it nevertheless “re-introduces 
ambiguity into the structure of the image”, which for Bazin is one of the defining traits of 
découpage en profondeur (1997: 101). 
 
lxxxv Reality is here understood in a different sense than it often acquires within film studies 




                                                                                                                                                             
is a more specialized notion of the term that could be called “profilmic reality”. Profilmic reality 
is a term that comes from the work of Étienne Souriau and refers to the world that exists before 
the camera, which the camera then records (see Souriau’s L’Univers filmique (1953; 8). When I 
use the term reality here, I am speaking of an entirely different relationship between image and 
reality. What interests me is not how the camera adheres to a profilmic reality, or even how the 
camera is productive of reality (which studies of direct cinema documentaries have so frequently 
pointed out), but that the reality of the image is informed by ontological functors. The Fluxes of 
the image are really the only domain that exists in a reciprocal relationship with the profilmic 
reality. Values, Phlya, and the existential Territories of the self remain sensuously imperceptible, 
yet all still go into producing the reality of the image – what it really contains, what it really 
expresses, what it really does, and what effects it may really produce in the world. 
 
lxxxvi Erin Manning deploys the term relational movement to emphasize movement’s metastable 
and creative quality of “worlding”. For Manning, the relational movement of bodies in space 
literally creates the world in which the movement happens (creates the world through 
movement). For a discussion on relational movement, see Manning (2009). I use the term here to 
emphasize how the creative act of bringing a world into existence emerges immanent to the 
movement of the ontological functors at work in a given event, and how the body always carries 
these functors into the event via the very fact of its existence, and its potential for prompting 
movements in others that can invoke resubjectifying affects. 
 
lxxxvii For Guattari's original chart that lays out the co-compositions between actual and real, and 
virtual and possible in the ontological quandrants, see page 28 of Schizoanalytic Cartographies 
(2013).  
 
lxxxviii Thus Apichatpong's ecosophic aesthetic composition reflects what Brian Massumi has to 
say about how the entirety of the event always contains a nonsensuous component. “Even if the 
event's conditioning elements and culmination are actual, the entirety of the event is virtual: 
doubly nonlocal, nonsensuously present, registering only in effect, and on all three counts really 
abstract” (Massumi 2011: 24).  
 
lxxxix Some of these other films that use similar imagery as found in Boonmee’s dream sequence 
include the various shorts of The Primitive Project, A Letter to Uncle Boonmee and Phantoms of 
Nabua. 
 
xc Apichatpong explains the pertinence of his cinematic intervention into the contemporary Thai 
mediascape as follows: “The story of Nabua undeniably has echoes of the current political 
turmoil in Thailand. Institutions involved in those events of the past, along with new ones, are 
the key players in the ongoing chaos. Just as in the past, they manipulate the public psyche, 
instilling it with faith and fear” (Weerasethakul 2009a: 198). In the same piece he provides a 
further account of how he encountered the stories of Nabua’s military occupation while filming 





                                                                                                                                                             
xciActual occasions are the “final real things of which the world is made up”, they are “drops of 
experience, complex and interdependent” (Whitehead 1978: 27). Actual occasions emerge from 
process, and thus carry a selective function, for they never actualize all of the possibilities 
offered by the processual flow from one set of actual occasions to another.  
 
xcii Whitehead might have even considered Uncle Boonmee a historical adventure film, given its 
activation of the past: “[A]dventures are to the adventurous […] a passive knowledge of the past 
loses the whole value of its message” (Whitehead 1967: 279). 
 
xciii Quoted during a personal discussion with the filmmaker at the Cinemalaya Film Festival in 
August, 2015.  
 
xciv In his address, Barclay describes the emerging body of Fourth Cinema as follows: “Bedeviled 
(1993), by Aborigine film maker Tracey Moffatt; The Pathfinder, by Nils Gaup (1987), the 
Saami director of Norway. Smoke Signals (1998) has been out here fairly recently, directed by 
Chris Eyre of the Cheyenne and Arapaho peoples of Oregon in the USA; From producer and 
director Zacharias Kunuk of the Inuit peoples, we have Atanarjuat (The Fast Runner) (2001). 
There’s the feature of young Aborigine director, Ivan Sen: Beneath Clouds (2002). And a film 
just completed and released, a feature titled The Business of Fancy Dancing (2002), written and 
directed by Sherman Alexie of the Coeur d’Alene tribe of Indians....In this country [New 
Zealand], we have Mauri (1988), written and directed by Merata Mita; Once Were Warriors 
(1994), director Lee Tamahori; and released this year, Te Tangata Whai Rawa O Weneti (the 
Maori Merchant of Venice) (2004), directed by Don Selwyn, and the first of them Ngati, written 
by Tama Poata and directed by myself, released in 1985. And Te Rua (1992) which I wrote and 
directed” (Barclay 2003b: 7). 
 
xcv These definitions come from the online Maori dictionary. For each one of these terms to be 
understood in their complexity, a more intimate familiarity with the workings of Maori culture is 
needed. However, I use the translations above to offer at least some insight into the sorts of 
values that Barry Barclay imagines as essential to the Maori incarnation of Fourth Cinema. Each 
Indigenous cinema will embody its own culturally specific values. Over the course of this 
chapter I will present two of these values—“ingasiq” and “busong”—specific to the film 
Palawan Fate and the people of Palawan.  
 
xcvi Onkwehonwe: “the real and original people” (Alfred 1999: xv). 
 
xcvii Caro’s film McFarland, USA (2015) exemplified this trend in her work. The film was 
produced by Disney and focuses on a high school cross-country team of Mexican-American 
youth who, with the help of a white All-American coach and a dose of determination and 
discipline, manage to overcome their marginal socio-economic status.  
 
xcviii In their stunning article “Genocide and Indian Residential Schooling: The Past is Present,” 
Roland Chrisjohn et al. present a detailed history of how the Canadian government lobbied the 




                                                                                                                                                             
an effort to prevent the Indian residential school system in Canada from qualifying as an act of 
genocide.  
 
xcix For example, see Ernst Hunter and Desley Harvey’s “Indigenous Suicide in Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada and the United States” and Ann N. Dapice’s “The Medicine Wheel.”  
 
c A similar discourse and set of policy initiatives has appeared in the Australian Aboriginal 
context as well. Bringing them Home, a Report of the National Inquiry Into the Separation of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families was tabled in parliament in 
1997, and over a decade later, after the National Apology to the Stolen Generations took place in 
2008, the government allotted funds for the creation of the Healing Foundation, which was 
established in 2009. The foundation was established to “address the harmful legacy of 
colonization, in particular the history of child removal that continues to affect Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people” (Healing Foundation: n.p.).  
 
ci This statement of objective comes from the Aboriginal Healing Foundation cached website, 
www.ahf.ca. 
 
cii For example, Wasekun House in Cree nation, Quebec (Saint-Alphonse-Rodriguez), used the 
AHF support for “therapeutic techniques such as the Healing Circles, Drumming Ceremonies, 
Sacred Fired, the Cleansing Ceremonies, the Sweat Lodges and Traditional Feasts; and the 
Cognitive-Behavioural Techniques used by the Psychologists and the staff of the program such 
as relaxation training, systematic desensitization, assertion training, self-management and 
meditation are all used in accordance with standard practice in the field.” The Nunavik Regional 
Board of Health and Social Sciences provided sexual abuse training and a healing gathering of 
elders to address the issue in fourteen communities in the Nunavik region. To offer yet another 
example, the McLeod Lake Indian Band in British Columbia created a family development 
program to help recover the loss of parenting skills due to the residential school system’s 
separation of families. The AHF website includes a description of every project that it funded 
over the course of its history, so it is possible to see the different foci and approaches of different 
communities who accessed the fund. For a specific list of the different western, traditional and 
alternative therapeutic techniques used, see page 68 of the Aboriginal Healing Foundation’s 
Third Interim Evaluation Report of the Aboriginal Healing Foundation Program Activity. 
 
ciii Levi Nowdlak, a sexual abuse survivor and client of the Mamisarvik Healing Centre in 
Ottawa, testified to the positive impact that AHF programs have had on her life: “It changed 
things for me dramatically. I started loving myself more” (Zerehi: n.p.).  
 
civ Coulthard builds on the work of Stephanie Irlbacher-Fox, whose book Finding Dahshaa: Self-
Government, Social Suffering, and Aboriginal Policy in Canada also argues that the discourse on 
reconciliation denies the present colonial reality. Roland Chrisjohn et. al further this argument 
with respect to how the reconciliation discourse is used to obscure the historical reality of 





                                                                                                                                                             
cv The concept of restitution has been most forcefully advanced by Taiaiake Alfred. For a 
detailed account of its what it entails and how it dramatically differs from the liberal ideology of 
“reconciliation,” see Taiaiake Alfred’s “Restitution is the Real Pathway for Justice of Indigenous 
Peoples.”  
 
cvi For Glen Coulthard the problem with self-determination as it is presently practiced in Canada 
is that it is “a conciliatory form of settler-state recognition for Indigenous nations … that seeks to 
‘reconcile’ Indigenous assertions of nationhood with settler state sovereignty via the 
accommodation of Indigenous identity claims in some form of renewed legal and political 
relationship with the Canadian state” (Coulthard 2014: 24, 3). According to these “politics of 
recognition,” as Coulthard calls it, building on the work of Richard Day, First Nations “self-
determination” still incarnates a hierarchical relationship where First Nations are subservient to 
the colonial state. Expressing a parallel concern, Taiaiake Alfred convincingly advances the idea 
that “sovereignty” is an “inappropriate concept” when thinking about Indigenous liberation 
struggles because it pre-determines the ends of such struggles by attaching it to the state-form. 
See pages 55-72 of “Sovereignty – An Inappropriate Concept” in Peace, Power, Righteousness.  
 
cvii The term “Fourth World” was coined in George and Michael Poslun’s 1974 book The Fourth 
World: An Indian Reality. Manuel defines the Fourth World as the “indigenous peoples 
descended from a country’s aboriginal population and who today are completely or partly 
deprived of the right to their own territories and its riches” (40).  The term actually originated in 
conversation between Manuel and Mbuto Milando, who stated that “When Native peoples come 
into their own, on the basis of their own culture and traditions, that will be the Fourth World” 
(McFarlane 1993: 160).  
 
cviii The film’s producer Raymond Lee mentions that Solito’s Palawan heritage was hidden from 
him in a podcast by the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies Lecture Series at the University of 
Hawaii. 
 
cix The concept of weak ties originates in the influential sociology essay by Mark Granovetter 
“The Strength of Weak Ties.” Granovetter focused on how weak ties (relationships to friends 
and acquaintances) factored into employment searches. Charles Macdonald points out how weak 
ties are fundamental to the spirit of cooperation in Palawan economic, ritual and communal life. 
 
cx A similar idea is advanced by Mike Mitchell, former chief of the St. Regis Mohawks 
(Akwesasne) in the seminal work of early First Nations documentary, You Are on Indian Land. 
In the film, he confronts an Indian agent, and says “We never broke a treaty. That Jay Treaty, 
stated in there, that as the Indians we obliged to seize making wars on the white man.… When 
that treaty was broken, that meant that we must again have been at war with the white man. 
Because when you break a treaty, this is what it signifies.” 
 
cxi According to Taiaiake Alfred, Aboriginalism equals death for Indigenous peoples; it is a 
colonial ideology of assimilation that is being sold to Indigenous communities through 
comprador politicians that aim to turn Indigenous culture and land into cultural and natural 




                                                                                                                                                             
to Indigenous peoples that has not yet been assimilated. In this regard, we can see why colonial 
governments around the world are so at ease in abandoning the policies of complete cultural 
assimilation that characterized colonial policy up until the mid-20th Century, and was embodied 
by legislation prohibiting religious and cultural practices of Indigenous peoples, the forced 
conversion to Christianity, and adoption of colonial languages. Now, neocolonial governments 
view Indigenous languages, songs, dances, ceremonies and arts as marketable commodities of 
national prestige and as perfectly acceptable cultural products, as long as they do not interfere 
with the ongoing colonial project of converting Indigenous lands into “natural resources.” 
 
cxii The five main aspects of Eurocentrism according to Stam and Shohat are: 1. It projects a 
linear historical trajectory leading from classical Greece to metropolitan capitals to Europe and 
the USA, and it renders history a series of empires from Pax Romana to Pax Americana; 2. It 
attributes to the West an inherent progress towards democracy; 3. It elides non-European 
democratic traditions, while obscuring manipulations within Western democracies and masking 
their part in manipulating/subverting non-Western democracies; 4. It minimizes the West's 
oppressive practices by viewing them as contingent, accidental, exceptional; and 5. It 
appropriates the cultural and material production of non-Europeans while negating both their 
achievements and its own appropriation, in that way consolidating its own sense of self (Shohat 
and Stam: 2-3). 
cxiii It is worth pointing out the important differences between Deleuzian and Bergsonian 
fabulation. What for Deleuze is a revolutionary act constructive of “a people to come” that defies 
colonial mythology, originally appeared in Bergson as the reactionary function of society par 
excellence. For Bergson, fabulation “attaches man to life, and consequently individual to society, 
by telling him tales on par with those with which we lull children to sleep” (1935: 179). 
Fabulation is a necessity of social cohesion, a necessary fiction, that prevents man, who has been 
endowed with intelligence and can thus think of his own individual interests and foresee his own 
death, from acting egotistically or from being overwhelmed by his mortality. Fabulation ensures 
a moral order that keeps man socially productive. For these reasons, fabulation is a fundamental 
operation of religion in what Bergson terms “closed societies.” To consult Bergson’s use of the 
concept of fabulation see the chapter “Static Religion” in The Two Sources of Morality and 
Religion.  
  
cxiv Quoted in Chaosmosis p. 134.  
 
cxv This attitude is inspired by Bertrand Russell, who writes: “In studying a philosopher, the right 
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